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 This thesis consists of four essays in empirical development economics. The first three 
essays focus on macroeconomic topics, examining issues related to the business cycle, fiscal and 
monetary policy, whereas the last one is focusing on a microeconomic topic, namely the 
relationship between schooling and child labor.  
 The first contribution investigates the effectiveness of macroeconomic policies in the 
recoveries periods in the Middle East, North Africa and Pakistan (MENAP). It is found that 
fiscal policy played a key role during the recoveries to potential output, although with weaker 
effects for the countries in the region that are more open to trade; monetary policy is found to 
have been less effective. The second essay explores the effects of the Medium-Term Expenditure 
Framework (MTEF) adoption on the main fiscal performance indicators, finding a positive and 
encouraging impact on fiscal discipline, allocative efficiency and technical efficiency, although 
the last one is not always robust. The third essay aims at identify the nexus between the excess of 
liquidity and commodity prices; in particular, it assesses whether the commodity prices react 
more powerfully than the consumer goods’ prices to changes in real money balances. The results 
show a positive relationship between real money and real commodity prices and provide 
empirical evidence for a stronger response of commodity prices with respect to consumer goods’ 
prices.  
 The last essay investigates the determinants of primary school enrollment, attendance and 
child labor in Bolivia, with a special attention at identifying the substitution and complementary 
relationships between schooling and working. The empirical findings reveal that the increase in 
enrollment is led by indigenous children and those living in urban areas. Moreover, contrary to 




attendance; while extremely poor children increased their school attendance, they were not able 
to reduce child labor. On the other hand, indigenous children made them substitutes increasing 
schooling and reducing child labor.  
 Different econometric techniques have been used, among which Ordinary Least Squares, 
Fixed Effects, Instrumental Variables, Generalized Methods of Moments estimations, Stochastic 
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This thesis consists of four essays in empirical development economics. The first three 
essays focus on macroeconomic topics, examining issues related to the business cycle, fiscal and 
monetary policy, whereas the last one is focusing on a microeconomic topic, namely the 
relationship between schooling and child labor.  
This introduction elaborates on the motivations underlying the four essays and states the 
research questions for each of them. Also, it explains how the chapters contribute to the literature 
on the relative topic. Thus, the introduction starts with the effectiveness of macroeconomic 
policies in the recovery phases for the MENAP countries, goes through the analysis of the 
impacts of the MTEF adoption on fiscal performance indicators and the investigation of the 
nexus among real money balances and commodity prices and consumer goods’ prices, and 
concludes with the identification of the determinants and the dynamics of schooling and child 
labor in Bolivia. 
The recent global economic and financial crisis also affected countries in the MENAP 
region. Given the limited integration with global capital markets and positive spillovers from the 
region’s oil exporters, the slowdown in MENAP countries has been somewhat less severe than in 
many other regions. While growth in the MENAP countries is expected to improve as the world 
economy begins to recover, it has been heavily debated what role countries’ policies can play to 
strengthen the extent to which they recover in line with the rest of the world. Thus, the first 
chapter of the thesis examines the factors that have helped stimulate recoveries in MENAP 
countries. In particular, it investigates the role of countercyclical fiscal and monetary policies.  
Earlier research on recessions and recoveries has focused on the determinants of 




examined recoveries in other groups of countries and region, however none of the previous 
studies undertakes an examination of the effects of macroeconomic policies on recoveries in 
MENAP countries per se. This paper makes two contributions. First, it documents the properties 
of output gap recessions and recoveries in MENAP countries which were not covered in earlier 
studies. In particular, the analysis of hydrocarbon-exporting MENAP countries is tailored to 
properly take into account the effect of hydrocarbon prices and production on economic activity 
and fiscal space. Recessions and recoveries in the hydrocarbon and non-hydrocarbon exporting 
MENAP countries are examined because their economic cycles have been shown to be closely 
linked. Second, the paper analyzes the effectiveness of macroeconomic policies, namely 
countercyclical fiscal and monetary policies, in the MENAP countries in stimulating recoveries. 
In order to do this, the paper adopts a specific methodology to identify recessions in the 
MENAP, namely a negative output gap relative to potential. 
The analysis of the stylized facts suggests that episodes of negative non-oil output growth 
are quite rare in MENAP countries, and that non-hydrocarbon output growth in oil-exporting 
MENAP countries has on average been higher than output growth in the other MENAP countries 
but also more volatile. The MENAP’s hydrocarbon exporters experienced more severe 
recessions in the 2000s than in the 1990s, possibly reflecting the downturn in the industrial 
countries in the aftermath of the bursting of the high-technology stock market bubble in the early 
2000s and the delayed effect of the low oil prices in 1998-1999. The duration of output gap 
recessions increased for all MENAP countries from the 1990s to the 2000s. The duration of 
recoveries also increased somewhat over the two decades. The econometric analysis revealed 
that fiscal stimulus is associated with stronger recoveries in both groups of MENAP countries; 




openness to trade in line with leakage effects. Monetary policy per se does not appear to have 
played a significant role in stimulating recoveries. Other main determinants of the strength of 
recoveries are the pre-recovery non-oil trade openness to GDP ratio and the public debt to GDP 
ratio, as well as the growth of real exports. 
The second chapter builds on the observation that government finances based on an 
annual cycle of budget planning and implementation suffer from critical problems, as short-
sightedness, because only the next year’s expenditures are reviewed; overspending, because huge 
disbursements in future years are hidden; conservatism, because incremental changes do not 
open up large future vistas; and parochialism, because programs tend to be viewed in isolation 
rather than in comparison with their future costs in relation to expected revenue. In order to 
address the shortcomings of annual budgets, the World Bank and the international aid 
community supported the adoption of the MTEF. MTEFs translate macro-fiscal objectives and 
constraints into broad budget aggregates and detailed expenditure plans. When it is implemented 
well, spending is limited by resource availability (fiscal discipline), budget allocations reflect 
spending priorities (allocative efficiency), and the delivery of public goods and services is cost 
effective (technical efficiency). 
 The second essay is the first study to present large-sample empirical evidence on the 
MTEFs’ impact on fiscal performance. Although some qualitative papers have been written 
about the necessary conditions that need to be in place for MTEFs to be successful, no 
systematic empirical evidence has been provided on the actual impacts of the MTEF on fiscal 
performance. In part, this reflects the lack of comprehensive data on MTEF implementation 
across countries. As a result, the existing literature offers limited information on which to draw 




This study aims to fill this gap in the literature by constructing a panel dataset for 181 
countries over the period 1990-2008 of the three MTEF degrees of sophistication : Medium-
Term Fiscal Framework (MTFF, which focuses on medium-term fiscal aggregates), Medium-
Term Budgetary Framework (MTBF, which considers the allocation of aggregate spending over 
sectors) and Medium-Term Performance Framework (MTPF, which in addition considers 
performance aspects of spending). Also, it investigates the effect of each MTEF phase on the 
various aspects of fiscal performance: fiscal discipline, allocative efficiency and technical 
efficiency. Finally, the paper explores whether the MTEF impact is enhanced by the presence of 
an operational Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA) or law, political cohesion, democracy, the 
number of IMF Missions and membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). 
Both the event study analysis and the econometric results suggest that MTEF adoption 
strongly improves fiscal discipline and that there is a larger effect with each successive MTEF 
phase. At the same time, although the event study analysis fails to provide a clear picture, the 
econometrics analysis reveals that MTBFs improve allocative efficiency. Finally, the MTPF 
seems to be the only MTEF phase that exerts a significant effect on technical efficiency, 
although the results are not always robust. As for the regulatory and political factors, it is found 
that being a member of the OECD has a favorable effect, however none of the other variables 
influence the effectiveness of an MTEF. 
 The third chapter addresses the issue of understanding the volatility of commodity prices. 
In the last four decades, the volatility of commodity prices generated turbulence in the global 
economy, affecting importing and exporting countries in opposite and vigorous ways. 




growth, with few contributions in relatively tranquil periods and more published papers when the 
commodities prices were back at high levels. The huge price variations of the last decade 
generated a renewed interest in the topic. 
In the 1970s, the popular view was that commodity prices were defined as a result of the 
evolutions in the relevant commodity market, playing an important role in the stagflation of that 
decade. However, this idea has been strongly challenged. An increase in expected inflation rate 
due, for example, to an increase in money supply causes agents to shift from money to 
commodities, provoking a rise of its prices. Therefore, increases in the price of oil and other 
commodities could be the result of an exceeding expansionary policy, rather than an exogenous 
inflationary supply shock. Falling commodity prices in the 1980s and 1990s were not considered 
as interesting as raising prices, even though oil producers such as Mexico and Russia were 
experiencing important revenue losses and countries like Argentina and Brazil were suffering 
from low agricultural prices. After collapsing in the second half of 2008, commodity prices 
stabilized in early 2009 and subsequently staged a comeback. Such behavior is in contrast with 
what happened during past recessions. In previous global downturns, prices typically continued 
to fall into the early phases of recovery or rose at rates far below the increases recorded in recent 
months. An exception is the oil price, which recorded meaningful increases early in previous 
recoveries. Thus, the recent happenings of quick commodity price increases and higher volatility 
following easy monetary stance in the US, matched with similar accommodative policies in the 
euro area and Japan, led some to infer some causal role for monetary changes in driving 
commodity prices and ultimately inflation. 
The idea of overshooting has been adapted by the literature to analyze theoretically the 




tightening monetary policy has relevant effects on commodity prices because they are flexible, 
whereas other goods’ prices are sticky. Thus, commodity prices overshoot their new equilibrium 
in the short-run in order to generate an expectation of future appreciation sufficient to offset the 
higher interest rate. The third essay aims at identifying the nexus between the excess of liquidity 
in the United States and commodity prices over the 1983-2006 period. In particular, it tests 
whether the latter react more powerfully than the consumer goods’ prices to changes in real 
money balances. 
The results show a positive relationship between real money and real commodity prices 
and provide empirical evidence for a stronger response of the commodity prices with respect to 
the consumer goods’ prices. This could imply that, if the magnitude of the reaction is due the fact 
that consumer goods’ prices are slower to react, then, their long-run value can be predicted with 
the help of the commodity prices. 
Finally, the last chapter of the thesis looks into an important microeconomic topic, 
namely the determinants and the dynamics of schooling and child labor in the Bolivian context. 
Bolivia remains among the three poorest countries in the western hemisphere and the poorest in 
South America (UNDP, 2007). According to the United Nations, achieving primary education 
represents a key factor for enhancing development progresses in the poorest countries. Efforts 
have been made to guarantee the continuous provision of universal, free-of-charge primary 
education. However, the fact that Bolivia has an illiteracy rate of 13 percent for people aged 15 
or older confirms that the difficulties experienced by its educational system are among the most 
severe in Latin America (World Bank, 2008). 
In order to reaffirm the commitment of the State to improve the educational system, a 




years. These programs are believed to be effectively contributing to higher enrollment and 
attendance rates, nevertheless several challenges concerning lack of homogenous implementation 
across municipalities and schools still need to be overcome. Likewise, with the goal of creating 
enabling conditions to guarantee the effective, multiethnic and non-discriminatory access to 
educational services, special programs have been developed to attend the needs of the vast 
indigenous population of the country. 
Moreover, Bolivia represents a country with a high share of child labor. This share 
achieves about 30 percent among extremely poor families. The literature showed that child labor 
not only represents an exploitative activity, but it is also associated with low level of education, 
therefore jeopardizing human capital growth. Yet, the real issue is to better understand the 
determinants of child labor so as to evaluate its welfare implications. More generally, it is crucial 
to jointly investigate the factors driving schooling and child labor decisions.  
The last essay aims at analyzing the determinants of primary school enrollment, 
attendance and child labor in Bolivia from 1999 to 2007, identifying how the substitution and 
complementary relationships among such activities evolve over time. The unprecedented use of 
Bolivia’s national household survey MECOVI for several years allows for an in-depth historical 
analysis of the recent trends of schooling and child labor. Due to the lack of empirical literature 
on this specific issue for Bolivia, this study represents a contribution that aims at filling the gap. 
Although enrollment became progressively more widespread in Bolivia, the attendance 
figures reveal that about 40 percent of the enrolled children did not go to school. The 
econometrics shows that the increase in enrollment is led by indigenous and children living in 
urban areas, whereas poverty and indigenous are the main characteristics driving the attendance 




school incentives since extremely poor children manage to allocate their time between school 
and working activities (presumably reducing their leisure time), making those complements. On 
the contrary, indigenous children made them substitutes, increasing schooling and decreasing 
working. Finally, the Bono Juancito Pinto (BJP) scholarship implementation in 2006 had a 
negative effect on attendance in 2007 as possibly children tended to enroll to benefit of the first 
installment but they do not attend school afterwards. In addition, the BJP does not play a role in 





Chapter 1: Recoveries in the Middle East, North Africa, and 





This paper identifies and documents the properties of output gap recessions and recoveries in the 
Middle East, North Africa, and Pakistan (MENAP) during the 1980 to 2008 period. It goes on to 
investigate the key determinants of the recoveries. The duration of MENAP countries’ recessions 
and recoveries has increased from the 1990s to the 2000s. MENAP hydrocarbon exporting 
countries’ recessions were on average more pronounced in the 2000s, and hydrocarbon 
importing countries’ recessions milder. Fiscal policy is found to have played a key role during 
the recoveries to potential output, although with weaker effects for MENAP countries that are 
more open to trade. Monetary policy is found to have been less effective. This is likely to be 
related to the fact that many of the MENAP countries have fixed exchange rate regimes and 
hence have limited room for active monetary policy.1 
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The 2008-09 global economic and financial crisis also affected countries in the Middle 
East, North Africa, and Pakistan (MENAP). The growth slowdown in MENAP countries has 
been somewhat less severe than in many other regions, as a result of limited integration with 
global capital markets and positive spillovers from the region’s oil exporters. While growth in 
the MENAP countries is expected to improve as the world economy begins to recover, it is an 
open question what role countries’ policies can play to strengthen the extent to which they 
recover in line with the rest of the world. 
This paper examines the factors that have helped stimulate recoveries in MENAP 
countries. In particular, it investigates the role of countercyclical fiscal and monetary policies. 
Earlier research on recessions and recoveries has focused on the determinants of recoveries from 
recessions caused by specific events such as currency crises or banking crises (e.g. Barro, 2001), 
or examined recoveries in other groups of countries (see IMF 2008a and IMF 2008b), which 
studied recoveries in advanced and emerging market countries, respectively) and regions, such as 
East Asia (Park and Lee, 2001). Cerra et al. (2009) undertakes a comprehensive examination of 
recoveries in a sample of 197 countries but does not analyze the effects of macroeconomic 
policies in MENAP countries per se. 
This paper makes two contributions. First, it documents the properties of output gap 
recessions and recoveries in MENAP countries which were not covered in earlier studies. In 
particular, the analysis of hydrocarbon-exporting MENAP countries is tailored to properly take 
into account the effect of hydrocarbon prices and production on economic activity and fiscal 
space. Recessions and recoveries in the hydrocarbon and non-hydrocarbon exporting MENAP 




instance, Ilahi and Shendy (2008) show that remittance outflows and the accumulation of 
financial surpluses during oil booms in the GCC oil-exporting countries are positively associated 
with private consumption and investments in other countries in the Middle East. Second, the 
paper analyzes the effectiveness of macroeconomic policies, namely countercyclical fiscal and 
monetary policies, in the MENAP countries in stimulating recoveries. In order to do this, the 
paper adopts a specific methodology to identify recessions in the MENAP, namely a negative 
output gap relative to potential. The focus of the analysis is on understanding the determinants of 
recoveries from negative output gaps. The analysis in the paper complements the analysis in 
Abdih et al. (2010) which documents the cyclical properties of fiscal policy in MENAP countries 
and shows that several MENAP countries pursued countercyclical discretionary fiscal policies in 
the current global crisis. 
The paper identifies 59 episodes of recessions across a panel of 20 MENAP countries 
over the 1980-2008 period. Recessions are defined as periods where output is below potential, 
which is proxied by long-term trend output. For the 10 hydrocarbon-exporting countries in the 
panel, the empirical analysis focuses on non-hydrocarbon output growth, instead of the overall 
one. Production of oil and gas is mainly driven by changes in OPEC production quotas (oil) and 
production capacity (natural gas) and does not necessarily react to countercyclical 
macroeconomic policies.
2
 The paper then identifies factors that are associated with recoveries of 
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initially saved. Higher oil prices lead to higher spending in later years to the extent that the rise in the oil price 
persists. In case of an economic downturn or a fall in oil prices, previous savings can be used to sustain higher 




output back to its potential.  Specifically, it examines the role of countercyclical monetary and 
fiscal policies, trade openness, export growth, and pre-recovery levels of investment, and public 
debt.  
The statistical analysis of the paper suggests that: 
 Episodes of negative non-oil output growth are quite rare in MENAP countries. 
 Non-hydrocarbon output growth in oil-exporting MENAP countries has on 
average been higher than output growth in the other MENAP countries but also 
more volatile. 
 The MENAP’s hydrocarbon exporters experienced more severe recessions in the 
2000s than in the 1990s. This likely reflects the downturn in the industrial 
countries in the aftermath of the bursting of the high-technology stock market 
bubble in the early 2000s and the delayed effect of the low oil prices in 1998-
1999. By contrast, the other MENAP countries’ slowdowns were milder in the 
2000s reflecting improvements in their policy frameworks made since the mid-
1990s. The other MENAP countries’ slowdowns in the 2000s were mostly caused 
by spillover effects from hydrocarbon exporters in the region. 
 The duration of output gap recessions increased for all MENAP countries from 
the 1990s to the 2000s. The duration of recoveries also increased somewhat over 
the two decades.  
 Fiscal stimulus is associated with stronger recoveries in both groups of MENAP 
countries. There is also evidence that the impact of fiscal policy is weaker in 




 Monetary policy per se does not appear to have played a significant role in 
stimulating recoveries. Its limited effectiveness is likely to be related to the 
stabilized and pegged exchange rate regimes operated by the countries in the 
sample which limit the scope for independent monetary policy and renders 
changes in money endogenous rather than a variable that policymakers can 
control.  
 Other main determinants of the strength of recoveries are the pre-recovery non-oil 
trade openness to GDP ratio and the public debt to GDP ratio, as well as the 
growth of real exports. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the factors that can help spur 
growth after a growth recession and reviews the evidence in the literature. Section 3 explains the 
methodology that is used to identify episodes of growth recessions and recoveries and presents 
the empirical strategy that is used to examine the determinants of the recoveries. It also presents 
the stylized facts on the growth recession and recovery episodes, describes the data, and presents 
the results of the empirical estimations. Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2. Determinants Of The Strength Of Recoveries 
Previous studies have related the strength of recoveries to a broad array of factors, 
including: proxies for fiscal and monetary policy measures taken in response to the output gap 
recession; indicators of initial conditions, i.e. the level of key macroeconomic variables in the 




investment to GDP ratio, the public debt to GDP ratio, and real export growth; characteristics of 
the output gap recession such as the amplitude and duration of the recession. 
Expansionary monetary policy can be expected to stimulate recoveries. However, many 
MENAP countries operate stabilized or pegged exchange rates. To the extent that (full or partial) 
capital controls allow a degree of independent monetary policy, an increase in the supply of 
money is likely to be associated with lower interest rates thereby providing support to the 
recovery. 
On balance, fiscal policy can be expected to have a positive effect on recoveries. A fiscal 
impulse is likely to increase output through higher consumption and investment. However, there 
may be adverse effects on output from an associated increase in interest rates. And a substantial 
part of the impulse may be diverted to increased demand for imported goods depending on the 
degree of trade openness, thereby limiting the effect of the fiscal impulse on the recovery. 
Moreover, reduced public savings associated with the fiscal impulse may be interpreted by tax 
payers as a signal of higher taxes in the future, thus inducing an increase in private savings, 
particularly if the level of government debt is high, and eventually reducing the positive effect of 
the fiscal impulse on private demand. Ilzetzki et al. (2009) show how countries with relatively 
high public debt (higher than 50 percent of GDP) and more open economies (export plus imports 
higher than 60 percent of GDP) have lower fiscal multipliers. The same study finds that 
multipliers are higher in economies with fixed exchange rate regimes, as in the Mundell-Fleming 
model monetary policy needs to accommodate fiscal policy, thus reinforcing the initial output 
effect of a fiscal expansion. The above argument would, therefore, suggest that there could be an 
important interaction effect between fiscal policy and the degree of trade openness. The 




Lee (2001) find a positive significant effect of public consumption on the pace of recovery from 
currency crises in East-Asian countries over the 1960 to 1995 period. By contrast, Barro (2001) 
finds expansionary fiscal policy to have negatively affected post-crisis recoveries in the same 
region.  
As regards indicators of initial conditions, pre-recovery export growth, a proxy for lagged 
world growth, is expected to have a positive effect on the strength of recoveries by increasing 
total demand in the economy. This effect is likely to be more muted in the event of a recession 
that is highly synchronized across countries, such as the current one.  
Higher trade openness, proxied by the sum of non-hydrocarbon imports and exports to 
non-hydrocarbon GDP, can be expected to be associated with stronger recoveries. Economies 
that are more integrated into the world economy stand to benefit more from an acceleration of 
the growth of global trade which has typically grown substantially faster than global output 
during the past decades. Milesi-Feretti and Razin (1998) find a positive association between 
trade openness and output recoveries using a panel dataset of 105 developing countries from 
1970 to 1996. Hong and Tornell (2005) corroborate this finding, as they detect a positive effect 
of higher pre-crisis openness to trade on output recoveries one year after a crisis.  
A higher investment to GDP ratio in the year before the recovery can be expected to have 
ambiguous effects on the recovery. On the one hand, a high investment to GDP ratio in the year 
before the recovery can be expected to positively affect the recovery. On the other hand, a crisis 
associated with an investment boom can weaken the recovery by giving rise to inefficiencies in 
investment decisions, by raising the debt burden of the corporate sector, and by being a prelude 
to higher nonperforming loans. In addition, a pre-recovery investment boom may cause a 




phase since there may be no need for additional investment once the desired stock of capital is 
obtained, thereby slowing the recovery. Indeed, for a group of 100 developing countries, Hong 
and Tornell (2005) find a negative effect of pre-crisis investments on output for up to three years 
after a crisis. However, the ―sudden stops‖ in investment that this study finds may be less 
prevalent in the MENAP countries which did not experience absolute declines in real output. 
Higher growth of real domestic credit can be expected to have an ambiguous effect on the 
strength of recovery along the same lines as a higher investment to GDP ratio.  
In addition to reducing the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus as discussed above, a high 
public debt to GDP ratio in the year before the recovery can be expected to have an independent 
negative effect on the strength of recovery. A heavy debt burden may act as an implicit tax on 
the resources generated by a country, and therefore reduce the size of domestic and foreign 
investments as well as their quality, raise creditors’ concerns about the country’s solvency, and 
create negative incentives for policy reforms (Corden, 1989). 
The magnitude of the recession (amplitude) as well as the length of the recession 
(duration) can influence the growth rate during the recovery. The lower a country’s level of 
output relative to its trend, the greater the scope for a higher subsequent growth rate as the 
economy rebounds to its potential growth. At the same time, the larger the output gap, the more 
difficult it would be for the country to close the gap in the first year. Therefore, the impact of 
amplitude on the recovery is ambiguous and likely to depend on the nature of the shock that 
caused the recession. It could be expected that longer (more persistent) recessions, for a given 






3. Empirical Analysis 
 
3.1. Identifying Turning Points in Economic Activity 
For the purposes of the empirical analysis, it is necessary to identify episodes of 
economic recessions and recoveries. This paper follows the ―growth cycle‖ approach (periods of 
above-trend and below-trend rates of economic growth) to dating turning points rather than the 
―classical‖ approach which relies on movements in the actual level of economic activity (real 
GDP, see for example, Cashin and Ouliaris, 2004, and IMF, 2008a). This is done because several 
countries in the sample did not experience many observable declines in the level of non-
hydrocarbon GDP (see Figure 2).  
In order to describe the methodology to define turning points and periods between 
turning points, the taxonomy of Mintz (1972) is adopted as a starting point. More specifically, 
turning points are described as downturns and upturns, with periods between downturns and 
upturns (upturns and downturns) denoted as low-rate (high-rate) growth phases.
3
 However, as 
shown in Figure 1 the procedure used in this paper deviates from Mintz (1972) by defining the 
recession phases as the portion of the low-rate phase in which non-hydrocarbon output is below 
potential —measured using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter (PO in Figure 1)—by more than 0.5 
percent (i.e. the output gap is less than -0.5 percent).  
 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
                                                 
3
 In a growing economy high-rate phases must coincide with expansions in the classical cycle, yet low-rate phases 






The latter restriction is needed so as to focus the analysis only on meaningful growth 
slowdowns. Upturns (U) are defined as the maximum negative output gap (represented by the 
largest deviation of the cycle—the solid line in Figure 1—from PO) because they represent the 
points after which recoveries commence. The recovery phase is then defined as the portion of the 
high-rate phase over which the economy moves from U+1 to non-oil potential output, within 
plus or minus 0.5 percent.
4
  
We could have defined the recovery phase as the period over which the economy reaches 
the next peak (D in Figure 1) from U+1--in line with classical procedures to date business cycles. 
However, this would capture periods where non-oil output is above potential output (positive 
output gaps) which could encompass other economic issues (e.g. overheating and inflation 
problems) that could warrant different macroeconomic policies. The amplitude of the recession 
is, therefore, defined as the distance between U and potential output, and its duration is the 
number of years of negative output gaps ending at U. 
 
3.2. Empirical Strategy and Data 
The paper studies the determinants of the strength of recoveries in MENAP countries. To 
this end, an empirical model which relates economic performance in the recovery phase to 
                                                 
4
 For the cases in which the ±0.5 percent band is not instrumental to define the end date of the recovery, the last year 
of the recovery is the one that minimizes the distance from the observation in the last recovery year before the lower 






measures of countercyclical macroeconomic policies, initial conditions, and variables that 
control for the magnitude and length of the economic recession is estimated:  
 
                   
                                                                
                                      (1) 
 
There is no common definition of the strength of recoveries. Some studies have used the 
growth rate in the year after a trough or the average over a few years after a trough (e.g. Milesi-
Feretti and Razin (1998), and Cerra et al. (2009). Other studies measure it as the change in output 
growth following a crisis (Gupta et al., 2003, and Hong and Tornell, 2005) and as the deviation 
of output growth from the tranquil period average (Hong and Tornell, 2005). In this paper, the 
strength of recovery is defined as the real non-oil GDP growth in the first year of the recovery 
phase (U+1) or the average growth over the whole recovery phase.  
It was mentioned previously that countries’ hydrocarbon output is constrained by 
capacity and/or Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) production targets. 
Therefore, the relevant measure of the recoveries to potential output in hydrocarbon-exporting 
countries relates to non-hydrocarbon output. 
A brief description of the construction of each of the explanatory variables in the 
regressions is given below. Data sources and variable definitions are discussed in Appendix. The 
key focus of the analysis is on the impact that countercyclical fiscal and monetary policies have 
on the recovery of growth. An important issue that needs to be tackled in this regard is the 




fiscal deficit can contribute to higher growth. But an exogenous increase in growth could 
contribute to a fiscal surplus, due to the functioning of automatic stabilizers (e.g. with higher 
growth causing higher tax revenues and lower social safety net outlays) and discretionary 
countercyclical policy actions by the government. The latter effect would make it difficult to find 
evidence of the former effect, incorrectly leading to the conclusion that fiscal stimulus (from 
higher deficits) does not raise growth.  
Toward this end, the pre-recovery (or lagged) values of the macroeconomic policy 
variables are used in the estimations. In addition to dealing with the issue of endogeneity, these 
variables capture that there can be a delay in the effect of a fiscal or monetary stimulus on the 
economy. The paper relates the growth in the first year of recovery (U+1, or the average growth 
in the entire recovery phase) to the lagged fiscal impulse (i.e. at U). The fiscal impulse (imp) is 
defined as the difference in the non-hydrocarbon fiscal balance to non-hydrocarbon potential 
output ratio between U and U-1. 
 
           
        
           (2) 
 
where a positive fiscal impulse corresponds to a decline in the non-hydrocarbon balance. 
In addition, the non-hydrocarbon fiscal balance is calculated as a ratio to potential output instead 
of actual output at U to reduce endogeneity with the growth of output in the first year of the 
recovery              ). The non-hydrocarbon fiscal balance to potential output ratio is 
calculated as: 
 
   
   
  
  





    
  










where    
       
   and         
   are, respectively, the ratios of central government 
non-hydrocarbon revenues and spending to non-hydrocarbon GDP (     ), and     and      
are the actual and potential real non-oil output.
5
 In line with Cerra et al. (2009), this approach 
does not distinguish between a fiscal impulse resulting from discretionary fiscal policy changes 
and automatic stabilizers as there is no reason to assume that the latter factor would be less 
effective than the former to stimulate the recovery. 
The growth rate of money (either nominal or real) at the upturn is used as the indicator of 
monetary policy.
6
 However, since the majority of the countries in the sample have de facto 
currency board arrangements, conventional pegs to a single currency or composite basket of 
currencies, they have limited room for active monetary policy. Nonetheless, some national 
central banks could still have some autonomy in determining the spread between domestic and 
foreign interest rates and, therefore, in operating monetary policy in the short run, as shown in 
Maziad (2009) for the case of Jordan.  
The initial conditions included in the baseline regression estimations are: real exports 
growth in the year before the recovery (U),
7
 the ratio of non-oil trade to non-oil potential GDP at 
                                                 
5
 Potential non-oil output was calculated by applying the HP filter.  
6
 Because of the limited availability of interest rate data for MENAP countries, monetary policy as deviations from a 
policy rule could not be measured. 
7
 Real exports growth rather than real non-oil exports growth has been included because data on the volume of non-




U, the ratio of fixed capital formation to potential GDP at U-1,
8
 and the ratio of public debt to 
potential GDP at U. Using the lagged values of these variable (i.e. at U) and dividing the non-oil 
trade by potential non-oil GDP and the fixed capital formation and public debt variables by 
potential overall GDP should help minimize possible endogeneity of these variables with the 
growth of non-oil output at U+1.  
 
3.3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The sample is composed of 10 hydrocarbon exporting countries and 10 other countries in 
the MENAP. The hydrocarbon exporters included in the sample are the six Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries--Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates 
(UAE)--and Algeria, Iran, Libya, and Yemen. The hydrocarbon importers comprise Djibouti, 
Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, Syria, Sudan and Tunisia. The countries 
are divided into hydrocarbon-exporting and hydrocarbon-importing following the IMF’s Middle 
East and Central Asia Departments May 2008 Regional Economic Outlook publication which 
groups the countries based on the share of oil in total exports,
9
 with the exception of Sudan that 
has been labeled as a hydrocarbon importer because of its low levels of hydrocarbon exports 
over all the considered period. The sample period is from 1980 to 2008. However, data for the 
                                                 
8
 Information on non-oil investments is not available. The investment to GDP ratio at U-1 is used to capture the pre-
recession trough level of investments. 
9
 Countries are classified as hydrocarbon exporters if the share of hydrocarbon exports in total exports exceeds 50 
percent. Some countries that are classified as hydrocarbon importers also export hydrocarbons  (e.g. Egypt and 
Syria). Because data on real non-hydrocarbon GDP is not available for a sufficiently long period for these countries, 




hydrocarbon exporting countries in the sample is only available from 1990 onward (with the 
exception of Algeria, for which data are available from 1991).  
The properties of real non-hydrocarbon output growth rates (first differences of 
logarithms of real output) for each of the 20 countries in the sample are reported in Table 1.  
 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
 
Average growth rates of other MENAP countries (excluding Lebanon) and volatility (as 
measured by the standard deviation of real non-oil output) are similar to those of non-
hydrocarbon exporting countries in Africa and Latin America. The hydrocarbon exporting 
MENAP countries, on the other hand, have had higher average non-hydrocarbon growth rates 
and slightly higher volatility over the 1990-2008 period compared with the hydrocarbon-
importers and hydrocarbon exporting countries in other regions. Table 1 also reports the 
autocorrelation coefficients of the first two lags of the output growth series. The first lags are 
generally positive, but the second lag is negative for the MENAP hydrocarbon exporters and 
positive for the other countries. This suggests that shocks to the MENAP hydrocarbon exporters 





The standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis of the growth cycles for the MENAP 
countries (filtered non-oil output series) extracted by the Hodrick-Prescott (HP), Baxter-King 





[Table 2 about here] 
 
 
On average, filtered non-hydrocarbon GDP exhibits higher volatility in the hydrocarbon-
exporting countries than in the other countries, excluding Lebanon (which suffered from 
extensive conflicts over the sample period), irrespective of the filtering method used. The 
hydrocarbon importing MENA countries show negative skewness of real non-oil GDP implying 
larger downward spikes than upward spikes, but this disappears in the case of the BK and CF 
filters once Lebanon is excluded. The average skewness of hydrocarbon exporters’, on the other 
hand, is very close to the normal distribution. The HP-filtered data suggests that average 
skewness for the GCC countries was also negative. The real non-oil GDP displays on average 
excess Kurtosis (leptokurtic distribution—with tails thicker than the normal distribution) for all 
the country groups, suggesting that large movements in MENAP (filtered) output are relatively 
common. 
                                                 
10
 For the HP filter the smoothing parameter, λ, has been set to 6.25. For the BK filter, Burns-Mitchell 
recommendations for annual data have been adopted, setting plo and phi to 2 and 8, respectively. Finally, for the CF 




The HP-filtered data is used to identify the turning points in economic activity. Table 3 
shows the start and end dates of the recoveries by country. Because the data for the hydrocarbon-
exporting countries in the sample is limited to the period from 1990 onward, the number of 
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Figure 2 presents the HP-based output gaps and the non-oil GDP growth rates. The 
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3.4. Basic Facts on Episodes of Recessions and Recoveries in the MENAP Region 
Table 4 reports the average duration (in years) of the recession and recovery phases of the 
59 episodes identified and the average amplitude of the aggregate phase movement in output (in 
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 It should be noted that since annual data is used, the analysis in the paper does not take into account recessions 




percent change), and the steepness (amplitude divided by duration or the average annual 
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The data on the median duration of recessions in real non-hydrocarbon GDP suggest that 
recession phases were equally as long as recovery phases for hydrocarbon importing MENAP 
countries in the 2000s while recovery phases tended to be shorter than recession phases in the 
1990s. A typical recession and recovery in the 2000s persisted for about 2 years. The data also 
show that there has been a trend increase in the length of recessions and recoveries of MENAP 
hydrocarbon-importers. The median recession lasted 2 years for the MENAP hydrocarbon 
importers in the 2000s compared with 1 year in the 1980s. The median amplitude measure shows 
that non-oil output during recessions ranged between 3 to 4 percent below potential output for 
the hydrocarbon importing MENAP countries across the three decades. Interestingly, recoveries 
to potential output are found to have been less steep on average than recessions for the 
hydrocarbon-importing MENAP countries in all three decades.  
The median duration of recessions in MENAP hydrocarbon-exporting countries was 
equal to the median duration of recoveries in the 1990s and 2000s respectively. But the duration 
                                                 
12
 Only four episodes are dropped if the criterion to identify a recession phase is changed to having a negative output 
gap that exceeds 1 percent instead of 0.5 percent. This does not alter the results on the average duration and 




of recessions and recoveries has increased over time for the hydrocarbon-exporting MENAP 
countries. The median duration of a recession was 2 years in the 2000s compared with 1 year in 
the 1990s. The median amplitude of the recessions was also larger for these countries in the 
2000s (nearly 6 percent negative output gap) than in the 1990s (about 2 percent negative output 
gap). The speed with which real non-oil GDP changed in the recessions (about 2.3 percent per 
year) was slightly faster than in the recoveries in the 1990s (1.9 percent per year) while the 
opposite was true in the 2000s.  
 
 
3.5. Estimation Results 
Basic descriptive statistics for the data used in the regression estimations are reported in 
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The results for the strength of recovery equations are presented in Table 6.  
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 Qatar 1995 is excluded from the sample because without it the results are substantially more robust to dropping 





[Table 6 about here] 
 
 
The dependent variable in Table 6 is growth of real non-oil output in the first year of the 
recovery (U+1). Another set of equations are also estimated that use the growth of real non-oil 
output in the entire recovery phase as the dependent variable. The results are broadly the same as 
the results in Table 6 and are not shown here. The equations are estimated with ordinary least 
squares including fixed effects. The basic conditioning variables in the equations are: recession 
amplitude, recession duration, a measure of the fiscal impulse, real export growth, the ratio of 
fixed capital formation to GDP, d non-oil trade openness, and the interaction of the fiscal 
impulse with non-oil trade openness. A proxy for monetary policy (either real or nominal money 
growth) is included as a conditioning variable in the regressions in columns 1 and 2. The results 
of estimating the regressions including the ratio of public debt to GDP as an additional 
conditioning variable are reported in column 3.  
The results confirm a strong and positive contribution of fiscal policy to growth during 
the first year of the recovery. At the same time, the interactive term between the non-oil trade 
openness and fiscal impulse variable is negative giving some credence to the hypothesis that a 
higher degree of trade openness can lead to fiscal leakage. Taking into account the interactive 
term and assuming the sample average degree of non-oil trade openness of 48 percent, the 
estimated coefficient in the column 2 regression specification implies that a 1 percent of non-oil 
GDP reduction in the non-hydrocarbon fiscal balance leads to a 0.25 percent increase in non-oil 




openness on the strength of recovery. The estimated coefficient for the ratio of non-oil trade 
openness is significant in most of the regression specifications. 
 
Monetary policy is found to be less important for post-crisis recovery. The coefficients on 
the growth of the nominal and real money supply are insignificant. A measure of the pre-
recovery rate of real domestic credit growth which may be related to monetary easing is also 
found to be statistically insignificant (this result is not shown in the table).
14
  
As regards the indicators of initial conditions, pre-recovery real export growth has a 
positive and significant impact on the post-recovery growth, in all the regression specifications 
excluding column 1 in Table 6. A 10 percentage point increase in the growth of real exports 
leads to a roughly 1 percentage point increase in growth in the first year of recovery. The sign of 
the estimated coefficient for the ratio of gross fixed capital formation to GDP depends on the 
regression specification but is always insignificant. The coefficient on the ratio of public debt to 
GDP in column 3 is negative as expected and significant. However, its effect is not significant in 
the regression with average growth over the entire recovery phase (not shown here).   
The results suggest a statistically significant positive relationship between the recession 
amplitude and growth in the first year of recovery. For example, the estimated coefficients imply 
that a 5 percent negative output gap is associated with a 2-3.4 percentage point increase in non-
                                                 
14
 Estimation of regressions that use the fraction of recovery completed in the first year (defined as             
                                     ) as the dependent variable also confirm the results shown here that 
fiscal policy has been effective in speeding up recoveries in the MENAP countries while monetary policy has not. 
These estimations suggest that a one percent increase in the fiscal impulse causes a 5 percent reduction in the output 




oil GDP growth in the first year of recovery. This is in line with the notion that there is more 
scope for a growth rebound after a sharp fall of output below potential. On the other hand, the 
duration of the recession always shows a negative coefficient, but this is significant in only one 
regression, confirming that longer recessions are associated with longer recoveries. 
The results are fairly robust to changes in the list of the conditioning variables and the 
number of observations. In particular, the results are robust to excluding the four recession 
episodes for which the output gap at U is between -0.5 and -1 percent and to restricting the 
sample period to the period from 1990 onward. The results are also robust to defining the 
recession (recovery) phase according to the Mintz (1972) taxonomy so that it covers the entire 
period from a peak (trough) in the filtered real GDP series to its trough (U, peak), instead of the 
period from potential output to U (from U to potential output). This only affects the construction 
of the recession duration and amplitude variables that are included in the regressions. The results 
remain broadly the same as before. Identifying recoveries based on overall output and using the 
growth rate of overall output in the first year of recovery instead of non-oil output for the oil-
exporting MENAP countries yields weaker results on the effects of macroeconomic policies and 
other key determinants. This is in line with the notion that oil and gas production are determined 




This paper is the first to analyze the statistical properties of output gap recessions and 
recoveries in the MENAP countries. It is also the first to analyze the determinants of recoveries 




non-hydrocarbon growth rates for hydrocarbon-exporting countries) have been rare for the 20 
MENAP countries in the sample. However, the MENAP countries are found to have experienced 
periods of meaningful growth slowdowns, including in the context of the current global financial 
crisis. In particular, the paper establishes 59 episodes during which output in the MENAP 
countries was significantly below potential output during the period 1980-2008.  
An examination of these episodes suggests that the features of recessions and recoveries 
in the MENAP countries appear to be changing. In particular, the duration of recessions and 
recoveries increased from the 1990s to the 2000s. This could be related to the changing nature of 
recessions in MENAP countries; however, its investigation is outside the scope of this paper and 
could be an interesting topic for future research. Hydrocarbon-exporting MENAP countries had 
more pronounced recessions in the 2000s than in the 1990s, but the other MENAP countries’ 
recessions were shallower. At the same time, recoveries to potential output have typically taken 
longer than the time it took for growth to reach a trough in the 2000s while the opposite was true 
in the 1990s. 
This paper investigates the factors that could help strengthen the MENAP countries’ 
recoveries to potential output. According to our findings, countercyclical fiscal policy has helped 
strengthen recoveries in the MENAP countries. However, the MENAP countries that were open 
to trade benefited less from a fiscal expansion owing to leakage effects. At the same time, the 
effectiveness of monetary policy seems to have been limited, probably because of limited 
exchange rate flexibility. Of the other indicators of initial conditions, pre-recovery real export 
growth and the non-oil trade to GDP ratio appear to have had important positive effects in 




recession investment to GDP ratio does not appear to have been a key factor influencing 
recoveries in the MENAP countries.  
The implication of these findings would be that MENAP countries should maintain a 
certain level of fiscal space to pursue expansionary fiscal policy in the event of a recession as 
fiscal policy has proven to be an effective driver of recoveries. In view of the evidence that 
higher trade openness weakens the effectiveness of fiscal policy, optimization of the impact of 
fiscal stimulus would seem to call for targeting additional spending at items and projects with a 
limited import content. However, given that increased trade integration supports long-term 
growth, this is not in any one country’s long-term interest. In fact, the importance of leakage 
effects underscores the need for coordination in fiscal stimulus across countries. A coordinated 
fiscal stimulus as called for by the IMF at the onset of the 2008-09 global financial crisis would 
make sure that the ―leakage‖ in the form of enhanced demand for foreign goods and services is 








Table A: Variables definitions and data sources
 
Variable           Source   Definition    
 
Non-oil output growth  WEO and IMF country  Growth rate of non-oil real GDP at U+1 
    desk data 
 
Recession amplitude  Authors’ calculations Absolute value of the distance between the  
potential output and the cyclical component at U, 
calculated on the HP filtered logged non-oil real GDP 
 
Recession duration   Authors’ calculations Number of years spent in the recession phase 
[PO,U], calculated on the HP filtered non-oil real 
GDP 
 
Recovery duration Authors’ calculations Number of years spent in the recovery phase 
[U+1,PO], calculated on the HP filtered non-oil real 
GDP 
 
Recovery steepness  Authors’ calculations Amplitude at U divided by the duration of  
the recovery phase [U+1,PO] 
 
 
Fiscal Impulse    WEO and IMF country The fiscal impulse at U is defined as the  
    desk data  difference between the ratio of the non-oil fiscal  
       balance to potential GDP at U and its value  
       at U-1. 
 
 
Real exports growth  WEO   Real exports growth rate at U.   
 
Non-oil trade openness WEO   Trade openness measured as the ratio of non-oil 
trade to non-oil potential GDP at U 
 
Fixed capital formation/pot. GDP WEO   Fixed capital formation to potential GDP at U-1 
 
 
Nominal broad money growth WEO   Growth of nominal broad money at U 
 
Real broad money growth WEO   Growth rate of real broad money at U. Real  
    broad money divided by the CPI (from the  
    WDI). 
 
Real domestic credit growth IFS   Growth rate of real domestic credit (domestic 
   credit/CPI) at U. Domestic credit is line 32 from  
     the IFS. 
 












Notes: Non-oil real GDP growth rate Y
NO
 is denoted by the dashed line, the HP output gap is 
denoted by the solid line and the potential output is the zero line. The vertical axis shows the 
growth rates in percentages and the percentage deviations from potential output. The horizontal axis 
represents the time t. D stands for downturn, U stands for upturn and PO stands for potential output. 



















































































Table 1: Properties of Non-Oil Output Growth Rates 
 
    




            1 y 2 y 
1980-2008 
      Nonhydrocarbon exporters in 
          MENAP  
 
3.57 4.09 5.09 1.43 0.11 0.14 
    Sub-Saharan Africa 3.71 4.34 5.07 1.58 0.17 0.08 
    Asia 
 
5.3 5.82 3.41 0.69 0.39 0.07 
    Latin America 3.42 3.91 4.3 1.37 0.42 0.07 
        1990-2008 
      Nonhydrocarbon exporters in 
          MENAP 
 
4.07 4.26 3.70 1.17 0.05 0.23 
    Sub-Saharan  Africa 3.77 4.55 4.99 1.43 0.23 0.12 
    Asia 
 
5.23 5.56 3.32 0.65 0.31 0.00 
    Latin America 4.11 4.45 3.3 0.88 0.4 0.1 
        Hydrocarbon exporters in 
         MENAP 
 
7.73 7.81 4.36 0.69 0.20 -0.02 
    GCC 
 
6.70 6.38 3.95 0.58 0.25 -0.04 
    Other 
 
9.27 9.95 4.97 0.87 0.12 0.02 
    Sub-Saharan Africa 4.96 6.61 11.40 2.88 0.46 0.20 
    Asia 
 
4.91 7.07 5.71 1.17 0.45 0.13 
    Latin America 4.85 4.52 1.8 0.37 -0.03 -0.16 
 
Notes: Sample moments were computed from log-differences of real output. Standard Deviation is expressed as 
a percentage. Coefficient of variation is the ratio of the standard deviation to the arithmetic mean. 
Autocorrelations of one and two years are the first and second autocorrelation coefficients, respectively. Non-
hydrocarbon exporters in sub-Saharan Africa include Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Senegal and 
South Africa. Non-hydrocarbon exporters in Asia include India, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. 
Nonhydrocarbon exporters in Latin American include Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru and Uruguay. African 
hydrocarbon exporters include Angola and Nigeria. Asian hydrocarbon exporters include Indonesia and 





Table 2: Descriptive Statistics on Filtered Non-Oil Output 
 
Country Standard Deviation Skewness Kurosis 
  HP BK CF HP BK CF HP BK CF 
1980-2008          
MENAP hydrocarbon importers        
 Total 4.9 3.2 3.21 -0.16 -0.13 -0.07 0.31 0.29 0.57 
   Excl. Lebanon 3.21 2.04 1.92 -0.16 -0.04 0.01 0.17 0.09 0.54 
          
1990-2008          
MENAP hydrocarbon exporters        
 Total 3.92 2.63 2.22 -0.01 -0.07 0.07 0.06 0.89 1.5 
   GCC 3.62 2.47 2.08 -0.21 0.21 0.07 -0.4 0.91 1.69 
   Other 4.17 2.77 2.34 0.16 -0.3 0.07 0.45 0.87 1.35 
 
         
MENAP hydrocarbon importers        
Total 3.77 2.41 2.31 -0.42 -0.37 -0.11 1.41 1.97 0.78 
  Excl. Lebanon 2.88 1.82 1.58 -0.11 0.02 0.09 0.25 0.37 0.17 
 
Notes: HP denotes the Hodrick-Prescott (1980) filtered data, BK denotes the Baxter-King (1999) filtered data 
and CF denotes the Christiano-Fitzgerald (2003) filtered data. Standard deviation is expressed as a percentage. 
The skewness measure is 
5.1
23 )/(  and the (excess) Kurtosis measure is
3)/( 224  , where 

 is the 






Table 3: Recovery Years (from trough (U) to potential output (PO)) 
 
MENAP hydrocarbon exporters               
  Algeria  Bahrain  Iran  Kuwait  Libya  Oman  Qatar  S.Arabia UAE Yemen  
 
94-95 92-93 98-99 93-94 95-96 96-97 95-96 95-97 92-93 94-97 
 
97-03 02-04 01-02 01-03 01-06 00-06 03-05 03-05 99-00 03-05 
  
06-07 
     
02-04 
  MENAP hydrocarbon importers               
  Djibouti Egypt Jordan   Leb. Mauritania Morocco Pakistan Sudan Syria Tunisia 
 
-80 81-83 91-92  -80 -80 81-82 02-05 85-87 84-85 82-83 
 
86-87 93-98 03-05 82-84 82-86 83-85 
 




90-93 92-93 87-88 
 




06-07 98-99 93-94 
  
03-06 95-97 
    
02-05 95-96 
   
02-04 
         00-03 97-98       05-06   
 






Table 4: Average Duration, Amplitude, and Steepness of the Phases for Non-Oil Real GDP by Decade and Group of Countries 
 
    1980-1989    1990-1999     2000-2008 
  Obs Dur. Dur. Ampl. Steep. Steep. Obs Dur. Dur. Ampl. Steep. Steep. Obs Dur. Dur. Ampl. Steep. Steep. 
Country     PO-U U-PO PO-U PO-U U-PO   PO-U U-PO PO-U PO-U U-PO   PO-U U-PO PO-U PO-U U-PO 
MENAP hydrocarbon exporters                  
Mean  - - - - - - 12 1.17 1.67 3.54 3.13 3.01 10 2.70 2.50 6.45 3.40 3.13 
Median   - - - - -  1.00 1.00 2.34 2.34 1.93  2.00 2.00 5.67 2.40 2.67 
SD   - - - - -  0.39 1.50 2.36 2.00 2.62  1.49 1.65 4.15 3.81 2.1 
Coeff. of variation  - - - - -  0.33 0.90 0.67 0.64 0.87  0.55 0.66 0.64 1.12 0.67 
                    
MENAP hydrocarbon importers                  
Mean  14 1.43 1.64 6.95 5.63 4.02 11 2.00 2.54 8.54 4.60 4.46 12 2.17 2.00 2.88 1.71 1.58 
Median   1.00 1.50 3.86 3.25 2.26  2.00 1.00 4.01 2.97 2.10  2.00 2.00 3.20 1.35 1.45 
SD   0.85 0.84 10.71 10.66 5.23  0.77 2.30 12.92 6.41 4.91  1.47 1.04 1.38 1.36 0.81 
Coeff. of variation   0.59 0.51 1.54 1.89 1.30  0.39 0.91 1.51 1.39 1.10  0.68 0.52 0.48 0.80 0.51 
                    
All MENAP countries                   
Mean  14 1.43 1.64 6.95 5.63 4.02 23 1.56 2.09 5.93 3.83 3.70 22 2.41 2.23 4.50 2.48 2.28 
Median   1.00 1.50 3.86 3.25 2.26  1.00 1.00 3.51 2.37 1.96  2.00 2.00 3.78 1.79 1.73 
SD   0.85 0.84 10.71 10.66 5.23  0.73 1.93 9.23 4.61 3.86  1.47 1.34 3.42 2.82 1.69 
Coeff. of variation   0.59 0.51 1.54 1.89 1.30   0.47 0.92 1.56 1.20 1.04   0.61 0.60 0.76 1.14 0.74 
 
Notes: Calculations on HP filtered data are reported. Duration, amplitude and steepness of HP filtered data are reported. The steepness is defined as the 
amplitude divided by the duration, and is measured as percent change. U stands for upturn and PO stands for potential output. Phases not completed at the 




Table 5: Summary Statistics of all the Variables 
 
Variable Obs  Mean SD Min Max 
All MENAP countries      
Non-oil output growth (first year of recovery) 57 9.97 8.02 0.10 38.20 
Recession amplitude 57 5.03 6.39 0.54 46.55 
Recession duration 57 1.88 1.17 1.00 5.00 
Fiscal impulse 57 0.21 6.23 -33.87 17.37 
Real export growth 57 2.54 13.69 -26.61 52.55 
Non-oil trade openness 57 47.52 28.24 5.14 130.78 
Fixed capital formation/Pot. GDP 57 21.03 7.85 1.97 45.85 
Fixed capital formation/Pot. GDP at U-1 57 20.85 6.99 2.49 42.37 
Fixed capital formation/Pot. GDP over the recession 57 21.11 7.51 2.23 45.85 
Nominal broad money growth 57 17.41 17.17 -7.37 87.91 
Real broad money growth 45 8.13 14.09 -29.05 70.34 
Real domestic credit growth 35 8.75 27.80 -68.84 136.48 
Public debt/Pot. GDP 41 73.27 54.05 0.00 205.91 
MENAP hydrocarbon importers           
Non-oil output growth (first year of recovery) 36 7.99 5.96 0.10 38.20 
Recession amplitude 36 5.09 7.61 0.54 46.55 
Recession duration 36 1.86 1.10 1.00 5.00 
Fiscal impulse 36 0.56 2.95 -7.40 7.25 
Real export growth 36 0.55 10.30 -26.61 18.80 
Non-oil trade openness 36 41.60 21.11 5.14 99.21 
Fixed capital formation/Pot. GDP 36 20.54 8.01 1.97 45.52 
Fixed capital formation/Pot. GDP at U-1 36 21.37 7.49 2.49 42.36 
Fixed capital formation/Pot. GDP over the recession 36 20.88 7.51 2.23 45.52 
Nominal broad money growth 36 19.18 19.89 -7.37 87.91 
Real broad money growth 31 8.63 15.67 -29.05 70.34 
Real domestic credit growth 25 3.32 19.01 -68.84 47.05 
Public debt/Pot. GDP 20 108.07 51.16 56.79 205.91 
MENAP hydrocarbon exporters           
Non-oil output growth (first year of recovery) 21 13.35 9.94 3.62 37.92 
Recession amplitude 21 4.93 3.61 0.99 13.26 
Recession duration 21 1.90 1.30 1.00 5.00 
Fiscal impulse 21 -0.38 9.63 -33.87 17.37 
Real export growth 21 5.96 17.87 -25.62 52.55 
Non-oil trade openness 21 57.65 35.82 9.69 130.78 
Fixed capital formation/Pot. GDP 21 21.87 7.69 10.41 45.85 
Fixed capital formation/Pot. GDP at U-1 21 19.96 6.11 9.39 10.41 
Fixed capital formation/Pot. GDP over the recession 21 21.51 7.68 28.91 45.85 
Nominal broad money growth 21 14.37 10.86 1.46 39.18 
Real broad money growth 14 7.01 10.15 -10.56 24.34 
Real domestic credit growth 10 22.33 40.86 0.64 136.48 
Public debt/Pot. GDP 21 40.13 31.49 0.00 94.04 




Table 6: Regressions of Non-Oil Output Growth in the First Year of Recovery, 1980–2008  
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 Real export growth 0.046 
 



































 Nominal broad money growth -0.0004 
     
 
(-0.17) 
     Real broad money growth 
  
-0.005 
   
   
(0.32) 
   Public debt/Pot. GDP 
    
-0.037 *** 
     
(-3.49) 
 Constant 4.124 
 
9.699 *** 8.223 ** 
  (1.54)   (4.41)   (2.19) 




41   
R-squared 0.829   0.520   0.928   
 
 Notes: See Appendix I for definitions of the variables. The numbers in parenthesis report  robust t-
 statistics. Estimations performed using ordinary least squares including fixed effects. ***, **, and * 
 denote significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. All explanatory variables  are 












In the past twenty years more than 130 countries have adopted Medium-Term Expenditure 
Frameworks (MTEFs) as a tool for improving fiscal performance. The rationale behind these 
reforms is that MTEFs allow governments to more adequately incorporate future fiscal 
challenges in the budget process, thereby reducing an undue emphasis on short-term goals. 
This paper empirically investigates the MTEFs’ impact on three key aspects of fiscal 
performance using a newly-collected MTEF dataset which covers 181 countries over the 
period 1990-2008. It is found that MTEFs strongly improve fiscal discipline and has a larger 
effect at more advanced MTEF levels. Higher-phase MTEFs also improve allocative 
efficiency. Only the most sophisticated MTEFs have a significantly positive effect on 
technical efficiency, although this result is not always robust. The paper also explores 
conditions that may affect the functioning of an MTEF, such as the presence of a fiscal 
responsibility act, political cohesion, democracy and technical assistance missions.1
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Government finances based on an annual cycle of budget planning and 
implementation suffer from critical problems. Wildavsky (1986, p.317) put it as follows: 
―One-year [budgeting], it has been argued, leads to short-sightedness, because only the next 
year’s expenditures are reviewed; overspending, because huge disbursements in future years 
are hidden; conservatism, because incremental changes do not open up large future vistas; 
and parochialism, because programs tend to be viewed in isolation rather than in comparison 
with their future costs in relation to expected revenue.‖ 
In order to address the shortcomings of annual budgets, the World Bank and the 
international aid community supported the adoption of  Medium-Term Expenditure 
Framework (MTEF). MTEFs translate macro-fiscal objectives and constraints into broad 
budget aggregates and detailed expenditure plans. When it is implemented well, spending is 
limited by resource availability (fiscal discipline), budget allocations reflect spending 
priorities (allocative efficiency), and the delivery of public goods and services is cost 
effective (technical efficiency). 
This paper is the first to present large-sample empirical evidence on the MTEFs’ 
impact on fiscal performance. Although some qualitative papers have been written about the 
necessary conditions that need to be in place for MTEFs to be successful, no systematic 
empirical evidence has been provided on the actual impacts of the MTEF on fiscal 
performance. In part, this reflects the lack of comprehensive data on MTEF implementation 
across countries. As a result, the existing literature offers a limited view on which to draw 
lessons on past experiences. 
This study aims to fill this gap in the literature by constructing a panel dataset for 181 
countries over the period 1990-2008 of the three MTEF phases: Medium-Term Fiscal 




Budgetary Framework (MTBF, which considers the allocation of aggregate spending over 
sectors) and Medium-Term Performance Framework (MTPF, which in addition considers 
performance aspects of spending). Second, it investigates the effect of each MTEF phase on 
the various aspects of fiscal performance: fiscal discipline, allocative efficiency and technical 
efficiency. Finally, the paper explores whether the MTEF impact is enhanced by the presence 
of an operational Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA) or law, political cohesion, democracy, the 
number of IMF Missions and membership in the OECD. 
The data reveal patterns in the timing of MTEF adoption across regions and levels of 
development. The OECD countries were the first to adopt MTEFs, and by the early 1990s 
most countries in this group had an MTPF in place. The bulk of MTEF reforms in Sub-
Saharan African countries took place in the 1990s. Latin American countries adopted MTEFs 
in the 1990s and 2000s, and Eastern Europe and the former soviet republics join the trend in 
the 2000s. Asian countries, however, do not display a clear adoption pattern. MTEF adoption 
is very likely endogenous to internal fiscal conditions, which makes the adequate 
identification of MTEF effects challenging. In this paper, in order to identify MTEFs’ 
impacts the differential patterns of MTEF adoption across regions are exploited. 
Both the event study analysis and the econometric results suggest that MTEF adoption 
strongly improves fiscal discipline and that there is a larger effect with each successive 
MTEF phase. At the same time, although the event study analysis fails to provide a clear 
picture, the econometrics analysis reveals that MTBFs improve allocative efficiency. Finally, 
the MTPF seems to be the only MTEF phase that exerts a significant effect on technical 
efficiency, although the results are not always robust. As for the regulatory and political 
factors, it is found that being a member of the OECD has a favorable effect, however none of 




The paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 discusses the role of the MTEF and its 
expected effects on the fiscal performance. It also reviews the relevant contributions in the 
literature. Section 3 presents some stylized facts. In section 4 the data, the event studies, the 
empirical strategy, and the interpretation of the econometric findings are presented. Section 5 




This section defines an MTEF, its different phases and their likely impact on fiscal 
performance. An overview of the literature is also provided. 
 
2.1. The Role of the MTEF 
MTEFs represent an approach to budgeting that addresses well-known shortcomings 
of annual budgeting (Wildavsky, 1986). Most public programs require funding and yield 
benefits over a number of years, but annual budgeting largely ignores future costs and 
benefits. Multi-year budget planning is the defining characteristic of MTEFs. Annual budgets 
take as their starting point the previous year’s budget and modify it in an incremental manner, 
making it difficult to re-prioritize policies and spending.
16
 MTEFs take a strategic forward-
looking approach to establishing spending priorities and resource allocation. They also look 
across sectors, programs and projects to see how spending can be restructured to best serve 
national objectives, which contrasts with the narrow self-interest of spending agencies and 
beneficiaries that dominates resource allocation under annual budgeting (World Bank, 1998).  
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 While incremental budgeting can work well in times of revenue growth, it comes under particular pressure 
when revenue falls, becomes more volatile or reaches its natural limit, and expenditure prioritization takes on 




MTEF effectiveness is assessed by identifying its impact on the three aspects of fiscal 
performance: fiscal discipline, allocative efficiency, and technical efficiency. Thus, if MTEF 
adoption constrains spending by resource availability (fiscal discipline), makes budget 
allocations reflect spending priorities (allocative efficiency), and generates cost effectiveness 
of the delivery of public goods and services (technical efficiency), it should lead to an 
improvement in all three of these areas.
17
 
Moreover, there are many cross synergies among these different aspects of fiscal 
performance. With an effective MTEF in place, governments should be free to focus on the 
microeconomic challenges of improving spending efficiency and not be pre-occupied with 
having to address the adverse macroeconomic consequences of persistent fiscal imbalances.
18
 
It should also be easier to maintain fiscal discipline if improvements to both allocative and 
technical efficiency reduce waste and inefficiencies. Moreover, against a background of fiscal 
discipline, new expenditure needs are more likely to prompt spending reallocations as 
opposed to requests for additional funding. Finally, both fiscal discipline and expenditure 
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 There is also a link to broader economic development. With improved fiscal outcomes, growth should be 
higher, inflation lower, and macroeconomic volatility reduced. Moreover, as the quality of spending improves, 
higher incomes should be accompanied by lower poverty rates, while better infrastructure should contribute to 
even higher growth and a further poverty reduction.  
18
 It can be argued that, in fact, large fiscal imbalances prompt better expenditure prioritization; however, the 
lessons from fiscal adjustments around the world is that spending cuts are borne disproportionately by high-
priority spending, and especially public investment in infrastructure, with adverse consequences for future 
growth (see, for example, Easterly e al., 2008). Lewis and Verhoeven (2010) report that the growth of public 
social spending has dipped as the global financial crisis has put fiscal positions under pressure, which risks 
setting back achievement of human development goals, because these depend on the rapid spending increases 




efficiency create fiscal space for productive spending on economic and social infrastructure, 
as well as in other high-priority areas, and to respond to fiscal risks.  
Following the taxonomy of Castro and Dorotinsky (2008), an MTEF can be broken 
down into three increasingly advanced phases: MTFF, MTBF and MTPF. MTFFs establish 
the aggregate fiscal ceilings; MTBFs establish the sector strategies and policies; and MTPFs 
shift the focus from inputs to outputs, outcomes and performance. Thus the three MTEF 
phases are ―nested:‖ an MTPF contains an MTBF, which in turn contains and MTFF. 
MTEFs can promote fiscal discipline by addressing a number of causes of the deficit 
bias. For example, by specifying an overall resource constraint, an MTEF reins in the 
political tendency to over-commit a fixed amount of resources (the common pool problem) 
because key policymakers have an incentive to internalize costs and benefits of public 
activities (i.e. centralized or delegation approach), or because policymakers internalize the 
spending externality by collectively negotiating and committing themselves to detailed 
multiannual fiscal targets (decentralized approach). These two principles, combined with 
structures and devices to transparently and efficiently monitor and enforce budget decisions, 
promote fiscal discipline. 
Further, by imparting a medium-term perspective to budgeting and taking into 
account the future fiscal costs of government policies and programs, an MTEF can fill 
information gaps that allow politicians to renege on commitments to implement affordable 
policies (the time consistency problem). A medium-term perspective also encourages 
governments to conduct discretionary stabilization in a symmetric, counter-cyclical manner, 
rather than asymmetrically which leads to rising deficits and debt (Kumar and Ter-Minassian, 
2007).  
In that they set a top-down resource constraint, MTFFs should have a significant 




works as intended. If rather than being viewed by spending agencies as constraints, ceilings 
or forward estimates are regarded as minimum entitlements, MTFFs could actually be a 
source of fiscal indiscipline and deficit bias (Schick, 2010). Since MTBFs and MTPFs 
incorporate an MTFF, they should have an increasingly strong effect on fiscal discipline 
compared to an MTFF alone. This is in part because countries that have the capacity to 
implement an MTBF or an MTPF will have greater success in working with an MTFF. But it 
is also a consequence of better prioritization and more emphasis on performance, which can 
bring the payoff to fiscal discipline into sharper focus.  
Prioritization guided by longer-term sector strategies should improve resource 
allocation. Insofar as spending agencies prepare sector strategies, and identify their resource 
needs and allocate their budgets according to strategic priorities, this bottom–up prioritization 
should produce a shift to spending with higher economic and social returns. However, the full 
pay-off to prioritization requires that choices are also made as to how resources should be 
allocated across sectors, which is done as part of the reconciliation between the top-down and 
bottom-up approaches involving a lead agency, normally the Ministry of Finance, and 
spending agencies, and in connection with which less strategic guidance may be available, 
especially in the absence of national medium-term planning. Moreover, as discussed later, 
these may be new roles for all the agencies involved, and there may be considerable learning-
by-doing before potential resource allocation gains are fully exploited. In addition, difficult 
decisions have to be made to cut low-priority but often politically sensitive spending. 
The outcome of effective prioritization should be a change in the composition of 
spending. In the short term, compositional volatility may increase following MTEF 
implementation as spending is reallocated to more productive sectors and programs. 
Thereafter, insofar as spending decisions are guided by strategic priorities with a longer-term 




how spending previously responded to short-term variations in resource availability. If the 
practice was that agency and program allocations were subjected to ad hoc changes as 
aggregate spending responds to short-term variations in resources, then longer-term 
compositional volatility would probably decline. If, on the other hand, spending was cut and 
restored across the board, or a few particular spending items were adjusted up and down, 
volatility might increase. On balance, based mainly on cross-country evidence that many 
fiscal adjustments are opportunistic and low-quality (references), it seems more likely that 
longer-term compositional volatility should decline, with the pay-off coming mainly from an 
MTBF and MTPF, although an MTFF may have some effect.   
Moreover, a shift away from unproductive spending should be observed.  Poor-quality 
investment, distorting and untargeted subsidies, bloated civil services and the like should not 
survive scrutiny under the MTEF, while productive spending on economic and social 
infrastructure, health and education services, and other growth- or development-friendly 
activities should be favored. So the introduction of an MTBF should certainly be associated 
with an increase in the share of productive spending in the total, and for an MTPF the impact 
should be somewhat stronger. An MTFF alone may also have a beneficial effect on resource 
allocation in that a medium-term resource constraint should lead to some re-examination of 
spending even with annual, input-focused budgeting. 
Technical efficiency is concerned with the link between inputs and outcomes. The 
better the economic and social outcomes achieved by spending programs from a given 
amount of budget resources, or the fewer resources used to achieve given outcomes, the more 
technically efficient is government spending. Improved technical efficiency may follow from 
an MTFF, but is more likely a consequence of an MTBF and MTPF, with the latter possibly 





2.2. A Review of the Literature 
 Since the mid-1990s, a large number of countries around the world have 
introduced MTEFs, in many cases with World Bank support. Reviews of experience with 
MTEFs, however, have suggested that they may not have lived up to expectations. Following 
some early work that raised issues about MTEF implementation (e.g., McNab et al., 2000; 
Oxford Policy Management, 2000), La Houerou and Talierco (2002) in their review of nine 
countries found that following MTEF introduction there was (i) only small improvement in 
the fiscal balance in South Africa and Tanzania, (although other studies report improved 
macroeconomic outcomes, e.g. Bevan and Palomba, 2000); (ii) evidence of reallocation to 
social spending linked to poverty reduction strategies in South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda, 
but no consistent pattern in other countries; (iii) no improvement in the budget deviation 
index;
19
 but (iv) increased civil society involvement in the budgeting process when the MTEF 
is published. The authors conclude that MTEFs, in most countries, have not led to 
improvements in annual budget preparation; budget behavior has not actually changed; the 
political leadership has little understanding of the MTEF; and MTEFs can become a means to 
present an unrealistic budget.  
Holmes and Evans (2003) review experience with MTEFs, again in nine countries 
(eight of which are in Africa). They conclude that MTEFs improved budgeting practices, 
albeit unevenly, and that in many cases they have both facilitated and were strengthened by 
the current emphasis on implementing poverty reduction strategies. The authors identify 
similar shortcomings as La Houerou and Talierco (2002) and highlight other requirements for 
success that are often not met (e.g., fiscal stability, effective engagement of donors and 
spending agencies). 
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 The budget deviation index is the sum of the absolute values of the difference between the approved budget 




The main conclusion of these two reviews is that MTEFs alone cannot deliver 
improved public expenditure management in countries in which other key aspects of budget 
management remain weak. More specifically, MTEF reforms have not taken sufficient 
account of initial country conditions in basic aspects of budget management and, with the 
exception of a few cases, have typically not paid sufficient attention to the political and 
institutional aspects of the reform process.  
 More recently, the World Bank’s Quality Assurance Group (2008) found 
evidence that MTEFs in Central America were no more successful than those in Africa. 
Wescott (2008) found mixed results for a sample of countries in different regions, and 
emphasized the importance of piloting MTEFs in areas where they are likely to deliver the 
largest payoff. Schiavo-Campo (2008) concluded that, while MTEFs have raised awareness 
of the need for a medium-term perspective and coordination between government agencies, 
many MTEFs are characterized by little or no ownership, divert attention from ―the basic 
plumbing‖ of expenditure management, and strain limited budgeting capacity. 
 Filc and Scartascini (2010) study MTEFs in Latin America and focus on 
Argentina, Colombia and Peru. They identified a number of common weaknesses in MTEF 
implementation, such as poor coordination and the poor quality of both statistics and 
projections. The authors recommend: (i) countries with weak capacity should introduce 
MTBFs and not the full MTPF; (ii) the MTFF should cover all government expenditures; 
(iii) expectations should not exceed feasibility; (iv) major benefits from the MTEF will only 
accrue if countries are in a sound fiscal position; and (v) to cease the strategic use of 
projections. 
 Oyugi (2008) studied the impact of MTEFs in Botswana, Kenya, Namibia, 
Tanzania and Zambia, and concluded that large budget deviations have compromised fiscal 




reallocation has proved difficult in Kenya, and sector advisory groups hardly meet in Zambia. 
 The comparative MTEF studies provide a compelling view of the limitations of 
MTEFs. However, the literature has focused on case studies of a limited number of countries, 
and therefore still lacks a comprehensive assessment of the MTEFs’ impact on fiscal 
performance. As a consequence, it is not clear whether MTEFs, despite their shortcomings, 
have been able to improve the budget environment in developing countries. This paper adds 
to this literature by building a comprehensive global MTEF database and by addressing the 
endogeneity issues that affect the accurate measurement of MTEF impacts on fiscal 
discipline, allocative efficiency, and technical efficiency.  
 
 
3. Stylized Facts 
Although some forms of medium-term expenditure projections existed in some OECD 
countries from the 1960s, the first application of a coherent system of forward budgeting 
occurred in Australia, where an MTEF was introduced in the 1980s (see Folscher, 2007). The 
MTEF has since been adopted by a large number of low and middle-income countries as a 
central element of public financial management (PFM) reform. 
 In the vast majority of cases the World Bank was involved in the decision to adopt 
and implement an MTEF, many of which came about as a result of a Public Expenditure 
Review (PER). The World Bank, however, is not the only sponsor of this approach, which 
has also been advocated by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the IMF (1999), though with some reservations. 
While MTEFs began to spread across industrial countries and Africa in the early 
1990s, it was not until the late 1990s and 2000s that they took off in emerging market 




MTEF. As Figure 1 shows, most MTEFs have been implemented since the mid-1990s, with 
an average of 10 countries a year introducing an MTEF between 1996 and 2008. Initially, 
MTEFs were dominated by MTFFs, and until recently about two-thirds of the increase in 
MTEFs has been in the form of new MTFFs. However, there has been a recent uptick in 
numbers of MTBFs and MTPFs, such that by the end 2008 there were 71 MTFFs, 42 MTBFs 
and 19 MTPFs. Table 1 shows that the shift to MTBFs and MTPFs has been mainly through 
transitions from one MTEF phase to another. There are only three countries (Bulgaria, 
Canada and Norway) that have moved from an MTFF to an MTBF and then to an MTPF 
during this period. 
 
 
 [Figure 1 about here] 
 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
 
 MTEF coverage varies significantly across country groups. Figure 2 shows 
that advanced economies have almost achieved complete coverage. Figure 3 shows that 
MTEF adoption in advanced countries occurred in two waves. In the late 1980s and early 
1990s, only a few advanced economies followed Australia’s lead in MTEF adoption, and 
then in the late 1990s MTEFs were introduced mainly in the European Union to support 
budgetary targets set as pre-condition for monetary union. By the end of 2008, almost half of 
the MTEFs in advanced economies were MTPFs. As there are relatively few MTBFs in these 




introducing a performance focus is a natural development, reflecting their more sophisticated 
budgeting systems. MTEFs have also achieved broad coverage of the countries in Europe and 
Central Asia. Figure 4 shows that things moved faster and further in Eastern and Central 
Europe than in the Former Soviet Union, which may reflect that countries of Eastern and 





[Figure 2 about here] 
 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
 
 Building on an early start in Botswana and Uganda, MTEFs have spread 
across Sub-Saharan Africa. Three-quarters of countries had one by the end of 2008. The 
number of MTFFs and MTBFs were relatively equal, and only three countries (Burkina Faso, 
Mauritius and Namibia) followed South Africa’s lead by implementing an MTPF. Figure 5 
reveals that MTEFs are now more numerous in Francophone Africa than Anglophone Africa. 
MTEFs have also been adopted by most countries in South Asia, with Nepal and Sri Lanka 
having MTBFs. 
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[Figure 5 about here] 
 
 
 MTEFs are less widespread in other regions, despite a recent spurt of 
adoptions in East Asia and the Pacific, including MTBFs in Cambodia and Thailand. The 
picture is similar in Latin America and the Caribbean, where a number of countries have 
introduced MTFFs following years of managing fiscal policy under IMF programs. Only four 
countries have moved beyond an MTFF and introduced an MTBF: Argentina, Colombia, 
Nicaragua and St. Lucia, although Brazil’s budgeting system has MTBF characteristics. In 
the Middle East and North Africa, MTEFs are a very recent innovation. Only Algeria and 
Jordan have an MTBF while major oil exporting countries (Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates) and Egypt have not adopted MTEFs.   
 The above patterns of MTEF adoption in developing countries have been 
relatively uniform across income levels, despite pronounced differences between regions. 
Apart from the widespread adoption of MTEFs in high-income countries, there is little 
difference across upper middle, lower middle, and lower-income countries. Indeed, if 
anything, MTEF adoption in developing countries appears to be inversely related to income 
level (see Figure 6). 
 
 







4. Empirical Analysis 
Reflecting the role of MTEFs outlined above, the empirical investigation tests the 
following three hypotheses: 
(i) MTFF improves fiscal discipline. 
(ii) MTBF improves allocative efficiency. 
MTBF improves fiscal discipline more than MTFF. 
(iii) MTPF improves technical efficiency. 
 MTPF improves allocative efficiency more than MTBF. 
MTPF improves fiscal discipline more than MTFF. 
 
Some other factors are thought to condition the MTEF effects on fiscal performance. 
Many countries have adopted FRAs (or fiscal rules) to safeguard against unsustainable fiscal 
policy. The presence of a FRA in combination with an MTEF may produce a stronger effect 
on fiscal discipline or may be redundant and not have any additional effect.  
In addition to economic factors, political variables have also been used to explore how 
the political environment affects fiscal performance. This issue was first highlighted by 
Roubini and Sachs (1989) who found that, all other things being equal, coalition governments 
tend to have larger budget deficits than single-party governments. Alesina and Perotti (1995) 
found similar results. Elgie and McMenamin (2008) initially replicated the political 
fragmentation model and found results consistent with the earlier studies, using a sample of 
OECD countries. When they added additional non-OECD democracies, however, the 
coefficient on the size of political fragmentation was no longer significant, which led the 
authors to conclude that the results of previous studies were sensitive to sample composition. 




related reforms easier to pass in the legislature and thus yield a stronger impact on fiscal 
discipline.  
The influence of democracy on fiscal policy outcomes has also been investigated in 
the literature. Alesina and Tabellini (1990) construct a model in which two policymakers with 
different objectives alternate power in a democracy. Their model shows that there will be 
higher deficits in a democracy where citizens disagree about the composition of public 
expenditures than an economy with an infinitely appointed social planner, and that the deficit 
bias increases as the degree of polarization between the two parties increases. Thus, it is 
interesting to explore whether the presence of the MTEF is enhanced in a democratic context. 
Technical assistance is expected to have a positive impact on fiscal discipline as 
significant resources have been directed to strengthening budget institutions during the past 
two decades (Dabla-Norris et al., 2010).  
Therefore, the following conditional effects are investigated: 
(vi)  MTEF impact is enhanced by the presence of an operational FRA or law. 
(v)  MTEF impact is enhanced by political cohesion. 
(vi)  MTEF impact is enhanced by democracy. 
(vii)  MTEF impact is enhanced by IMF technical assistance. 
(viii) MTEF impact is enhanced by the OECD membership. 
 
This section first presents the data and the event studies for the dependent variables. 
Second, the econometric strategies chosen for the analysis are introduced as well as the 








To exploit both cross-sectional and time series variation, a panel dataset of the MTEF 
phases for 181 countries over the period 1990-2008 is constructed. A brief description of the 
variables used in the analysis is provided below, while the Appendix contains a 
comprehensive list of variables and sources. 
Fiscal discipline, one of the indicators of fiscal performance, is measured by the 
central government’s overall balance. Although the literature suggests several additional 
indicators (e.g. primary balance, net debt, interest payments, and total expenditure), data 
availability limited the choice. Overall balance, beyond offering a greater data coverage, 
provides a more complete view on the fiscal constraints of the country. On the other hand, it 
should be noted that, contrary to the primary balance, it does not account from the effect of 
inflation on interest payments, and that interest payments are a function of accumulated debt 
and not the present fiscal stance. Primary balance, on a more limited sample of countries, has 
been used as a robustness check. 
The potential proxies for allocative efficiency are budget composition volatility and 
volatility of core spending (education and health). Since volatility in these sectors jeopardizes 
long-term objectives, education and healthcare spending should be largely unaffected by 
short-term fluctuations in GDP. In other words, allocative efficiency implies that spending in 
core sectors where needs are fairly constant does not behave in a volatile manner. However, 
given data constraints, the only available indicator is the volatility of the ratio of health 
spending to total spending, defined as the absolute value of the percentage change in the 




extrapolated using the HP filter
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,      , minus the same deviation at time    , normalized 
by the trend at time    : 
 
                            
                             
       
       (1) 
 
In order to better understand changes in allocative efficiency, an additional variable, 
general government expenditure on health as a percentage of total government expenditure, 
which proxies productive spending is used. If a country adopts an MTEF and this leads to 
improved allocative efficiency, a likely initial impact is that as health spending is brought in 
line with policy priorities, the share of health in overall government spending is adjusted. 
Thereafter, one would expect spending to be relatively stable in line with medium-term 
policy priorities.  
Finally, a Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) is performed to obtain a measure for 
technical efficiency. This technique was inspired by Farrell (1957), who defined technical 
efficiency as the ability to produce the maximum possible output from a given set of inputs, 
and measured it in terms of the relationship between the observed output and the maximum 
attainable output for the observed inputs. Inefficiencies might arise from waste or because the 
most cost effective set of programs and interventions are not implemented. 
The SFA approach requires the relation between outcomes and inputs to be specified. 
Thus, the country with the highest health level after controlling for inputs is the most 
efficient, and the efficiency level of the other countries is measured with respect to the 
maximum. The frontier is defined as a function of an efficient production to which two 
disturbances are added:    , a symmetrical disturbance that includes the random noise and 
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   , a biased strictly non-negative disturbance that is originated by technical inefficiencies.
22
 
The problem that arises in these methods is that the     component cannot be observed and 
must be inferred from the composite error term,            . The separation of noise and 
inefficiency components is made from the conditional expectation of     given     (see 
Jondrow et al.,1982). 
Thus, a production function that shows how health levels, proxied by life expectancy, 
vary with inputs, health spending per capita in PPP terms, is estimated as follows: 
 
                                                              
                 (2) 
 
where the group of covariates is the same as the one used in Greene (2005) when data 
are available.
23
 This group includes population density, years of schooling, a government 
indicator for voice and accountability, an indicator for government effectiveness, a dummy 
variable for OECD countries and year effects.
24
 All input variables, as well as the output 
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 In this manner, external events that affect the production function are normally distributed, however for    , 
the inefficiency term, various distributions have been proposed: normal mean distribution, exponential 
distribution, normal truncated distribution and Gamma distribution. However, there is no a priori reason to 
prefer any specific type of distribution on the errors. 
23
 As a backup strategy, the same production function with child mortality as output of the health sector has 
been estimated. However, this indicator is a ―reverse‖ output where a lower value is better, requiring a slight 
modification to the above model. Thus, it was adjusted by using the reciprocal of child mortality, but it should 
be noted that this modification is a non-linear transformation and cause results to be non-equivalent (in general, 
any non-linear transformation of input or output data leads to differences in inefficiency estimation results, 
including the ordering of production units, or countries in this case). 
24




variable, enter the production function in log form. The technical efficiency scores are 
obtained as a transformation of the non-negative disturbance: 
 
                              
         (3) 
 
The MTEF variables consist of three mutually exclusive dummies
25
—MTFF, MTBF, 
and MTPF—which were coded as one if a country met the following criteria: 
 MTFF: the government has rolling aggregate, expenditure, revenue, and other 
fiscal forecasts. Features include the availability of a macro-fiscal strategy, macroeconomic 
and fiscal forecasts, and debt sustainability analysis. 
 MTBF: the budget, spending agency or other reports explain aggregate and 
sectoral expenditure objectives and strategies, budget circulars detail medium-term 
expenditure ceilings and revenue forecasts, and budget documents contain some detail for 
medium-term estimates. Note that countries that introduced piloted MTBFs were considered 
as MTFFs as the health sector might be one of the uncovered ones. 
 MTPF: the budget, spending agency or other reports explain program 
objectives and strategies, listing specific agency and/or program output or outcome targets, as 
well as results. 
For the purpose of this paper, no value judgments were made to distinguish between a 
well-functioning MTEF and an MTEF which only exists in regulations or law. Such a 
distinction would introduce a significant amount of subjectivity into the analysis. 
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 The value one has been given in the years in which the country adopted its highest MTEF phase, zero 
otherwise. Thus, if a country had an MTPF, the other dummies were coded as zero to isolate the impact on the 




The construction of the MTEF dummies relied upon an extensive data collection 
effort as no single type of document sufficiently describes the existing institutional 
arrangements for all countries or even individual countries. Thus, the data were compiled 
from a large number of sources, including IMF Article IV country reports, IMF Fiscal 
Transparency Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs), World Bank 
PERs, and World Bank Country Financial Accountability Assessments (CFAAs), OECD 
documents, donor case studies, and country websites (see Appendix for a more detailed 
description of the data sources). Additionally, World Bank and IMF public sector specialists 
supplemented the above information with technical details.  
In order to test whether the MTEF impact is enhanced by the presence of a FRA, a 
dummy variable is constructed and takes the value one when an expenditure rule, a revenue 
rule, a debt rule, or a budget balance rule (or a combination of them) is operational, zero 
otherwise. Along the same lines, political cohesion is measured through a dummy variable 
that takes the value one if the fraction of seats held by the government (calculated by dividing 
the number of government seats by total seats) is higher than 50 percent, zero otherwise.  
Many different measures have been used to measure democracy, such as Freedom 
House, Polity IV, etc. Cheibub et al. (2010), address the strengths and weaknesses of the 
main democracy indicators, concluding that they are not interchangeable. However, they also 
argue that a measure of democracy based on a minimalist conception is compatible with most 
of the theoretical issues that animate empirical research. Thus, in their extension of the 
dataset firstly published in Alvarez et al. (1996), they include the variable Democracy-
Dictatorship (DD) that is adopted in this analysis. 
Finally, the number of IMF technical assistance missions has been introduced to test 
for an enhanced MTEF impact. 





4.2. Event Studies 
The event studies are conducted by normalizing each country’s MTEF 
implementation date to year  , distinguishing between MTFFs, MTBFs and MTPFs. The 
measures of fiscal discipline, allocative efficiency and technical efficiency, are averaged 
across countries and plotted for years    ,    ,    ,  ,    ,     and    , along 
with 95 percent confidence intervals. Given an interest in whether MTEFs spur better fiscal 
performance, it is instructive to compare years    ,    ,     with years    ,     and 
   , and so averages for these periods are indicated.26 Longer-term pre- and post-MTEF 
averages are also shown, to provide an indication of the more durable influence of MTEFs.
27
 
The event study analysis suggests that fiscal discipline is stronger after MTEF 
implementation. Panel a of Figure 7 shows that the fiscal deficit is almost 3 percentage points 
of GDP lower on average in the 3 years following MTEF implementation than in the 3 years 
preceding it, while the longer-term improvement is around 3.5 percentage points. It would 
seem, however, that the fiscal improvement is short-lived, with the fiscal balance weakening 
3 years after MTEF implementation, but a comparison of longer-term pre- and post-MTEF 
averages reveals that this down turn and any subsequent deterioration is temporary. Further 
analysis indicates that the source of the fiscal improvement is both lower spending and higher 
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 A case can be made for including year t as the first year of the post-MTEF period since the MTEF was in 
effect that year. However, in some cases it is unclear whether an MTEF became operational in the year of 
implementation, especially in cases where the calendar and fiscal years do not coincide, hence the decision to 
treat the implementation year as transitional.  
27
 Note that not all countries that have implemented MTEFs can be included in the event studies because some 
MTEFs were in place or introduced very early or late in the 1990-2008 period. Also, since MTPFs are a more 





revenue, with a significantly larger contribution from the latter. The pattern is similar for 
MTFFs (see Panel b of Figure 7). 
The fiscal balance actually begins to improve in the year of MTEF implementation. If 
the MTEF became fully operational in that year this could reflect the immediate impact of the 
MTEF. However, it was noted above that there are reasons to treat this as a transitional year, 
and not part of the post-MTEF period. If included as the first of a three year post-MTEF 
window (comprising years   ,    , and    ), this would show the MTEF as having an 
even stronger impact since the fiscal balance deteriorates in year    . Moreover, the earlier 
improvement in the fiscal balance could also be due to the signaling effect that the MTEF 
adoption announcement exerts and to the fact that an MTEF is typically adopted with or after 
other PFM reforms that might be positively affecting the fiscal balance. 
MTBFs and MTPFs have a larger impact on fiscal discipline than MTFFs. As Panel c 
and d of Figure 7 reveal, MTPFs are associated with a larger fiscal improvement than 
MTBFs. When the components of the fiscal balance are analyzed separately, it is clear that 
while the improvement under an MTBF is revenue driven, the improvement under an MTPF 
is expenditure driven. MTPFs are also implemented against the background of much stronger 
fiscal positions, which could suggest that strong fiscal discipline provides the opportunity to 
focus on improving efficiency as a means of strengthening fiscal positions. The interpretation 
of this result is limited, however, by the small number of MTPFs in the sample. 
 
 






Figure 8 confirms the expected long-term reduction in the volatility of allocations to 
the health sector. No increase in the short-term volatility, however, is observable as one 
might expect from a shift in budgetary allocations after MTEF adoption. The absence of 
short-term volatility might be due to the normalization of the volatility measure for the trend 
at time    . If the normalization is avoided, the panel for the MTBF (not shown) suggests 
an increased and somewhat erratic short-term volatility in health spending with an MTBF, 
which is consistent with a short-term shift in resources to the health sector and a modestly 
higher health share. 
Figure 9 suggests that MTEFs do not have a significant short-term or long-term 
impact on the health expenditure share, which may indicate that health spending was a 
sufficiently high priority before MTEF implementation.  
 
 
[Figure 8 about here] 
 
 
[Figure 9 about here] 
 
 
The impact of MTEFs on technical efficiency is difficult to discern from the event 
study. Figure 10 suggests that an MTEF has no relevant impact on technical efficiency both 
in the short- and longer-term. While an MTPF appears to have a positive effect on technical 
efficiency in the short term, the lack of any impact over the longer term is difficult to 




with caution. Also, the results are likely affected by the small within-variation of the output 
variable (life expectancy) and the relatively short time span. 
 
 




4.3. Empirical Strategy 
Three well-known methodological challenges must be overcome to correctly identify 
the impact of a PFM reform, such as an MTEF, on fiscal performance: reverse causality, 
omitted variable bias, and errors-in-variables. 
First, reverse causality arises because fiscal stress (e.g., a financial crisis) may have 
prompted a country to restrain spending, adopt an MTEF, or strengthen an existing one. The 
problem has been extensively discussed in the literature (see Alesina and Perotti, 1999; Stein, 
Talvi and Grisanti, 1999: Knight and Levinson, 2000; Perrotti and Kontopoulos, 2002; and 
Fabrizio and Mody, 2006), but none of the authors were able to find an instrument which 
influences the probability of a budgetary reform (or a change in fiscal institutions in general) 
and is not itself affected by fiscal performance. 
If MTEFs have positive effects on fiscal outcomes, and poor fiscal outcomes improve 
the chances of adopting an MTEF, then the simultaneous causality bias would be expected to 
be negative. If this were the case, the estimates are still useful as a lower bound for the actual 
effect. However, if countries adopt MTEFs in good fiscal times, the reverse causality bias is 




underlying assumption in the earlier papers has been that budget performance cannot quickly 
feed back into budgetary reforms.  
Second, the omitted variable bias arises due to the failure to account for a factor that 
affects both the adoption of an MTEF and fiscal performance. For instance, strong economic 
growth may reduce the pressure on a government to reform fiscal institutions, and, at the 
same time, improve the government’s fiscal outcomes, thus leading to a negative omitted 
variable bias. In general, the risk of attributing the effect of the omitted variables to the 
regressors will generate an overstatement of the fiscal institutions effect. As specified by 
Fabrizio and Mody (2006), a partial solution to this problem is to disregard the variation 
across countries and analyze only the within-country variation. This approach, in effect, 
eliminates the country specific fixed effects that may influence budget deficits but may not be 
observed. Thus, by focusing on variations within a country over time, the problem of omitted 
variables is alleviated but not eliminated. Most studies have not been able to adopt this 
method because either budget institutions do not move much over time or because these 
movements are difficult to measure. Where it has been implemented, Knight and Levinson 
(2000) suggest that the results are typically different from those obtained in cross-country 
analysis, indicating that the problem of omitted variables is relevant.  
Finally, if some of the variables in the analysis are not measured accurately, there is 
the potential for errors-in-variables bias, which usually dampens the effect of interest. 
Although in the empirical model, the primary explanatory variable, MTEF status, can be 
observed with a high degree of precision, there is still scope for measurement error in the 
MTEF dummies and the other explanatory variables. 
To address these endogeneity issues, an instrument for MTEF adoption is constructed, 
defined as the geographic diffusion of a given MTEF phase. As mentioned, MTEFs have, to a 




adopt MTEFs at short time intervals from each other. At the same time, there is little reason 
to expect that a neighbor’s fiscal institutions directly affect a country’s fiscal performance, 
which likely satisfies instrument exogeneity. Regional MTEF diffusion is defined as follows: 
 
 
            
                            (4) 
 
where   is the observed country,   is the total number of countries in the geographical 
region
28
, and           is the number of countries in the region that introduced the MTEF. 
 Unfortunately, only two of the three instruments pass the relevance test – 
MTPF diffusion is not strong enough to serve as a valid instrument jointly with the other two. 
To overcome the strength issue, the three static instruments are augmented with dynamic 
instruments, as suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991).
29
 This strategy also allows us to 
account for possible persistence in fiscal outcomes, by using a lagged dependent variable.
30
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 The United Nations sub-regions classification has been adopted for the diffusion instrument calculation. 
29
 The Arellano-Bond (1991) and the Arellano-Bover (1995)/Blundell-Bond (1998) dynamic panel estimators 
have become increasingly popular. As Roodman (2006) notes, both are general estimators designed for 
situations with ―small T, large N‖ panels, a linear functional relationship, a single left-hand-side variable that is 
dynamic, independent variables that are not strictly exogenous (correlated with past and possibly current 
realizations of the error), fixed individual effects, and heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within individuals 
but not across them. 
30
 Lagging the dependent variable might alleviate the reverse causality problem as well, if fiscal reforms respond 




Arellano-Bond estimation, also known as ―Difference GMM‖, transforms all 
regressors by differencing and uses the Generalized Method of Moments (Hansen 1982).
31
 
However, the lagged levels of the regressors might be poor instruments for the first-
differenced regressors. If this is the case, the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimator, also 
known as ―System GMM‖, should be used. This estimator uses the levels equation to obtain a 
system of two equations: one differenced and one in levels. By adding the second equation, 
additional instruments can be obtained. Thus, the variables in levels in the second equation 
are instrumented with their own first differences. The underlying additional assumption is 
that first differences of instrumented variables are uncorrelated with the fixed effects. This 
technique allows the introduction of more instruments, and can dramatically improve 
efficiency. 
Moreover, both country and time variation in the data are exploited by controlling for 
(i) long-term country characteristics, such as culture and norms (using country fixed effects); 
and (ii) global factors that impact all countries, such as resource prices (using year fixed 
effects).  A possible concern about the exogeneity of neighbors’ MTEF adoption status is that 
it is driven by regional shocks that affect countries located in the same geographical region. 
To control for this confound, region-year interactions (or region-specific time trend) have 
been included. 
Errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and, following Bertrand et al. (2004), are 
clustered at the country level to correct for possible serial correlation within countries. 
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 Sometimes, the forward orthogonal deviations transform, proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995), is 




4.4. Baseline Specifications and Conditional Effects 
An empirical model which relates fiscal performance to the introduction of the MTEF 
frameworks and a set of covariates is estimated for each performance indicator: 
 
                    
                                                      (5) 
 
where the dependent variable                     is the ratio of overall fiscal 
balance of the central government to GDP for fiscal discipline, the volatility of health 
spending to total spending and the health spending share for allocative efficiency, and the 
technical efficiency scores derived from the stochastic frontier estimation for technical 
efficiency;      ,       and       are mutually exclusive dummy variables for the 
presence of the frameworks;              include a set of controls commonly used in the 
literature such as GDP growth, trade openness, population, inflation, aid and dummies for oil 
exporters, conflicts, HIPC initiative, IMF program and credit market access;   is a set of 
unchanging country specific effects (proxied by country dummies);    are effects common to 
all countries in period t (time dummies); and     is the error term.  
To test the conditional effects hypotheses, a second set of regressions is estimated 
with the addition of interaction terms to study the conditional effects on MTFF is estimated: 
 
                                                             
                                      (6) 
 




To check the sensitivity of the results to alternative specifications, the model with 
alternative sets of covariates and instruments is estimated. Furthermore, the robustness of the 
results is checked by using pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), and by introducing fixed 
effects, year effects and regional trends. In these models, identification is based on 
uninstrumented difference-in-differences comparisons.  
Another relevant concern is the robustness of the results to possible outliers. In 
particular, because of the large changes in fiscal balance in some countries or changes in 
fiscal institutions not well documented, the question arises whether the results are driven by 
these countries. The approach proposed by Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002) is followed, excluding 
one region at a time to test for the possibility of influential observations. 
 
4.5. Empirical Results 
The results for fiscal discipline are presented in Table 3. From column (1) to column 
(8) the same specification is estimated using different techniques. Endogeneity is best 
handled when the Arellano-Bond System GMM estimator is adopted (columns (5) to (8)) and 
the results overall confirm a strong and positive contribution of all the phases of the MTEF to 
fiscal discipline. As expected, the higher the level of MTEF sophistication (from an MTFF to 
an MTBF and finally to an MTPF), the bigger the magnitude of the impact. For instance, in 
column (8), the preferred specification, the adoption of an MTFF increases the overall fiscal 
balance by 0.85 percentage points, the MTBF by 0.99 percentage points and the MTPF by 
2.82 percentage points. 
Among the controls, the coefficient for oil exporters has an important impact on fiscal 
discipline. It has a positive and significant sign with a fairly high magnitude, implying that oil 
exporting countries enjoy extra revenues that improve the overall fiscal balance. At the same 




small, significant and negative coefficient, which could be the result of lower disbursements 
with respect to what was committed by donors. In Column (9), credit market access is added 
to the equation, but the estimated coefficient on this variable was not significant. It is 
worthwhile noting that both the magnitude and the statistical significance of the main three 
coefficients remain robust despite the large number of missing observations on this variable. 
 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
 
Estimates remain statistically strong and qualitatively similar across all specifications 
in Table 3. Although estimated coefficients for MTEF dummies are higher in magnitude, they 
are positive, significant and almost always scaled from MTFF to MTPF. Significance is only 
lost for MTFF and MTBF when the uninstrumented difference-in-differences approach is 
adopted. 
In Table 4, the regulatory and political factors that may potentially affect the MTEFs’ 
impact are explored. In column (1), it is measured how MTFF’s impact depends on the 
presence of a FRA. The estimates suggest that a FRA improves the effect of MTFF on fiscal 
balance by 0.6 percentage points, but this improvement is not statistically different from zero. 
Column (2) suggests that an MTFF’s impact does not depend on whether the ruling 
government has a majority, while column (3) finds no support for the notion that MTEFs’ 
effects are different between democracies and autocracies. Column (4) finds no evidence that 
IMF missions influence the effectiveness of an MTFF. Finally, column (5) suggests that 






[Table 4 about here] 
 
 
Tables 5 and 6 show the empirical findings of the MTEF impact on allocative 
efficiency. The dependent variable in Table 5 is the volatility of health spending, as 
previously defined. The volatility measure alone, however, may not provide the full picture of 
the effect of the MTEF on allocative efficiency. Therefore, Table 6 presents the results for 
productive spending, proxied by general government expenditure on health as a percentage of 
total government expenditure.  
Column (8) of Table 5 provides the results for the specification that best handles 
endogeneity issues. The strongest effects are expected on the MTBF and MTPF variables, 
and this is partially confirmed in the empirical findings. More specifically, MTBF reduces the 
volatility of health allocations by 2.95 percentage points and a non-negligible negative and 
significant effect comes from the implementation of the MTFF, which reduces the health 
spending volatility by 2.66 percentage points. This effect is likely to be due to the inclusion 
of the piloted MTBFs into the MTFF category.
32
 Finally, countries that introduced an MTPF 
do not experience a significant reduction in the volatility of health expenditures. There are 
two possible explanations. First, countries with MTPFs are typically the advanced economies 
(see Figure 6) that already have low volatility levels. Second, as highlighted in Section 3, 
none of the MTPF reformers transitioned from having no MTFF or an MTFF, to an MTPF. 
Thus, although half of the MTPFs were adopted concurrently with the MTBF, the other half 
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of countries already had an MTBF that most likely already impacted the volatility of health 
spending prior to MTPF adoption. 
The only covariate that presents a significant coefficient is the aid variable. More, 
specifically, aid flows seem to increase the volatility of health spending and this might reflect 
the unpredictable nature of aid flows. In column 9, the Credit Market Access variable is once 
again added to the specification, and although the coefficient has the expected negative sign, 
it is not significant.
33
 In the same specification, being an oil exporter significantly increases 
the volatility in health spending as predicted. This result is likely to be due to the windfall 
revenues that the oil dependence generates. 
Overall, the results are quite robust to the employment of other techniques, although 
significance is lost when the difference-in-difference approach is used. 
 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
 
Table 6 completes the picture of allocative efficiency by showing the results for 
productive spending. The dependent variable is general government expenditure on health as 
a percentage of total government expenditure. As expected, Column (8) shows a positive and 
significant effect for all the MTEF phases, with the magnitude scaled from MTFF to MTPF. 
More specifically, MTEF adoption increases spending on health as a percentage of the total 
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 Note that both aid flows and credit market access imply incoming funds, however the expected signs on the 
two variables are opposite. In the former case, the money inflow is poorly predictable, therefore generating 
variability in the allocations across sectors; in the latter case, the country resorts to credit market only when it 




spending by 0.40 percentage points, the MTBF by 0.48 percentage points and the MTPF by 
1.04 percentage points. Interestingly, only MTBF is significant once the Credit Market 
Access variable is introduced, which also has a positive and strongly significant effect. 
As expected, GDP growth increases expenditure on health as a percentage of total 
spending. At the same time, being an oil exporter negatively affects the relative spending on 
health, probably because resources are dedicated to investments in oil related activities. 
The use of other techniques generates positive signs on the MTEF dummies, however, 
the results are not always significant. Overall, Tables 5 and 6 provide evidence that MTEF 
adoption exerts a positive effect on allocative efficiency. 
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Finally, Table 7 presents estimates of the MTEF’s impact on technical efficiency.The 
specification that best handles endogeneity is presented in column 8, which shows a positive 
and significant effect from MTPF adoption. As expected, it is only the last phase of the 
MTEF that has a significant effect on the technical efficiency.  
The results are quite robust for all the specifications employing the GMM estimator. 
The findings from the application of other estimation techniques show mixed results. 
 
 






Overall the results provide evidence that MTEF adoption improves fiscal discipline 
and that more advanced stages yield a greater impact. At the same time, productive spending 
is enhanced in MTEF countries and MTBF (and MTFF to a lesser extent) adoption decreases 
the volatility of health spending as a ratio of total spending, thus improving allocative 
efficiency. Finally, the MTPF seems to be the only MTEF phase that exerts a significant 




In the last twenty years, MTEFs have been adopted by more than 130 countries, and 
have achieved almost significant coverage across the globe. Although there has been much 
debate in the literature as to whether MTEFs are a worthwhile strategy, this paper is the first 
to empirically investigate the impact of MTEFs on fiscal performance in a broad sample of 
countries. In order to disentangle the effect of each MTEF phase (MTFF, MTBF and MTPF), 
a panel dataset spanning 181 countries over the period 1990-2008 is constructed. 
The event study analysis suggests that fiscal discipline is stronger after MTEF 
implementation and also in the longer-term. Moreover, it shows that MTBFs and MTPFs 
have a larger impact on fiscal discipline than MTFFs. As expected, the volatility of 
allocations to the health sector decreases in the long-term, but no clear short- or longer-term 
effect is observable on the health expenditure share. Lastly, the impact of MTEFs on 
technical efficiency is difficult to distinguish from the event study and only the MTPF seems 
to have a short-term positive impact.  
The econometric findings corroborate the event study results. MTEF adoption is 
associated with a strong improvement in fiscal discipline and there is a greater effect with 




is enhanced in the MTEF adopting countries and MTBF adoption decreases the volatility of 
health spending as a ratio of total spending, thus improving allocative efficiency. Finally, the 
MTPF seems to be the only MTEF phase that exerts a significant effect on technical 
efficiency of the health sector, although results are not always robust. No significant effect on 
MTEF effectiveness is found, however, from the number of IMF missions, political factors 
such as majority vs. minority governments or democratic vs. autocratic governments, or FRA 
adoption, while OECD membership generates a positive and significant effect. 
This analysis may be subject to two caveats. First, an MTEF might be in place only in 
law (de jure) and not in practice (de facto). The potential bias in this case, however, is 
negative and the estimates could still be regarded as a lower bound. Second, the analysis of 
the impact on allocative efficiency and technical efficiency is limited to the health sector and 
does not represent the entire budget composition due to limited data availability.  
Overall, the evidence is supportive of MTEF implementation and, in particular, of 
MTPFs. Thus, the results may be of particular interest to multilateral and bilateral providers 
of technical assistance to PFM reforms, and to country authorities seeking to introduce or 







Table A: Variables and sources 
Variable Source Definition 
Fiscal Discipline WEO Ratio of the overall central government fiscal balance to GDP. 
Health Spending Volatility WHO 
Absolute value of the percentage change in the deviation of the ratio of health spending to total spending from the 
trend componentextrapolated using the HP filter, minus the same deviation at time t-1, normalized by the trend at time 
t-1. 
Productive Spending WHO General government expenditure on health as a percentage of total government expenditure. 
Technical Efficiency WDI 
Estimations of the efficiency scores from a stochastic frontier model that shows life expectancy as output and health 
spending per capita in PPP terms as input (along with population density, years of schooling, a government indicator 
for voice and accountability, and one for government effectiveness, a dummy variable for OECD countries and year 
effects). 
MTFF 
World Bank / IMF documents; 
Case Studies 
Dummy variable that takes the value one if the MTFF is the highest framework adopted, zero otherwise. 
MTBF 
World Bank / IMF documents; 
Case Studies 
Dummy variable that takes the value one if the MTBF is the highest framework adopted, zero otherwise. 
MTPF 
World Bank / IMF documents; 
Case Studies 
Dummy variable that takes the value one if the MTPF is the highest framework adopted, zero otherwise. 
MTFF Diffusion 
World Bank / IMF documents; 
Case Studies; UN data 
Ratio of countries in the same UN region adopting an MTFF to the number of countries in the UN region, excluding 
the country itself.  
MTBF Diffusion 
World Bank / IMF documents; 
Case Studies; UN data 
Ratio of countries in the same UN region adopting an MTBF to the number of countries in the UN region, excluding 
the country itself. 
MTPF Diffusion 
World Bank / IMF documents; 
Case Studies; UN data 
Ratio of countries in the same UN region adopting an MTPF to the number of countries in the UN region, excluding 
the country itself. 
Health Spending Per Capita (PPP) WHO Education Expenditure per capita in PPP terms. 
GDP Per Capita (PPP) WEO Current GDP per capita in PPP terms. 
Population Density WDI People per squared kilometer. 
Years of Schooling WDI Number of years of primary and secondary education completed. 
Government Voice and 
Accountability 
WGI 
Index capturing perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their 





Table A (Continued) 




Index capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence 
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies. 
OECD OECD Dummy variable that takes the value one if the country belongs to the OECD club, zero otherwise. 
FRA FAD Fiscal Rules Database 
Dummy variable that takes the value one if a debt rule or a balanced budget rule or a revenue rule or an expenditure rule is 
adopted, zero otherwise. 
Political Cohesion DPI 
Dummy variable that takes the value one if the fraction of seats held by the government (calculated by dividing the number of 
government seats by total seats) is higher than 50 percent, zero otherwise. 
Democracy Cheibub et al (2010) 
Democracy-Dictatorship (DD) dummy variable that takes the value one if a regime meets the following requirements: (1) the 
chief executive must be chosen by popular election or by a body that was itself popularly elected, (2) the legislature must be 
popularly elected, (3) there must be more than one party competing in the elections, (4) an alternation in power under electoral 
rules identical to the ones that brought the incumbent to office must have taken place, zero otherwise.  
IMF Missions IMF Number of IMF FAD Technical Assistance missions per year. 
GDP Growth WDI Real GDP growth rate. 
Trade Openness WDI Trade openness measured as the ratio of the sum of imports plus exports to GDP. 
Inflation WEO Inflation rate. 
HIPC Initiative World Bank 
Dummy variable that takes the value one if the country is in the period between the decision point and the completion point, 
zero otherwise. 
Aid OECD Overseas Development Assistance net disbursements as a percentage of GDP. 
Oil-Exporter WEO Dummy variable that takes the value one if the ratio of oil exports to GDP is higher or equal to 30 percent. 
Conflict CSCW Dummy variable that takes the value one if there are at least 1,000 battle-related deaths, zero otherwise. 
IMF Program IMF Dummy variable that takes the value one if the country had an IMF Program, zero otherwise. 






Table 1: Sources of MTEF Growth, 1990-2008 
  1990 New 
MTEFs 
Transitions Reversals 2008 
MTFF 9 104 -41 -1 71 
MTBF 1 21 23 -3 42 
MTPF 1 0 18 0 19 
MTEF 11 125 0 -4 132 
Notes: The MTFF reversal is Argentina, the MTBF reversals are Argentina, Estonia and 






Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
      Across Within     
Fiscal Discipline 2991 -2.24 9.40 9.59 -151.33 384.15 
Health Spending Volatility 2293 8.88 6.92 10.45 0.00 188.74 
Productive Spending 2471 10.64 4.18 1.93 0.00 41.33 
Technical Efficiency 1434 90.82 7.58 1.20 61.51 99.21 
MTFF 3378 0.17 0.20 0.32 0 1 
MTBF 3378 0.07 0.15 0.22 0 1 
MTPF 3378 0.04 0.15 0.13 0 1 
MTFF Diffusion 3359 0.17 0.12 0.18 0 1 
MTBF Diffusion 3359 0.07 0.09 0.12 0 1 
MTPF Diffusion 3359 0.04 0.12 0.08 0 1 
Health Spending Per Capita (PPP) 2465 667.68 939.93 284.37 0 7536.27 
GDP Per Capita (PPP) 3140 8735.82 10464.41 3428.78 122.88 79485.46 
Population Density 3304 188.89 638.90 60.86 1.43 6943.19 
Years of Schooling 1435 10.50 2.29 0.56 2.10 16.67 
Government Voice and Accountability 1798 47.78 27.92 5.26 0 100 
Government Effectiveness 1756 48.18 27.96 6.59 0 100 
OECD 3439 0.16 0.36 0.08 0 1 
FRA 3439 0.25 0.32 0.29 0 1 
Political Cohesion 2798 0.82 0.25 0.29 0 1 
Democracy 3325 0.56 0.46 0.18 0 1 
IMF Missions 3439 0.51 0.75 1.64 0 32 
GDP Growth 3250 3.74 2.63 6.18 -51.03 106.28 
Trade Openness 3069 85.28 49.14 16.89 0.31 456.65 
Inflation 3202 47.39 164.88 477.52 -26.32 23773.10 
HIPC Initiative 3439 0.04 0.10 0.17 0 1 
Aid 3233 3.67 6.88 3.81 -2.96 96.42 
Oil-Exporter 3233 0.07 0.24 0.11 0 1 
Conflict 3439 0.05 0.14 0.17 0 1 
IMF Program 3378 0.33 0.35 0.32 0 1 
Population 3426 
32.86 122.00 8.64 0.01 
1324.66 
Notes: The sample consists of 181 countries during 1990-2008. Data sources and units of measurement are 





Table 3: MTEF Effects on Fiscal Discipline 
Dependent Variable = Central Government Balance as percentage of GDP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  Pooled 
OLS 































MTFF 1.94*** 1.46*** 0.09 0.46 1.16*** 1.61*** 0.58 0.85** 0.86* 
 (0.43) (0.44) (0.52) (0.48) (0.37) (0.42) (0.44) (0.42) (0.49) 
MTBF 1.65*** 2.24*** 0.22 0.64 1.56*** 1.95*** 0.82 0.99* 1.17* 
 (0.54) (0.55) (0.70) (0.66) (0.50) (0.54) (0.56) (0.52) (0.60) 
MTPF 3.95*** 5.67*** 2.47** 2.97*** 2.57*** 3.83*** 1.82** 2.82*** 3.00** 
 (0.63) (0.86) (1.06) (0.84) (0.92) (0.99) (0.93) (0.96) (1.25) 
Lag GDP Growth 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.08*** 0.07*** -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Trade Openness 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Oil Exporter 6.08*** 4.37*** 3.52*** 3.20*** 4.08*** 4.17*** 3.84*** 3.89*** 5.09*** 
 (1.68) (0.96) (0.97) (0.92) (1.03) (1.04) (1.04) (1.04) (1.18) 
Conflict -3.04** -2.56** -2.05** -2.00* -1.61** -1.58** -1.60** -1.56** -1.64* 
 (1.23) (1.11) (1.03) (1.10) (0.66) (0.65) (0.65) (0.64) (0.88) 
Lag IMF Program 0.08 0.25 0.49 0.32 -0.25 -0.23 -0.22 -0.20 -0.41 
 (0.44) (0.37) (0.36) (0.38) (0.29) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.41) 
Population 0.00 0.02 -0.07* -0.06 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Population Sq. -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Inflation -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
HIPC -0.13 -0.46 -0.62 -2.03*** 0.15 0.08 -0.10 -0.13 -0.05 
 (0.77) (0.76) (0.80) (0.72) (0.76) (0.75) (0.78) (0.77) (0.80) 
Aid -0.11** -0.06 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05* -0.05 -0.06* -0.05* -0.04 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Lag Fiscal Discipline     0.37*** 0.37*** 0.33*** 0.35*** 0.31*** 
     (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) 
Lag Credit         0.70 
   Market Access         (0.53) 
Fixed Effects N Y Y Y - - - - - 
Year Effects N N Y N N N Y Y Y 
Countries 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 
Instruments - - - - 27 30 44 47 43 
AR(2) test [p-value] - - - - 0.171 0.168 0.134 0.126 0.255 
Hansen J [p-value] - - - - 0.605 0.58 0.468 0.315 0.398 
Observations 2,613 2,613 2,613 2,613 2,605 2,605 2,605 2,605 1,914 
R-sq. 0.16 0.49 0.53 0.55 - - - - - 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by country. GMM specifications use lags 1-3 of the endogenous 
variables with collapsed instrument matrix. Three additional instruments based on MTEF diffusion in the neighboring area are 






Table 4: MTEF Conditional Effects on Fiscal Discipline 
Dependent Variable = Central Government Balance as percentage of GDP 
 





































MTFF 0.72 0.80 -0.08 0.82* 0.88* 
 (0.55) (0.75) (1.12) (0.43) (0.46) 
MTBF 1.08** 0.84* 2.05 0.88* 0.91* 
 (0.51) (0.50) (1.36) (0.52) (0.53) 
MTPF 3.08*** 2.69*** 0.75 2.77*** 0.59 
 (0.94) (0.88) (1.38) (0.96) (0.95) 
MTFF x FRA 0.60     
 (0.67)     
FRA -0.53     
 (0.53)     
MTFF x   0.03    
   Political Cohesion  (0.70)    
Political Cohesion  -0.53    
  (0.43)    
Democracy   -1.27   
   (2.15)   
MTFF x    1.63   
   Democracy   (2.17)   
MTBF x    -1.69   
   Democracy   (2.47)   
MTPF x    2.69   
   Democracy   (2.37)   
MTFF x     -0.03  
   IMF Missions    (0.11)  
IMF Missions    -0.03  
    (0.08)  
MTPF x OECD     2.97** 
     (1.47) 
OECD     -0.39 
          (0.83) 
Year Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Countries 162 148 161 162 162 
Instruments 57 53 62 53 52 
AR(2) test [p-value] 0.128 0.438 0.133 0.134 0.127 
Hansen J [p-value] 0.251 0.203 0.511 0.362 0.544 
Observations 2,605 2,254 2,587 2,605 2,605 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by country. GMM 
specifications use lags 1-3 of the endogenous variables with collapsed 
instrument matrix. Three additional instruments based on MTEF diffusion in the 
neighboring area are used as indicated. The constant term, Lag of GDP growth, 
Trade Openness, Oil Exporter, Conflict, Lag IMF Program, Population, 
Population Squared, Inflation, HIPC, Aid, Lag of Fiscal Discipline and the 
constant term are included in all the regressions. * significant at 10%; ** 




Table 5: MTEF Effects on Health Spending Volatility 
Dependent Variable = Absolute value of the percentage change in the deviation of the ratio of health spending to total spending from 
the trend component, normalized by the trend at time t-1 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  
Pooled 






























MTFF -2.88*** -1.56* -0.60 -0.87 -1.90** -3.06*** -1.62 -2.66*** -2.01* 
 
(0.59) (0.90) (0.99) (0.90) (0.96) (0.87) (1.04) (0.91) (1.06) 
MTBF -2.27** -2.21* -0.50 -0.75 -2.82*** -3.58*** -2.24** -2.95*** -2.51** 
 
(1.08) (1.19) (1.19) (1.17) (0.88) (0.92) (0.96) (0.97) (1.03) 
MTPF -4.16*** -2.20 0.65 -1.58 -0.09 -2.84* 0.48 -2.19 -0.38 
 
(0.77) (1.53) (1.86) (1.73) (2.25) (1.48) (2.33) (1.55) (1.73) 
Lag GDP Growth 0.09 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.15 
 
(0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Trade Openness 0.00 -0.04* -0.03 -0.05 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Oil-Exporter 2.43* 0.73 1.45 1.68 1.56 1.28 1.91* 1.61 1.80* 
 
(1.25) (2.24) (2.16) (2.29) (1.01) (1.01) (1.05) (1.05) (1.01) 
Conflict 1.28 2.47 1.76 1.62 1.71 1.65 1.47 1.43 1.17 
 
(2.40) (2.56) (2.59) (2.24) (1.74) (1.76) (1.71) (1.72) (1.79) 
Lag IMF Program 1.55 0.76 0.32 0.53 1.00 0.92 1.01 0.93 0.55 
 
(1.04) (1.04) (0.99) (1.11) (0.91) (0.89) (0.90) (0.88) (0.79) 
Population -0.01 -0.04 0.07 0.04 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 
(0.01) (0.13) (0.14) (0.18) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Population Sq. 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Inflation 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01* 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
HIPC -0.63 -0.55 -1.34 0.89 -0.51 -0.35 -0.93 -0.79 -0.88 
 
(1.58) (1.87) (1.92) (1.71) (1.45) (1.45) (1.43) (1.45) (1.42) 
Aid 0.58*** 0.49 0.47 0.49 0.50* 0.49* 0.52* 0.51* 0.48* 
 
(0.22) (0.41) (0.41) (0.43) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.29) 
Lag Volatility 
    
0.28*** 0.28*** 0.26*** 0.27*** 0.26*** 
     
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Lag Credit 
        
-1.64 
   Market Access 
        
(1.11) 
Fixed Effects N Y Y Y - - - - - 
Year Effects N N Y N N N Y Y Y 
Countries 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 
Instruments - - - - 27 30 38 41 42 
AR(2) test [p-value] - - - - 0.723 0.734 0.786 0.761 0.777 
Hansen J [p-value] - - - - 0.646 0.301 0.455 0.214 0.271 
Observations 2,047 2,047 2,047 2,047 1,882 1,882 1,882 1,882 1,882 
R-sq. 0.13 0.33 0.34 0.35 - - - - - 
Notes: Cross-sectional regressions are based on averaged data over the sample period 1990-2008. For panel regressions, robust 
standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by country. GMM specifications use lags 1-3 of the endogenous variables with collapsed 
instrument matrix. Three additional instruments based on MTEF diffusion in the neighboring area are used as indicated. The constant 





Table 6: MTEF Effects on Productive Spending 
Dependent Variable = General government expenditure on health as a percentage of total government expenditure 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  
Pooled 






























MTFF 1.81*** 0.39* 0.06 -0.04 0.17 0.26** 0.14 0.40*** 0.20 
 
(0.40) (0.24) (0.28) (0.24) (0.15) (0.12) (0.17) (0.13) (0.14) 
MTBF 2.20*** 1.02*** 0.58 0.30 0.38* 0.33** 0.36 0.48*** 0.39** 
 
(0.75) (0.32) (0.36) (0.32) (0.21) (0.14) (0.24) (0.16) (0.19) 
MTPF 2.82*** 1.56*** 0.84 0.10 0.28 0.85** 0.25 1.04*** 0.51 
 
(0.68) (0.48) (0.56) (0.64) (0.43) (0.37) (0.42) (0.37) (0.38) 
Lag GDP Growth -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 0.02 0.03** 0.02 0.03** 0.03* 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Trade Openness -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Oil-Exporter -2.59*** -0.17 -0.29 0.02 -0.89*** -0.53*** -0.87*** -0.52** -0.70*** 
 
(0.68) (0.30) (0.33) (0.41) (0.26) (0.20) (0.26) (0.21) (0.25) 
Conflict -1.42* -0.20 -0.09 -0.03 -0.28 -0.12 -0.27 -0.14 -0.07 
 
(0.74) (0.32) (0.33) (0.29) (0.22) (0.20) (0.22) (0.20) (0.20) 
Lag IMF Program -0.59 -0.18 -0.14 -0.12 -0.24* -0.14 -0.23* -0.15 -0.00 
 
(0.46) (0.25) (0.26) (0.24) (0.14) (0.11) (0.14) (0.11) (0.12) 
Population -0.02* 0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Population Sq. 0.00* -0.00* -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Inflation -0.00** -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
HIPC 1.06 0.64 0.56 0.35 0.29 0.16 0.24 0.12 0.19 
 
(0.78) (0.63) (0.62) (0.62) (0.29) (0.26) (0.28) (0.26) (0.27) 
Aid -0.10* 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
(0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Lag Productive 
    
0.72*** 0.85*** 0.73*** 0.84*** 0.79*** 
   Spending 
    
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Lag Credit 
        
0.74*** 
   Market Access 
        
(0.19) 
Fixed Effects N Y Y Y - - - - - 
Year Effects N N Y N N N Y Y Y 
Countries 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 
Instruments - - - - 55 58 67 70 71 
AR(2) test [p-value] - - - - 0.635 0.600 0.702 0.680 0.691 
Hansen J [p-value] - - - - 0.384 0.173 0.667 0.204 0.253 
Observations 2,209 2,209 2,209 2,209 2,047 2,047 2,047 2,047 2,047 
R-sq. 0.14 0.84 0.85 0.86 - - - - - 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by country. GMM specifications use lags 1-10 of the endogenous variables 
with collapsed instrument matrix. Three additional instruments based on MTEF diffusion in the neighboring area are used as indicated. 





Table 7: MTEF Effects on Technical Efficiency 
Dependent Variable = Estimations of the efficiency scores from a stochastic frontier model that shows life expectancy as output 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  
Pooled 






























MTFF -0.13 -0.37 -0.54** -0.25 -0.12 -0.02 0.10 0.11 0.03 
 
(0.96) (0.25) (0.26) (0.21) (0.13) (0.11) (0.16) (0.13) (0.14) 
MTBF -5.29*** -0.54 -0.77* -0.56 -0.19 -0.10 0.07 0.07 0.01 
 
(1.50) (0.42) (0.45) (0.36) (0.18) (0.15) (0.21) (0.17) (0.18) 
MTPF -1.28 -0.10 -0.45 0.41 0.28 0.42** 0.61** 0.51*** 0.38* 
 
(1.93) (0.83) (0.86) (0.85) (0.27) (0.20) (0.25) (0.19) (0.23) 
Lag GDP Growth -0.11 -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Trade Openness -0.02 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Oil-Exporter -6.95*** -1.50*** -1.61*** -0.96*** 0.11 0.04 0.17 0.06 0.02 
 
(2.15) (0.58) (0.56) (0.22) (0.17) (0.15) (0.17) (0.15) (0.15) 
Conflict -0.00 0.37 0.40 0.30 0.11 0.13 0.03 0.04 0.06 
 
(1.34) (0.30) (0.29) (0.27) (0.33) (0.31) (0.31) (0.30) (0.30) 
Lag IMF Program -0.21 0.13 0.09 0.15 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.07 -0.04 
 
(0.89) (0.24) (0.25) (0.21) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
Population -0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.01) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Population Sq. 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Inflation -0.01*** 0.00 0.00** -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00** 0.00* 0.00* 
 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
HIPC -6.80*** -0.12 -0.07 0.09 0.28* 0.16 0.20 0.09 0.08 
 
(1.57) (0.34) (0.34) (0.25) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) 
Aid -0.14 0.05* 0.05* 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 
(0.09) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Lag Technical 
    
1.06*** 1.04*** 1.06*** 1.04*** 1.04*** 
   Efficiency 
    
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Lag Credit  
        
0.10 
   Market Access                 (0.10) 
Fixed Effects N Y Y Y - - - - - 
Year Effects N N Y N N N Y Y Y 
Countries 164 164 164 164 161 161 161 161 161 
Instruments - - - - 103 106 111 114 115 
AR(2) test [p-value] - - - - 0.522 0.459 0.628 0.592 0.644 
Hansen J [p-value] - - - - 0.057 0.051 0.176 0.164 0.155 
Observations 1,317 1,317 1,317 1,317 1,157 1,157 1,157 1,157 1,157 
R-sq. 0.21 0.98 0.98 0.98 - - - - - 
Notes: The technical efficiency scores are based on estimating the production function 〖LifeExpectancy〗_it =  α + 
β〖HealthSpending_pc_PPP〗_it + γ〖Covariates〗_it + τ_t + v_it - u_it, where the group of covariates includes population density, 
years of schooling, a government indicator for voice and accountability, and one for government effectiveness, a dummy variable for 
OECD countries and year effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by country. GMM specifications use lags 1-2 of 
the endogenous variables with collapsed instrument matrix. Three additional instruments based on MTEF diffusion in the neighboring 
area are used as indicated. The constant term is included in all the regressions. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 


































































Figure 3: MTEF Adoption in Advanced Economies and by Developing Country Region, 1990-2008 
 




























































































































































































































































































Figure 4: MTEF Adoption in Europe, 1990-2008 
 
























































































































































































































































































Panel a: MTEF (72 obs)
mtef 95% conf. interval





































Panel b: MTFF (40 obs)
mtff 95% conf. interval



































Panel c: MTBF (20 obs)
mtbf 95% conf. interval



































Panel d: MTPF (12 obs)
mtpf 95% conf. interval






































Panel a: MTEF (67 obs)
mtef 95% conf. interval



























Panel b: MTFF (41 obs)
mtff 95% conf. interval































Panel c: MTBF (19 obs)
mtbf 95% conf. interval



























Panel d: MTPF (7 obs)
mtpf 95% conf. interval
















































Panel a: MTEF (67 obs)
mtef 95% conf. interval







































Panel b: MTFF (41 obs)
mtff 95% conf. interval







































Panel c: MTBF (19 obs)
mtbf 95% conf. interval








































Panel d: MTPF (7 obs)
mtpf 95% conf. interval









































Panel a: MTEF (41 obs)
mtef 95% conf. interval



























Panel b: MTFF (25 obs)
mtff 95% conf. interval


























Panel c: MTBF (11 obs)
mtbf 95% conf. interval




























Panel d: MTPF (5 obs)
mtpf 95% conf. interval










Chapter 3: Commodity Prices, Consumer Goods’ Prices 





This paper aims to identify the nexus between the excess of liquidity in the United States and 
commodity prices over the 1983-2006 period. In particular, it assesses whether commodity 
prices react more powerfully than consumer goods’ prices to changes in real money balances. 
Within a cointegrated vector autoregressive framework, the author investigates whether 
consumer prices and commodity prices react to excess liquidity, and if the different price 
elasticities of supply for goods and commodities allow for differences in the dynamic paths of 
price adjustment to a liquidity shock. The results show a positive relationship between real 
money and real commodity prices and provide empirical evidence for a stronger response of 
commodity prices with respect to consumer goods’ prices. This could imply that, if the 
magnitude of the reaction is due the fact that consumer goods’ prices are slower to react, then 
their long-run value can be predicted with the help of commodity prices.The findings support 
the view that the latter should be considered as a valid monetary indicator.1 
  
                                                 
1
 The author wishes to thank Katarina Juselius and Morten Tabor for their kind support in carrying out the 
econometric analysis. A special thank to the participants to the Summer School at the University of Copenhagen 
for providing me with important comments. Note that all mistakes and opinions expressed in the paper belong to 





In the last four decades, the volatility of commodity prices generated turbulence in the 
global economy, affecting importing and exporting countries in opposite and vigorous ways. 
Nonetheless, the attention of the literature to the topic seemed to be proportional to price 
growth, declining in relatively tranquil periods and rising when the commodities prices were 
back at high levels. The huge variations of the last decade generated a renewed interest in the 
topic. 
In the 1970s, the popular view was that commodity prices were defined as a result of 
evolution in the relevant commodity market, playing an important role in the stagflation of 
that decade. However, this idea has been strongly challenged. An increase in the expected 
inflation rate due, for example, to an increase in money supply causes agents to shift from 
money to commodities, provoking a rise in prices. Therefore, increases in the price of oil and 
other commodities could be the result of an exceedingly expansionary policy, rather than an 
exogenous inflationary supply shock. 
Falling commodity prices in the 1980s and 1990s were not considered as interesting 
as raising prices, even though oil producers such as Mexico and Russia were experiencing 
important revenue losses and countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Australia were suffering 
from low agricultural prices. 
After collapsing in the second half of 2008, commodity prices stabilized in early 2009 
and subsequently staged a comeback. Such behavior is in contrast with what happened during 
past recessions. In previous global downturns, prices typically continued to fall into the early 
phases of recovery or rose at rates far below the increases recorded in recent months. An 





Thus, the recent happenings of quick commodity price increases and higher volatility 
following the easy monetary stance in the US, matched with similar accommodative policies 
in the euro area and Japan, led some to infer some causal role for monetary changes in 
driving commodity prices and ultimately inflation. 
Drawing on Dornbusch (1976), the idea of overshooting has been adapted to analyze 
theoretically the relationship between money, consumer prices and commodity prices by 
Frankel (1986). The latter argued that tightening monetary policy has relevant effects on 
commodity prices because they are flexible, whereas other goods’ prices are sticky. Thus, 
commodity prices overshoot their new equilibrium in the short-run in order to generate an 
expectation of future appreciation sufficient to offset the higher interest rate. 
This paper aims at identifying the nexus between the excess of liquidity in the United 
States and commodity prices over the 1983-2006 period. In particular, it tests whether the 
latter react more powerfully than consumer goods’ prices to changes in real money balances. 
Within a cointegrated VAR framework, it is investigated whether consumer prices 
and commodity prices react to excess liquidity in the US, and if the different price elasticities 
of supply for goods and commodities allow for differences in the dynamic paths of price 
adjustment to a liquidity shock. 
The results show a positive relationship between real money and real commodity 
prices and provide empirical evidence for a stronger response of commodity prices with 
respect to consumer goods’ prices. This could imply that, if the magnitude of the reaction is 
due to the fact that consumer goods’ prices are slower to react, then, their long-run value can 
be predicted with the help of the commodity prices. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, some contributions on the issue 




strategy, test results and interpretation of the findings are presented. Section 5 ends the paper 
reporting the conclusions. 
 
 
2. A review of the literature 
Before discussing the empirical analysis employed, some of the main contributions on 
the relationship between monetary policy, consumer prices and commodity prices will be 
reviewed. 
Drawing on Dornbusch’s exchange rate overshooting model, Frankel (1986) provides 
a theoretical framework to analyze the impact of money supply shocks on commodity prices. 
He substitutes the price of agricultural goods for the price of foreign exchange and argues 
that the reason for the overshooting phenomenon is that prices for agricultural and mineral 
products adjust rapidly, while the price of goods adjusts more slowly. In fact, the hypothesis 
is that commodities are exchanged in a reactive auction market in which the supply cannot be 
easily expanded, whereas the consumer goods market enjoys a copious supply. 
Frankel illustrates the dynamic starting from a monetary contraction that is expected 
to be permanent and that would eventually lead to an equal fall of consumer and commodity 
goods’ prices in the absence of other disturbances. However, given the manufactured price 
stickiness in the short-run the nominal money supply contraction is a reduction in the real 
money supply. Such a reduction should be offset by an interest rate rise. Nevertheless, the 
arbitrage condition implies that, since commodities are storable, the interest rate cannot grow 
more than the expected rate of increase in the commodity prices plus the storage cost. 
Therefore, the spot price of commodities must fall today and must do so until the moment in 





Over the last three decades the role of commodity prices in setting monetary policy 
has been faced by many researchers. On the one hand, it has been argued that commodity 
prices may be an earlier indicator of the current state of the economy because, as assumed by 
Frenkel (1986) these prices are usually set in continuous auction markets with efficient 
information (see Olivera, 1970; Garner, 1989; Marquis and Cunningham, 1990; Cody and 
Mills, 1991). Thus, some policymakers became advocates of using commodity prices as a 
leading indicator of inflation and endorsed policy proposals using commodity prices as a 
guide to adjust short run money growth target ranges (see Garner, 1989). A rise in 
commodity prices may indicate to policymakers that the economy is growing too rapidly and 
hence inflation is inclined to rise. In such a case, the monetary authority may observe the 
rising commodity prices and respond by raising interest rates to tighten money supply.  
On the other hand, the counterargument is that commodity prices cannot be used 
effectively in formulating monetary policy because they are subject to large, market-specific 
shocks, which may not have macroeconomic implications (see Marquis and Cunningham, 
1990; Cody and Mills, 1991). However, many others (see Bessler, 1984; Pindyck and 
Rotemberg, 1990; Hua, 1998) argue that commodity price movements are the result of 
monetary or macroeconomic changes and that the causality should run from 
macroeconomic/monetary variables to commodity prices. Barsky and Kilian (2002) offer 
another important contribution. They argue that monetary expansions and contractions could 
generate stagflation of important magnitudes, by providing evidence about the role of 
monetary fluctuations in determining the prices of oil and, in particular, the prices of 
industrial commodities that preceded the 1973 oil price increase. Bernanke et al. (1997) 
investigate the relationship between the oil price shocks, US monetary policy and the 




economy comes from tighter monetary policy resulting from the change in oil prices and not 
from the change in oil prices per se.  
Another piece of literature analyzes the impact of the commodity price evolutions on 
the behavior of monetary policy and its informational role for formulating it. Awokuse and 
Yang (2003) argue that commodity price indicators contain important information about the 
future movements of macroeconomic variables. Bhar and Hamori (2008) assess the 
information content of commodity prices for monetary policy. Using a cross correlation 
approach between economic activity and commodity futures prices, they affirm that 
commodity prices can serve as suitable information for monetary policy. 
Fuhrer and Moore (1992) investigate the relationships between asset prices and 
inflation in a Keynesian model in which monetary policy controls inflation by manipulating 
the federal funds rate. They find that the indicator properties of asset prices are quite sensitive 
to the monetary policy rule. Hamori (2007) empirically analyzes the relationship between the 
commodity prices index and macroeconomic variables in Japan, arguing that the former and 
the general price level are closely related, with movements in commodity prices leading 
movements in the general price level. However, he specifies that the commodity price index 
was found to be valid as a leading indicator of the consumer price index before the zero 
interest policy was introduced, as afterwards the relationship ceased to exist. 
Other studies, such as Surrey (1989), Boughton and Branson (1990, 1991), and 
Browne and Cronin (2007), investigate empirically the potential importance of monetary 
conditions on the relationship between commodity prices and consumer goods’ prices. 
However, they all use different empirical techniques or different specifications from the one 






3. A Model of Price Dynamics 
This section presents the theoretical framework through which the investigation aims 
to answer the following research question: do commodity prices react more strongly than 
consumer goods’ prices? 
 As mentioned, the commodity price overshooting theory was advanced by Frankel 
(1986). The essence of this theoretical framework is that the short-term reaction to an 
expansionary monetary policy produces an overshoot of the commodity prices and a more 
delayed reaction in the consumer goods market. In the long-run, consumer prices adjust to the 
new equilibrium. However, Frenkel’s theory is fundamentally based on the assumption that 
commodity prices react more strongly in the short-run than the consumer goods’ prices. 
 In order to test the hypothesis it is allowed for a two-good economy, and commodities 
and consumer goods with prices      and     , respectively. The substantial difference 
between these two goods is that consumer prices are decided in a market with a supply that 
adjusts to the changes in demand, while the commodity prices are decided in a market 
restricted in supply and with high transaction costs, due to transportation expenses. 
Therefore, consumer goods’ prices are sticky, whereas commodity prices are not. 
 The rationale for this assumption can be found in the current scenario where many 
low-cost producers (especially in developing countries) are generating additional supply of 
consumer goods, while commodity supply is constrained by natural factors. Furthermore, the 
speed of the adjustment depends on the fact that participants in the commodity markets are 
usually more equally informed than their consumer goods’ counterparts. 
 Graphically, the two markets can be represented as in Figure 1: 
 
 






 Figure 1 shows the price-quantity changes as a result of a monetary expansion in 
markets with high (left graph) and low (right graph) price elasticity of supply. The aggregated 
supply of price elastic goods in the short-run is characterized by infinite price elasticity so 
that additional demand brought about by a liquidity shock (from D to D’) can be satisfied 
without any price increase. Consequently, the liquidity shock translates into an increase in 
output achieving a new short-run equilibrium at      . In contrast, goods characterized by 
restrictions in supply, cannot be expanded easily and are thus quantity-insensitive to a 
monetary expansion. Additional demand is then fully reflected in a rise in commodity prices. 
 In the long-run, prices will also react on the price elastic goods market if the well-
documented neutrality of money holds; any change in money supply is met with a 
proportional change in the price level that keeps real money and real output in both markets 
unchanged. 
 More formally, the general price level is: 
 
                  ,            (1) 
  
 A once-off increase of μ percent in the money supply in period   produces an increase 
in the general price level by           . However, given the initial assumption, such 
increase fully translates into the commodity price     , because      is sticky. Thus, the 
price relationship at time   will be: 
 
       
             





Assuming no further changes in the money supply in period    , the general level of 
prices at time     will be the same as in  .  
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This allows setting the right hand side of Equation 2 to be equal to the right end side 
of Equation 3. 
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As     
    =   
    and     
              
   , after some algebra the following equation 
is obtained: 
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The different dynamics of the adjustment processes implies that the size of the change 
of the consumer goods’ prices in period   can be predicted by observing the spread between 
the current period price of the commodities    
     and the equilibrium value to which it 
must adjust in period    ,      
 
     
    , which is dependent on the monetary shock in 











4. Empirical Analysis 
First, this section documents the strategy chosen for the analysis and the data used and 
describe s the empirical analysis. Secondly, the results from the estimation of the model are 
presented and discussed. 
 
4.1. Empirical Strategy 
The analysis is carried out using a cointegrated VAR model. Formally the model is 
six dimensional VAR with independent and identically-distributed Gaussian errors: 
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where    is the following vector of variables: 
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Namely real output, real money, short term and long term interest rates, inflation and 
real commodity prices, and    is a vector of deterministic components. 
The Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) representation of the VAR model 
combines levels and differences as follows: 
 





where   are the effects in the long-run and    contains the short-run information. The 
inconsistency with the    integrated of order one is solved by transforming the multivariate 
model and reducing the rank of   to     with   being the number of variables. The 
reduced rank matrix can be factorized into two     matrices   and β        . The 
factorization provides   stationary linear combinations of the variables called cointegrating 
vectors, and     common stochastic trends of the system.  
Within a cointegrated VAR framework, the common shocks, or common stochastic 
trends, are hitting all the variables simultaneously. Since an impulse response analysis 
implies assuming a certain structure of shocks, namely that one variable is exclusively hitting 
the variable we are interested in, this has been neglected as such assumption cannot be tested 
(see Juselius, 2006). 
 
4.2. Data and Unit Root Tests 
The choice of the country has to do with the fact that, even if the US accounts for less 
than one third of world GDP, its importance in the monetary and financial system is evidently 
higher than that. The period under analysis goes from the first quarter of 1983, to the first 
quarter of 2008. Such span corresponds to a fairly stable period in terms of inflation growth.  
As an indicator of the nominal money supply, data on the M2 aggregate have been 
downloaded from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) dataset, as well as data on 
nominal gross domestic product (GDP), consumer price index (CPI), 3-month Treasury bill 
rate and 10-years government bond yield. As a proxy for the commodity prices the 
Commodity Research Bureau (CRB) index has been adopted. This index measures the 
combined movements in the prices of 22 basic commodities whose markets are assumed to be 





 In order to perform an I(1) analysis, a nominal to real transformation has been 
performed. Since nominal GDP and nominal money supply show clear features of I(2) 
processes, they have been considered in real terms. Likewise, some transformations have 
been done on price indexes. On the one hand, inflation has been considered instead of the CPI 
index (typically I(2)); on the other hand, the difference between the CRB index and the CPI 
index has been taken (real commodity prices hereafter). 
 Real money, real GDP, inflation and real commodity prices have been taken in logs. 
The interest rates have been transformed into quarterly rates. Table 1 presents some 





[Table1 about here] 
 
 
 The unit root properties of the series are tentatively investigated using two unit root 
tests. The first unit root test performed is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, for which 
stationarity serves as the null hypothesis. However, it should be noted that the ADF test could 
fail to distinguish between a unit root and a near unit root process and it can happen that 
indicates that a series contains a unit root when it does not (Perron 1989). Thus, a second unit 
root test is adopted, namely the Kwiatkowsk, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (KPSS) test, for 
which the null hypothesis is non-stationarity. 
 
 
                                                 




[Table 2 about here] 
 
 
 As shown in Table 2, the results from both the tests employed confirm that all the 
variables in the system are integrated of order one at 5% significance level. Nonetheless, it 
should be remembered that such tests are not reliable in the presence of breaks or shifts in the 
series. 
 Figure 2 and 3 show the graphs of the series in levels and first differences. 
 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
 
 A graphical inspection of the data reveals that the assumption of constant mean does 
not seem appropriate for the level of the variables, whereas it does much more so for the 
differenced series. The assumption of constant variance seems to be approximately satisfied 
for the differences, even though some variability can be observed in most of the series. In 
order to account for the biggest departures from assumptions, three permanent blip dummies 
have been added to the model in correspondence of the biggest residuals. The first one takes 
the value one during the fourth quarter of 1984, when Ronal Reagan was re-elected as 




second quarter of 2006, probably due to an unexpected plunge in energy prices. The last 
dummy controls for the economic impacts of the terrorists attack of September 11, 2001. 
 Moreover, it is worth noting that the graph of the real money shows two breaks in 
trend. A constant increase in the variable is observed from the beginning of the sample until 
1987. A period of approximately zero growth follows and lasts until 1995, when it starts 
increasing as fast as in the first period. Thus, the slope of the two growing trends seems to be 
roughly the same. Even though the introduction of two breaks has been attempted, it turned 
out more satisfactory to allow for trends in the levels. This should have the effect of 
averaging out the aforementioned breaks. Moreover, since it is not possible to know a priori 
whether these trends cancel out in the cointegrating relations, the chosen specification allows 
these to be trend-stationary and have non-zero intercepts. 
 
4.3. Lag Length Selection and Residual Analysis 
 Table 3 shows that the Schwartz criterion (SC) suggests     and the Hannan-Quinn 
(HQ) criterion suggests    . However, when imposing     the other misspecifications 
tests become much worse, implying that the SC might have penalized too much. The LM 
tests in the last two columns show the left-over residual autocorrelation in each VAR(   
model and seem to accept the absence of autocorrelation for the VAR with 2 lags. 
 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
 
 Table 4 presents the results of the multivariate residual analysis. In particular the null 




relatively small sample, it is not advisable to rely on the asymptotic properties of the 
estimator, thus the normality assumption turns out to be relevant and it is safely accepted. 
Lastly the null hypothesis of no ARCH effects is accepted at both lags. 
  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
 
 Table 5 shows the results of the univariate residual analysis. The output of the ARCH 
and Normality tests reflect the good results of the multivariate analysis. The skewness and 
kurtosis statistics are close to the normal distribution values, suggesting that by inserting the 
three blip dummies the biggest outliers should have been controlled for. 
 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
 
 Overall, both the multivariate and univariate tests suggest that the residuals are well 
behaved and therefore that the model is well specified.  
 
 
4.4. Rank Determination 
 The cointegration rank is determined according to Johansen (1996) LR Trace test. 
When the sample is small, the asymptotic distributions are generally poor approximations to 




corrections developed in Johansen (2002). The asymptotic distribution of the rank test 
statistic differs depending on the deterministic components in the model and on almost any 
type of dummy variable
3
. Therefore, the safest procedure is to simulate the new critical 




[Table 6 about here] 
 
 
 The choice of the cointegration rank is not clearly defined, in fact the Trace test 
Bartlett corrected suggests that     is accepted only at 10% significance level. Looking at 
the significance of the α coefficients of the third cointegration vector in Table 7 it seems that 
information regarding the real GDP and the real commodity prices would be neglected by 
choosing    .  
  
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
  
 A graphical inspection of the cointegrating relations in Figure 4 reveals some 
symptom of I(2)ness. The first two cointegration relationships look fairly stationary, but the 
third one presents some indication of cyclical swings. However, it should be observed that the 
                                                 
3 An exception to this are the centered seasonal dummies, which, by construction, sum to zero over time, and hence 




lower panel    
      corrected for short-run effects of each graph is similar to the upper panel 
   
    , confirming that the I(2) problem could have been limited (see appendix for a formal 
I(2) rank test). 
 
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
 
 Moreover, an examination of the characteristic roots shows that the largest 
unrestricted root for     is 0.90 and for     is 0.78 (pretty far from the unit circle). This 
seems to confirm the presence of three common stochastic trends. Figure 5 shows the roots of 
the companion matrix for    . 
 
 




4.5. Recursive Tests 
 The graphs of the recursively calculated fluctuation tests in Figure 6 show that the X-
form of     and     are in the rejection region at the beginning of 1995, when the recursion 
starts. The test statistics remain at a fairly high level until approximately 1998. The recursive 
graphs of the     suggest that the parameter of the second cointegration relation are 
considerably constant over the sample period. The overall test in the lower right-hand side 




noted that the R-form looks stable in all   , meaning that the instability is only in the short-run 
coefficients. In general, the eigenvalue fluctuation tests provide a fair picture. 
 
 
[Figure 6 about here] 
 
 
 The Max test of β Constancy is always lower than one and shows a slightly higher 
volatility after 2003. Figure 7 confirms what is suggested by the eigenvalue fluctuation tests, 
namely that the changes in the eigenvalues are due to changes in α. 
 
 




4.6. Long-Run Exclusion 
 The Π matrix gives tentative evidence of long-run exclusion for the variables in the 
system. If a variable is excludable, the coefficients in the columns must be insignificant. 
From the PI matrix there are no clear signs that any of the variables can be excluded from the 
cointegration relations. 
 A formal LR-test for variable exclusion has been performed. Based on the results in 
Table 8, it is not possible to exclude any variable at 10% significance level for    . 










4.7. Weak Exogeneity and Pure Adjustment 
 The The Π matrix gives preliminary evidence of weak exogeneity. If a variable is 
weakly exogenous, the coefficients in the rows must be insignificant; in other words, it 
represents a pushing force. The only variable that seems not to react to any other variables is 
the real money. 
 The formal LR-test for weak exogeneity in Table 9 shows that both real GDP and real 
money are weakly exogenous at 10% significance level, even though the joint exogeneity is 
rejected. It has been decided to carry out the analysis including them in the system in order to 
analyze their impact in the Γ matrix. 
 
 
[Table 9 about here] 
 
 
 Another LR-test is carried out to test for unit vector in the α matrix. In other words, it 
tests whether the cumulated disturbances from the i
th
 variable do not enter the common trends 
(pure adjustment hypothesis). At 10% significance level Table 10 shows that the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected for the long term interest rate and the real commodity prices. 










4.8.  Identification and Interpretation of the Results 
 The identifications process starts from the long-run relationships. It is carried out by 
imposing     non-testable4 just-identifying restrictions on each beta vector of the 
unrestricted reduced VAR model with rank    , with no changes to the likelihood function 
with respect to the under identified model. Table 11 presents the estimation results that seem 
to suggest that the first beta vector is describing a money demand relationship with an 
unconventional sign on the inflation variable. The second cointegrating relationship 
illustrates the expected correlation between real output, real money, real commodity prices 
and a trend. Finally, the third stationary vector is expressing a relationship between inflation 
and the interest rate spread. 
 
 
[Table 11 about here] 
 
 
 The over-identified structure is modeled imposing restrictions accordingly to the t-
value of the β vectors’ coefficients of the just-identified structure. This is accepted with a 
fairly large p-value of 0.642 (meaning that the stationarity of the long-run relations cannot be 
jointly rejected). 
                                                 




 Table 12 permits the detection of the pulling forces for each cointegration relation. 
The money demand relationship is corrected by changes in inflation, whereas the real 
commodity prices are the only equilibrium correcting force for the second cointegrating 
relation. Lastly, deviations from the inflation expectations relationship are corrected by 
inflation itself.  
 
 
[Table 12 about here] 
 
 The short-run identification has been carried out by removing all the non-significant 
variables from each equation of the cointegrated VAR
5
. The parsimonious structure cannot be 
rejected with a p-value of 0.257 and is broadly consistent with the classification into pushing 
and pulling forces6. 
  The equation for the interesting variable is reported in Table 13. 
 
 
[Table 13 about here] 
 
 
 From the inspection of the Ώ matrix in Table 14, it is evident that some residuals are 
highly correlated (positively between real GDP and real money, negatively between inflation 
and real GDP, negatively between inflation and real money and positively between the two 
interest rates) and this would suggest a simultaneous specification of the model. Nonetheless, 
                                                 
5 Centered seasonal dummies have been left in the equations for each variable, even if insignificant. 




such analysis has not been pursued because of the problems in determining the direction of 
the causation between the mentioned variables. 
 
 
[Table 14 about here] 
 
 
 Overall, the results confirm the existence of the hypothesized long-run equilibrium 
relationship between real money and real commodity prices, with an effect from real output. 
Moreover, there is evidence that the real commodity prices are the only equilibrium 
correcting variable. 
 It can be concluded that in order to restore the long-run equilibrium when there is a 
real excess (lack) of liquidity, the real commodity prices need to increase (decrease). Such 
increase (decrease) can be achieved through an increase (decrease) in the commodity prices 
stronger (smaller) than the increase (decrease) in the consumer goods’ prices, generating a 
larger spread between the two as in Figure 8. 
 
 
[Figure 8 about here] 
 
 
 The Moving Average (MA) representation of the data for     corresponds to 
      common trends. Since         just-identifying restrictions are imposed on 
each vector, estimates are not unique and the likelihood function is unchanged. However, the 




matrix C is unique
7
. The normalization has been placed on the variables with the highest 
residual standard errors, namely real GDP, real money and real commodity prices. 
 The cumulated empirical shocks to the real GDP have had significant and high 
negative effects on the real commodity prices. The inverse is true, but the impact is much 
more moderate. The cumulated shocks to real money have had positive effects on inflation, as 
well as the cumulated shocks to short-term interest rate on long-term term one and vice versa. 
Moreover, the cumulated shocks to long term interest rate have had positive effects on 
inflation. Likewise, the cumulated shocks to inflation have had similar positive effects on 
both the interest rates. Finally, the cumulated shocks to all the variables have had a positive 
effect on themselves. It seems that the long-term interest rate is purely adjusting (consistently 
to the previous findings). 
 In order to impose the over-identifying restrictions on α, joint weak exogeneity for 
real money and real GDP is tested keeping fixed the restrictions on the β vectors. Since the 
hypothesis turns out to be rejected at 10% significance level, a zero row in α is imposed only 
for the real money, for which the null hypothesis cannot be rejected with a p-value of 0.505. 
The C matrix of the over-identified MA representation is broadly consistent with the results 
obtained for the just-identified structure. 
 As a robustness check, the CRB has been replaced with the Conference Board’s 
Sensitive Materials Index (SENSI). This comprises raw materials and metals but excludes 




                                                 
7 As when imposing just-identifying restrictions on the cointegrating relationships, the PI matrix was uniquely 





 Commodity prices are currently seen as one or the main source of current inflationary 
pressures and there seems to exist, as discussed by Frenkel (2006), a linkage between 
increases in commodity prices in commodity exporting countries and monetary policy 
changes in advanced industrial economies. This, as suggested, would defy the common 
knowledge that changes in commodity prices are solely impacted by developments occurring 
in the commodity markets. 
The aim of the paper is to identify the nexus between the excess of liquidity in the US 
and commodity prices over the period 1983-2006 within a cointegrated VAR framework and 
in particular at testing whether the commodity prices react more powerfully than the 
consumer goods’ prices to changes in real money balances. 
 The results provide empirical evidence on the magnitude of the reaction of 
commodity and consumer goods’ prices to an increase in real money. In particular, a long-run 
equilibrium relationship between real money and real commodity prices has been found, with 
an effect from real output. The two variables of interest show positive and significant 
correlation. 
 Moreover, real money seems to be a weakly exogenous variable and therefore is a 
pushing force (away from the equilibrium), whereas real commodity prices are the only 
equilibrium correcting variable to such cointegration relationship, or pulling force. 
 Therefore, in order to restore the long-run equilibrium when there is a real excess 
(lack) of liquidity, the real commodity prices need to increase (decrease). Such increase 
(decrease) can be achieved through an increase (decrease) in the commodity prices stronger 
(smaller) than the increase (decrease) in the consumer goods’ prices, generating a larger 




 The results have important policy implications. More specifically, if the magnitude of 
the reaction is due to the fact that consumer goods’ prices are slower to react, then their long-
run value can be predicted with the help of the commodity prices. In other words, the extent 
of the rise in the commodity prices acts to predict subsequent changes in the price of the other 
goods, namely the consumer goods, whose price is initially unchanged. 
Moreover, the results also support the idea that monetary policy cannot only focus on 
the core CPI and ignore developments in the commodity market. In fact, if commodity prices 
are very high it might be the case that monetary policy is loose; therefore they should be 
taken into account as a useful monetary indicator. This conclusion is particularly relevant to 






 The rank test for the I(2) system has been performed for the system of variables (  ) 
used in the analysis. The result is border-line as the hypothesis H(3,2,1) cannot be rejected 
with a p-value of 0.105. Therefore, the system might present rank equal to three, two I(1) 
trends and one I(2) trends. 
 However, it should be noted that the estimates obtained are consistent even when 





Table A: I(2) Rank Test 
 
  s2 = p-r-s1 
p-r  r     6  5         4   3         2         1         0 
 
6   0  585.487   430.095   349.873   283.396   241.097   209.188  190.965 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)            (0.000)   (0.000) 
 5   1            340.790   270.370   207.163   167.098   134.455              116.182 
                 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)              (0.000) 
 4   2                     207.162   152.244   108.296   81.881              67.516 
                          (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.003)   (0.018)           (0.022) 
 3   3                              102.274   66.687    47.417               38.974 
                             (0.003)   (0.084)   (0.105)             (0.117) 
 2   4                                        40.874    26.709                16.859 
                                          (0.239)   (0.316)               (0.434) 
 1   5                                                  12.445                3.334 
                                                       (0.424)               (0.827) 
Approximate 95% Fractiles 
 
 6   0  282.595   244.789   211.074   181.464   155.978   134.640           117.451 
 5   1            206.055   174.292   146.636   123.112   103.747              88.554 
 4   2                     141.531   115.818    94.243    76.841                63.659 
 3   3                                89.020    69.376    53.921                42.770 
 2   4                                         48.520    34.984                25.731 
 1   5                                                  20.018                12.448 
 





Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the variables 
 
Variable    Obs Mean SD Min Max
 
Real Money (M2)  157  7.86 0.72 6.38 9.02 
Real GDP   157 24.47      0.27 23.98 24.91 
T-Bill Rate   157        5.79 2.92 0.23 15.09 
Govt Bond Yield  157        7.38 2.56 2.73 14.85 
CPI Inflation  157 4.72 0.51 3.66 5.41 
Real Commodity Prices 157 -0.19       0.39 -0.83 0.60
 
Source: IFS, CRB. 
 
 
Table 2: Unit Root Tests 
 
Variables              ADF test              KPSS test 
   Level  Difference  Level  Difference 
 
Real Money (M2) -1.43  -4.80**   1.59**  0.25 
Real GDP  -2.98  -4.93**   1.98**  0.28 
T-Bill Rate  -3.07  -3.64*   1.25**  0.09 
Govt Bond Yield -3.33  -5.32**   1.70**  0.05 
CPI Inflation  -1.57  -3.83*   1.98**  0.45 
Real Commodity Prices -2.73  -6.15**   1.43**  0.17 
 
Notes: The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test statistics are from a model that includes as many lags 
as suggested by and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIK) Hannan-Quinn (HQ) criterion, a constant 
and a trend. 
 
 
Table 3: Lag Length Determination 
 
Model    T Regr Log-Lik  SC H-Q LM(1)  LM( ) 
 
VAR(5)   5  90    38  3282.75   -61.55  -65.33  0.595  0.856 
VAR(4)   4  90    32 3244.50  -62.50 -65.68  0.815  0.016 
VAR(3)   3  90    26 3208.81   -63.51 -66.09  0.239  0.139 
VAR(2)   2  90    20  3172.93   -64.51  -66.50  0.088  0.731 
VAR(1)   1  90    14  3105.83   -64.82 -66.21  0.000  0.000 
 
Notes:   are the lags in the model, T is the number of observations. 
 
 
Table 4: Multivariate Residual Analysis 
 
Autocorrelation   Normality   ARCH 
LM(1)        LM(1)  
LM(2)        LM(2) 
 
  (36) = 46.019 [0.122]     (12)= 9.509 [0.659]     (441) =  427.608 
[0.668] 
  (36) = 37.473 [0.401]         (882) =  921.552 
[0.173] 
 





Table 5: Univariate Residual Analysis 
 
Variable   ARCH(2) Normality Skewness Kurtosis 
 
Δ Real Money (M2)  4.717 [0.095] 1.430  [0.489]    0.264  2.736     
Δ Real GDP   3.279 [0.194] 4.262  [0.119]    -0.390  3.733     
Δ T-Bill Rate   5.583 [0.061] 1.856  [0.395]    -0.215  3.325     
Δ Govt Bond Yield  0.787 [0.675] 0.506  [0.777]    0.169  2.868     
Δ CPI Inflation   4.800 [0.091] 2.085  [0.352]    0.016  3.411     
Δ Real Commodity Prices 1.768 [0.413] 0.458  [0.795]    -0.010  3.050     
 
Notes: p-values in brackets. 
 
 
Table 6: Trace Test Statistics 
 
      Eig.Value   Trace    Trace*    Frac95    P-Value  P-Value* 
 
 6   0 0.553  190.965  164.447   115.237    0.000      0.000 
 5   1      0.407   116.182   101.056   85.895    0.000      0.002 
 4   2      0.264    67.516    59.345    62.538    0.016      0.088 
 3   3      0.212    38.974    33.960    41.737     0.097     0.254 
 2   4      0.135    16.859    15.222    25.295     0.406     0.533 
 1   5      0.035     3.334     2.988    12.486     0.811     0.852 
 
Notes: Bartlett correction of the rank test is denoted by *. 
 
 
Table 7: α and β vectors for     
 
Vector  Real GDP     Real M2      T-Bill            Govt Yield     CPI Infl          Real Comm P  Trend
 
   
                          6.744            1.000           0.173             0.638             -202.583        0.879     -0.034 
   
                          -3.564           1.000           0.231            -0.237             -8.757        -0.187       0.014 
   
                          -0.310           0.055           -0.101            0.064              1.000       -0.033       0.001 
 
Variables                                         
 
Real GDP   -0.003   0.008   0.046 
                                                (-1.655)  (0.745)   (2.341) 
Real M2                              -0.002  -0.019      -0.032 
                                           (-1.223)  (-1.520)    (-1.468) 
T-Bill                                  -0.025  -0.433   0.483 
                                                (-1.049)  (-2.693)     (1.732) 
Govt Yield                          -0.080  0.577   -0.152 
                                           (-2.677)  (2.809)    (-0.426) 
CPI Infl                               0.006   0.016     -0.005 
   (6.949)   (2.742)   (-0.505) 
Real Comm P                     -0.016  0.106   0.621 
                                            (-1.274)  (1.220)   (4.118)
 





Table 8: Long-Run Exclusion 
 
R     DGF     5% C.V. Real GDP     Real M2       T-Bill            Govt Yield     CPI Infl          Real Comm P Trend
 
1      1           3.841    1.870             0.464            0.263             2.954             24.229             2.828          2.429 
                   [0.171]        [0.496]          [0.608]          [0.086]           [0.000]            [0.093]   [0.119] 
 2     2           5.991   21.386           17.682          13.021           17.659            44.240            6.294          21.047 
                   [0.000]         [0.000]          [0.001]        [0.000]           [0.000]            [0.043]       [0.000] 
 3     3           7.815   26.999        17.964          18.735          22.146            50.640           6.388    22.339 
                   [0.000]        [0.000]          [0.000]          [0.000]           [0.000]            [0.094]       [0.000] 
 4     4           9.488   29.597          25.850           27.146         23.835            59.199            13.365   22.341 
                   [0.000]        [0.000]          [0.000]         [0.000]           [0.000]             [0.010] [0.000] 
 5     5          11.070   38.923          30.867           37.155         33.683            68.021             20.884   30.340 
                  [0.000]         [0.000]          [0.000]          [0.000]           [0.000]            [0.001]  [0.000] 
 
Notes: p-values in brackets. 
 
 
Table 9: Test for Weak Exogeneity 
 
R     DGF     5% C.V. Real GDP     Real M2       T-Bill            Govt Yield     CPI Infl          Real Comm P
 
1     1            3.841               2.071            1.213            0.710      4.539             19.275          0.998 
                                            [0.150]          [0.271] [0.400]       [0.033]           [0.000]             [0.318] 
2     2            5.991               2.442            3.112            5.357         11.204            35.321              1.709 
                                            [0.295]          [0.211]          [0.069]      [0.004]           [0.000]              [0.425] 
3     3            7.815               4.538            4.884            6.952          11.345           36.193              6.640 
                                            [0.209]          [0.181]          [0.073]      [0.010]           [0.000]             [0.084] 
4     4            9.488               10.855          4.988            9.042        12.632            36.895             12.794 
                                            [0.028]          [0.289]          [0.060]       [0.013]           [0.000]             [0.012] 
5     5            11.070             14.584          7.949            18.947       20.752            46.093             20.846 
                                            [0.012]          [0.159]          [0.002]       [0.001]           [0.000]             [0.001] 
 
Notes: p-values in brackets. 
 
 
Table 10: Test for Pure Adjustment 
 
R     DGF     5% C.V. Real GDP     Real M2       T-Bill            Govt Yield     CPI Infl          Real Comm P
 
1     5             11.070            44.672          53.863          33.205           27.097            7.898              49.811 
                                            [0.000]          [0.000]          [0.000]          [0.000]            [0.162]            [0.000] 
2     4             9.488              23.456          31.534          8.286             11.106            7.337              24.816 
                                            [0.000]          [0.000]          [0.082]          [0.025]            [0.119]            [0.000] 
3     3            7.815               6.450            17.230          7.770             4.286              7.311              5.124 
                                            [0.092]          [0.001]          [0.051]          [0.232]            [0.063]            [0.163] 
4     2            5.991               1.927            13.706          4.685             4.136              6.926              1.227 
                                            [0.382]          [0.001]          [0.096]          [0.126]            [0.031]            [0.541] 
5     1            3.841               0.421            10.151          0.318             0.541              4.807              1.064 
                                            [0.517]          [0.001]          [0.573]          [0.462]            [0.028]            [0.302] 
 





Table 11: The just-identified long-run cointegration relations for     and the α coefficients. 
 
Vector  Real GDP     Real M2       T-Bill            Govt Yield     CPI Infl       Real Comm P  Trend
 
   
                          -0.979           1                   -0.598        0.598              -62.152        0    -0.001 
                             (-1.796)                              (-6.575)       (6.575)            (-11.789)          (-0.171) 
   
                          -4.148           1                   -0.145           0                      0        -0.285      0.016 
                             (-10.745)                            (-4.319)                           (-4.279)          (6.391) 
   
                          0                   0                   0.170         -0.129              1                     0.017             0.001 
                                                                       (9.357)          (-6.876)                       (0.870)     (1.686)
 
Variables                                         
 
Real GDP                           -0.009  0.017      -0.036 
                                           (-1.488)  (1.691)   (-0.949) 
Real M2                              -0.010            -0.013      -0.056 
                                           (-1.543)  (-1.123)   (-1.355) 
T-Bill                                  -0.177     -0.003     -0.017 
                                           (-2.055)  (-1.756)    (-3.258) 
Govt Yield                          -0.165  0.007      0.008 
                                           (-1.500)    (3.533)    (1.127) 
CPI Infl                              0.023             -0.002       0.111 
                                           (7.484)            (-0.335)   (5.756) 
Real Comm P                     -0.052      0.176      -0.275 
                                           (-1.118)    (2.248)    (-0.952) 
 
Notes: t-values in brackets. 
 
 
Table 12: The over-identified long-run cointegration relations for     and the α coefficients. 
 
Vector  Real GDP     Real M2       T-Bill            Govt Yield     CPI Infl          Real Comm P Trend
 
   
                             -1                   1                     4.045              -3.832                46.431               0    0 
                                                                             (9.401)            (-8.880)              (10.579)          
   
                             -4.073             1                     0                      0                       0                       -0.338     0.018 
                                (-11.655)                                           (-6.603)   (8.278) 
   
                             0                     0                     0.039              -0.039                1                       0  -0.000 
                                                                              (9.041)            (-9.041)                  (-2.998) 
 
Variables                                         
 
Real GDP                           -0.012      0.018       1.114 
                                           (-1.753)   (1.615)     (1.699) 
Real M2                              -0.011     -0.010      1.078 
                                           (-1.459)   (-0.808)    (1.489) 
T-Bill                                  -0.242     -0.365      20.742    
                                           (-2.580)   (-2.341)    (2.265) 
Govt Yield                          -0.153      0.535       19.056 
                                           (-1.241)    (2.606)    (1.577) 
CPI Infl                               0.025     -0.004      -2.505 
                                           (7.439)   (-0.746)   (-7.494) 
Real Comm P                      -0.062      0.208       5.581 
                                           (-1.187)    (2.392)     (1.093)
 





Table 13: Short-run Identification, equation for the real commodity prices  
 
Independent Variable      Coefficient   Std.Error   t-value    t-prob 
 
Second Coint Rel 0.166    0.060       2.75    0.007 
Constant              15.784 5.738       2.75    0.007 
CSeasonal          -0.006    0.013     -0.434    0.666 
CSeasonal_1        -0.004 0.013     -0.322   0.748 




Table 14: Correlation of Structural Residuals (standard deviations on diagonal)  
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Figure 7: Max Test of Constant β 
 
 
Figure 8: Commodity Prices and Consumer Goods´ prices reactions to Real Excess of Liquidity 
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Chapter 4: Determinants and Dynamics of Schooling and 





This paper investigates the determinants of primary school enrollment, attendance and child 
labor in Bolivia from 1999 to 2007. The analysis also aims at identifying the substitution and 
complementary relationships between schooling and working. Although enrollment rates 
show a significant improvement, lack of attendance remains an issue. The empirical results 
reveal that the increase in enrollment is led by indigenous children and those living in urban 
areas. Moreover, contrary to common belief, being extremely poor and indigenous are the 
main determinants of school attendance. Although extremely poor children increased their 
school attendance, they were not able to reduce child labor. However, for indigenous children 
school attendance and child labor were substitutes, increasing schooling and reducing child 
labor.1 
  
                                                 
1
 The author wishes to thank Soren Anderson, Fabrizio Carlevaro, Richard G. Newell and Marc-Alexandre 
Sénégas for the kind support in carrying out the econometric analysis. A special thank to Simona Iammarino, 
Dena Ringold, Robert Vos and to the ILAS at Columbia University for providing us with important comments. 





Bolivia remains among the three poorest countries in the western hemisphere and the 
poorest in South America (UNDP, 2007), with a per capita GDP of 1378 US dollars and with 
37.7 percent of the population living below the extreme poverty line in 20072. According to 
the United Nations, achieving primary education represents a key factor for enhancing 
development progresses in the poorest countries3. Efforts have been made to guarantee the 
continuous provision of universal, free-of-charge primary education. However, the fact that 
Bolivia has an illiteracy rate of 13 percent for people aged 15 or older confirms that the 
difficulties experienced by its educational system are among the most severe in Latin 
America (World Bank, 2008). 
In order to reaffirm the commitment of the state to improve the educational system, a 
series of cash-transfer benefits and school feeding programs have been approved over the last 
20 years. These programs are believed to be effectively contributing to higher enrollment and 
attendance rates, nevertheless several challenges concerning lack of homogenous 
implementation across municipalities and schools still need to be overcome. Likewise, with 
the goal of creating enabling conditions to guarantee the effective, multiethnic and non-
discriminatory access to educational services, special programs such as the Intercultural 
Bilingual Educational Program have been developed to attend the needs of the vast 
indigenous population of the country
4
. 
                                                 
2
 GDP data are from the United Nations National Accounts Main Aggregate Database, data on poverty are from 
MECOVI 2007. 
3
 More specifically, this represents the second Millennium Development Goal (MDG) as established by the 
United Nations. 
4
 According to the MECOVI surveys employed, more than 50 percent of the total Bolivian population declare 




Moreover, Bolivia represents a country with a high share of child labor. This share 
achieves about 30 percent among extremely poor families. Child labor not only represents an 
exploitative activity, but it is also associated with a low level of education (see Basu and Van, 
1998 for example), therefore jeopardizing human capital growth. Yet, as emphasized by 
Baland and Robinson (2000), the real issue is to better understand the determinants of child 
labor so as to evaluate its welfare implications. More generally, it is crucial to jointly 
investigate the factors driving schooling and child labor decisions.  
This paper aims at analyzing the determinants of primary school enrollment, 
attendance and child labor in Bolivia from 1999 to 2007, identifying how the substitution and 
complementary relationships among such activities evolve over time. 
The unprecedented use of Bolivia’s national household survey MECOVI for several 
years allows for an in-depth historical analysis of the recent trends of schooling and child 
labor. Due to the lack of empirical literature on this specific issue for Bolivia, this study 
represents a contribution that aims at filling the gap. 
Results at the descriptive level reveal that enrollment became progressively more 
widespread in Bolivia. Nonetheless, the attendance figures are discouraging, as about 40 
percent of the enrolled children did not go to school.  
Triprobit estimations show that the increase in enrollment is led by indigenous and 
children living in urban areas, whereas poverty and indigenous are the main characteristics 
driving the attendance behavior. While school feeding and conditional cash transfer programs 
are likely to have allowed extremely poor children to attend school, at the same time these do 
not seem sufficient to let them forgo child labor. In fact, the proportion of working children 
seems not to be affected by school incentives since extremely poor children manage to 




time), making those complements. On the contrary, indigenous children made them 
substitutes, increasing schooling and decreasing working. 
Furthermore, the empirical evidence also shows that the implementation of the Bono 
Juancito Pinto (BJP) scholarship in 2006 has a negative effect on attendance in 2007 as 
possibly children tend to enroll to benefit from the first installment but they do not attend 
school afterwards. In addition, the BJP does not discourage children abandoning working 
activities. 
The paper structure is as follows. Section 2 introduces the socio-political Bolivian 
context and briefly reviews the education system reforms. Section 3 goes through some of the 
main contributions in the empirical literature. The theoretical framework used for the analysis 
is presented in Section 4. The empirical strategy and the model are described in Section 5. In 




2. The education system in Bolivia: a Historical Perspective 
This section introduces a brief summary of the main education policies adopted in 
Bolivia, along with a short review of the main socio-political events of the last two decades.  
Reforms of the education system in Bolivia have been undertaken since 1905, when 
the first reform established a national education system. In 1955, the second important reform 
increased education coverage and supported a homogenous national culture. The 1970s and 
the 1980s were marked by a variety of education interventions which lacked central 
coordination or long-term plans. 
During the 1980s, Bolivia started a long transition into democracy. In 1993 a coalition 




(MNR) as president, who pursued an aggressive economic and social reform agenda. The 
most dramatic change was the capitalization program that leaded to the sale of many national 
enterprises. This process was accompanied by frequent social protests.  
On the educational front, the current Education Reform Program (ERP) is considered 
the third important reform of the Bolivian education system. The Ministry of Planning 
established the Technical Support Team of the Education Reform (ETARE), and the 
Education Reform Law was successfully introduced in 1994. The Educational Reform Law 
stipulates that the Bolivian State has the duty to offer free-of-charge education to all citizens, 
which is equivalent to a sub-guarantee of financial protection of the preprimary, primary and 
secondary education. As a matter of fact, however, educational spending focuses on primary 
education due to the national priority of guarantying access to this level. 
The reform aimed at improving the quality and efficiency of education, making it 
more relevant to the country’s economic needs, broadening its coverage, promoting the 
permanence of educators in the system, and addressing the needs of the vast indigenous 
population of the country5. Toward these ends, it restructured the education system and its 
administration, extended the years of mandatory education from five to eight, improved the 
teacher training system, and prioritized primary education incorporating the Intercultural 
Bilingual Educational Program6. Although a conclusive evaluation is not available, data 
suggests that there have been substantial improvements at the national level. Despite this, 
                                                 
5
 Many of the programs of the Educational Reform have introduced a set of guarantees that can be subject to 
redress by indigenous people if their right to access educational services in accordance to their languages and 
cultural characteristics is not granted by the State. 
6
 Education may be monolingual in Spanish with the additional study of an indigenous language or it may be 




Bonifaz and Ochoa (2002) highlight some deficiencies across municipalities, income groups 
and ethnic groups that jeopardize the achievement of the universal primary education.  
There have been other initiatives such as the Programa de Atencion a Niños y Niñas 
Menores de 7 Años (PAN), which was created in April of 1997 by the Bolivian government 
within the 1997-2001 Country Programme of the World Food Programme (WFP) with the 
goal of achieving adequate development and growth of children under the age of six. It 
reaches 72,000 children that are in a situation of extreme poverty, and provides them with 
education, nutrition, healthcare and protection. The children who attend these day care 
centers are fed breakfast and lunch and receive general care during the day while their 
mothers are in class. The Day Care Center has more than 450 centers in the province of 
Chuquisaca, and serves 8,500 children. Unfortunately the budget that the centers receive from 
the state is insufficient and does not cover the basic needs. Furthermore, there are no funds 
available for the maintenance of the infrastructure of the centers, and as a result, the centers 
are in an abandoned state and in bad need of repairs and renovations. 
 In 2004, the Street Children Programme was introduced with the aim to contribute to 
the development of 7,200 boys, girls and adolescents who live and work on the street through 
greater access to integrated educational services, health and nutrition within a framework of 
gender equality. The mechanism is food for training. 
 During the new election held in December 2005, Evo Morales was elected as the first 
indigenous president with a large victory reaching 54 percent of the electorate's votes. 
President Evo Morales introduced a 50 percent increase of the minimum wage in March 
2006, and two months later nationalized most of Bolivia's natural gas fields, which many 
indigenous Bolivians had been demanding for years.  
Among the main policies adopted by Morales, the BJP became law in 2006. These 




schools across the nation. Over half of the children targeted by the law (those between the 
ages of five and ten years old) have never attended or do not currently attend school. The 
money is distributed in cash directly to the children in nationwide ceremonies conducted with 
the help of the armed forces. It is paid in installments of 100 Bolivianos, one at the beginning 
and one at the end of the school year (nearly 26.5 US dollars a year). All public school 
children who are in the designated grade levels are eligible, regardless of their family’s 
income. This bonus should encourage the children to enroll and remain at school during their 
required term. However, after being enrolled and therefore receiving the first payment, 
students are not coerced to attend school. At the same time, if they do not attend, they prevent 
themselves from being awarded the second trench. The BJP can be considered only one of the 
several policies in favor of the indigenous communities. Many others followed the new 
constitution, adopted in February 2009, which gave Bolivians of indigenous descent more 
economic and political rights. 
Today, several school feeding programs are implemented in some communities in 
Bolivia7. These kinds of programs are believed to be effectively contributing to higher 
enrollment and attendance rates, and are sometimes combined with cash transfer programs 
conditional upon households letting the children go to school. An example is the In-School 
Breakfast Program (Desayuno Escolar), which started to be delivered in 1990. Many children 
walk at least one mile to get to school, and receiving a breakfast before starting classes 
alleviates their short-term hunger and lets them benefit more from the lesson. Clearly, it was 
conceived as a supplementary meal, meaning that the parents are supposed to provide the 
children with a first breakfast. However, it is not usually the case. 
                                                 
7
 The Ministry of Culture and Education (MEC) declared that the primary targets of such program are the 




Another example is the Programa de Alimentación Escolar (PAE) introduced during 
the 2003-3007 Country Programme of the WFP, from which 42,000 children over the age of 
six are benefitting. The aim is to support regular primary school attendance and to improve 
learning capacity by means of hunger relief in the short term. The main beneficiaries are the 
vulnerable municipalities and the regulating body is the Ministry of Education. 
Overall, Bolivia went through many liberal and nationalist cycles that substantially 
failed in the refunding of the State. The country is currently living a period of political, social 
and economic change where Evo Morales’ presidency represents a symbolic revolution in 
giving relevance to the role of the indigenous people in the society. 
 
 
3. Determinants of School Enrollment, Attendance and Child Labor: Literature 
Review 
Education constitutes the main means through which a country invests in human 
capital. Therefore education may be seen as the key factor for enhancing development 
progresses in poorer countries. Many developing countries still experience low levels of 
education attainment, and this is one of the reasons why they unsurprisingly lag far behind 
the developed world. Thus, it became relevant to investigate the main determinants of 
enrollment and attendance behavior for these countries, in order to assist policymakers in 
designing policies that lead to increased educational attainment.  
The literature on the determinants of education is vast and to review it completely 
would be beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, before moving to the empirical 
analysis it is worth reviewing some of the main contributions on the determinants of 
households’ demand for schooling and child labor. 
Low levels of education in developing countries might be related to high levels of 




the economic literature on child labor, the authors clarify the positive relationship between 
poverty and child labor and therefore the negative effect of poverty on children’s education. 
They claim that education, as well as leisure, is a ―luxury good‖ for poor families with an 
extremely low income8. In their altruistic model, household wealth is the most important 
factor in the decision to send children to school or to work. That is, child labor arises only if 
adult wages are insufficient to sustain the household. Therefore, they argue that a ban on 
child labor may even be welfare reducing for a poor household if poverty is the main cause of 
child labor.  
 On the contrary, Baland and Robinson (2000) find that a small ban on child labor may 
constitute an actual Pareto improvement even though it does not directly compensate parents. 
The reason is that endogenous changes in wages induced by a reduction in child labor may 
make parents and firms better off. 
 The empirical investigation carried out by Jayachandran (2002) for India supports the 
theoretical results of Basu and Van (1998). He shows that poverty is among the key factors 
that explain why parents cannot afford to send their children to school. Along the same line, 
the empirical analysis of Psacharopoulos (1997) also confirms that child labor reduces 
educational attainment in Bolivia and Venezuela9. For the African context, Canagarajah and 
Coulombe (1997) find a significant negative relationship between going to school and 
working in Ghana.  
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 Such concept is called ―luxury assumption‖ or ―luxury axiom‖. 
9
 Note that Psacharopoulos (1997) does not focus on the determinants of school enrolment and attendance in 
Bolivia. More specifically, the author does not analyze whether or not a working child is less likely to be 




 In contrast, Ravallion and Wodon (2000) question that child labor displaces schooling 
in Bangladesh. In addition, Ray (2000) and Bhalotra (2007) do not find empirical evidence of 
the ―luxury axiom‖ in the context of Pakistan and India respectively10. 
It is not easy to identify standard key determinants of education due to the country-
specific socio-cultural characteristics. Schultz (1999) attempts to identify three key 
socioeconomic determinants of households’ demand for schooling and comes up with public 
expenditure on education, parental education and the wealth of families. 
Spending in public education in developing countries (where the level of public 
infrastructure is typically low) may have a huge impact on stimulating education enrollment 
and attendance. Duflo (2001), for example, focuses on the case of Indonesia, where a massive 
school construction program, implemented by the national government during the 1970s, led 
to a strong increase of the enrollment rate. Also Handa (2002) and Handa and Simler (2005) 
point out that building more schools in the context of Mozambique had a strong impact on 
school enrollment.  
On the other hand, the lack of government support in fostering education might have 
drastic effects on education. In fact, Glewwe and Ilias (1996) noted that enrollment rates 
declined in Ghana during the late 1970s and early 1980s due to a reduction of public 
spending in education. Nevertheless, Al-Samarrai (2006), investigates the link between 
educational access and public education expenditure in a cross-country framework and finds 
that it is weak. 
Household characteristics, such as the education of parents, probably represent one of 
the most relevant factors leading to children enrollment and attendance in the developing 
world. The idea underlying such claim is that educated parents by and large understand the 
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importance of achieving basic education and therefore feel responsible to send their kids to 
school. The reverse is true for non-educated parents who started to work at an early age. This 
is evident in Wahba (2006) that shows that Egyptian parents, who were child laborers 
themselves, would most likely send their children to work. In other words, for those parents 
education may not necessarily be considered as an investment.  
 Some studies also consider cultural aspects such as gender issues that may influence 
some disparities in enrollment and attendance. Tansel (2000) points to gender as one 
characteristic that should not be neglected when analyzing the determinants of education. He 
noted that the effect of income on the schooling of girls was larger than that of boys. Al-
Samarrai and Peasgood (1998) find that household characteristics such as parental education 
may have a totally different impact on the education of females and males in Tanzania. Using 
some descriptive statistics, Bonifaz and Ochoa (2002) find that Bolivia does not present a 
significant gender gap in terms of total school attendance, even though minor differences 
emerge when considering the socioeconomic status and the living area.  
  
 
4. Theoretical Framework 
 In order to carry out the analysis, Ravallion and Wodon’s (2000) theoretical 
framework is adopted, as they jointly analyze the decision of working and schooling when 
school incentives are provided by the government. In fact, as noted in Section 2, the school 
feeding programs provided by the government makes this framework appropriate. 
It is assumed that parents are free to determine the time allocation of their children. In 
addition, assuming that parents are altruistic and want the best for their kids, they will 





Drawing from Basu and Van (1998), if no school incentive is available and if 
households’ wages are too low, families will be forced to send their children to work in order 
to survive. However, if the government provides children with incentives for schooling, 
households’ decisions on their children’s allocation of time may vary according to the 
relationships occurring among leisure, school and work. In particular, as in Ravallion and 
Wodon (2000), it is assumed that families have the following utility function: 
 
 ZHSCUU ;;;         (1) 
 
 where C is consumption, S stands for schooling, H is leisure and Z is a vector of 
household characteristics. In addition, the child’s total time available is:  
 
LHST          (2) 
 
 where L is the time devoted to labor. Considering w  as the wage received for 
working and b  as the incentive received to enroll/attend school, the budget constraint faced 
by the families is: 
 
)(ZYbSwLC          (3) 
 
 where )(ZY  represents the household’s income as a function of the above mentioned 
vector of household characteristics. Therefore, if parents maximize the utility function subject 
to the time available and the budget constraint, the latter can be rewritten as: 
 





Note that  bw  is the price of attending school11. Thus, w  and b  are turn out to be 
crucial when allocating time. Assuming strict quasi-concavity of the utility function, the 
problem here is to evaluate the impact of an increase of school incentive on labor. As shown 
in Ravallion and Wodon (2000), the impact of an increase of the subsidy on labor can be 
























    (5) 
 
Under the concavity assumption ofU , the first and third term are strictly negative. On 
the other hand, the second term might be either positive or negative. Therefore, the effect of a 
subsidy that increases schooling has an ambiguous effect on child labor. More specifically, if 
leisure and schooling are (utility-compensating) substitutes, a school incentive may have 
either no or positive impact on child labor. On the other hand, the effect on child labor is 
negative if schooling and leisure are complements. Thus, in the former scenario child labor 
increases or stays the same as schooling increases, whereas in the latter child labor decreases. 
According to the previous setup, by identifying the determinants of school attendance, 
enrollment and child labor in Bolivia, the empirical analysis as described in the following 
section allows inferring how Bolivian households allocate time and thus whether these goods 
are complements or substitutes. More specifically, the evaluation of the determinants across 
time (1999-2007) helps shading light on the dynamics of the joint schooling/child labor 
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 The final constraint can be obtained by pricing the amount of time by w  (as the wage determines 
the price of the time). Moreover, by inserting wT  in the initial constraint on both side of the equation 




decisions made by different groups such as (not) indigenous and (not) extremely poor 
households.    
 
 
5. Empirical Strategy 
 This section describes the chosen empirical strategy, while the model specification is 
illustrated in the following subsection. 
The enrollment, attendance and working decisions are modeled assuming that these 
are made by a representative agent within the household wishing to maximize his or her 
family’s welfare.  
Therefore, a linear random utility function is employed, where the utility associated 
with both the decision to enroll or not to enroll the child in primary school is assumed to be a 
linear function of a set of household’s socio-economic characteristics )( iX , and of a 
stochastic term, which represents unobservable and measurement errors )( i . Hence, the 
indirect utility of household i  associated with the enrollment decision )( ,EiU and not 
enrollment )( ,NiU can be expressed as: 
 
EiEiEi XU ,, )(            (6)
 
NiNiNi XU ,, )(            (7) 
 
Thus, the representative agent of the household i  will choose to enroll the child if the 
utility associated with the decision is higher than the utility associated with the alternative 
decision: )()( ,, NiEi UU  . If a variable Y  is defined such that 1, EiY  if the 
thi  household 
enrolls the child and 0, EiY if it does not, the probability that the 




child is  )()Pr()1( ,,, NEXUUY iNiEiEi   , where   is the cumulative 
distribution function of NiEi ,,   . 
Normalizing the utility of not enrolling the child in school to zero )0( , NiU it is 
possible to derive the empirical equation for the enrollment decision: 
 
 iEiEi XUY  )0Pr()1Pr( ,,        (8) 
 
Similarly, other two equations are derived to model the probability of the same 
household i  to let the child attend school and work: 
 
 iAiAi XUY  )0Pr()1Pr( ,,        (9) 
 iWiWi XUY  )0Pr()1Pr( ,,       (10) 
 
where AiU ,  and WiU ,  are the indirect utilities associated with sending the child to school and 
to work. 
 Therefore, it is possible to empirically analyze the household’s determinants of 
enrollment, attendance and working behavior through the estimation of  ,   and   
parameters in the empirical equations (8), (9) and (10).  
 The most common econometric regression procedure to estimate these equations by 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) is the Probit model
12
. It assumes that the error term 
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 The alternative is to use Logit regressions, assuming an error term logistically distributed. However, the 





is normally distributed with mean zero and variance equal to one, and (.)  is the cumulative 
distribution function for a standard normal random variable. Nonetheless, a possible issue 
with this approach is that it does not consider the correlation among the household’s 
decisions on enrollment, attendance and working. Hence, the univariate approach estimation 
of the three correlated equations is not a fully efficient econometric procedure, as it ignores 
the correlation among the error terms. 
 Due to the clear interrelation among the dependent variables of interest, the estimation 
method must reflect the joint decision making process. More specifically, enrollment, 
attendance and working cannot be treated as independent decisions. This rules out the 
possibility of using a multinomial Logit model since it assumes that all variables are 
considered independent. That is, as already considered by Wabha (2006), using a multinomial 
Logit model would imply that the decision to work is independent or, in other words, not 
affected by whether or not a schooling option is available. It should be noted that the 
empirical works aiming at analyzing jointly the schooling and working decisions did not pay 
enough attention to the interdependence problem. For example, Psacharopoulos (1997), 
Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1997) as well as Ravallion and Wodon (2000), when modeling 
schooling and working do not allow for a multivariate specification that would have tackled 
the endogeneity among the dependent variables. Only Wabha (2006) uses a bivariate Probit 
procedure in modeling child labor and schooling. 
 Thus, given the hypothesis of interdependence among the three variables of interest, a 
trivariate Probit model (Triprobit) is employed. This, in fact, allows for the existence of 
possible correlated disturbances.  
 
 iEi XY  )1Pr( ,         (11) 




 iWi XY  )1Pr( ,         (13) 
 
In this model, the error terms follow a trivariate normal distribution: 
 
0)()()( ,,,  WiAiEi EEE   
1)()()( ,,,  WiAiEi VVV        (14) 
 ),,( ,,, WiAiEiCov  
 
The evaluation of the likelihood function requires the computation of trivariate 

























   (15)
 
 
 The model is estimated by the method of simulated maximum likelihood (SML). In 
particular, the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) smooth recursive simulator is used to 
evaluate the three-dimensional Normal integrals in the likelihood function (see Hajivassilious 
et al., 1995).  
For each observation, a likelihood contribution is calculated for each replication, and 
the simulated likelihood contribution is the average of the values derived from all the 
replications. The simulated likelihood function for the sample as a whole is then maximized 
using the standard maximum likelihood technique. 
Given the nature of the data, the Triprobit methodology does not consider fully the 




the enrollment decision determines completely the possibility of attending school, selecting 
households that can actually take the latter decision, and a non-random sample selection 
could generate biased estimates as specified in Heckman (1979). An econometric approach 
that can be considered to deal with this problem is to specify a tivariate Probit with sample 
selection model, and adapt the Heckman two-step procedure to this dichotomous case (Van 
de Ven et al., 1981). However, the lack of an instrumental variable did not allow the authors 
to adopt such extension. 
Moreover, the longitudinal dimension of the data is not explored, as any methodology 
that takes it into account (i.e. pseudo panel or pooled cross sections) would not allow 
investigating the substitution and complementary relationships of the dependent variables 
over the considered period. 
Gouriéroux and Montfort (1997) show that under standard conditions the SML 
estimator is consistent as the number of observations and the number of draws tends to 
infinity, and is asymptotically equivalent to the true maximum likelihood estimator as the 
ratio of the square root of the sample size to the number of draws tends to zero. 
Note that since the Triprobit is an ad-hoc procedure, the calculation of the marginal 
effects and their standard deviations is not provided by the standard statistical packages. 
Therefore, both the marginal effects and the standard deviations have been computed using 
the procedure suggested by Anderson and Newell (2003) and subsequently corrected by 
Carlevaro and Sénégas (2006). 
 
 
5.1. The Model 
Considering the methodological issues presented in the previous section, the 















   (16) 
 
 Where Y is the probability of the event Enrollment in the first equation, Attendance in 
the second one and Working in the last one. 
 Note that, apart from Age, all the variables used in the equations are dichotomous. 
The dependent variable Enrollment takes the value one when the child is enrolled in the 
current year into primary school and zero otherwise. Attendance takes the value one if the 
child answers that he is currently attending the course he got into during the current year and 
zero otherwise. Finally, Working takes value one when the child answers that he worked at 
least one hour during the previous week and zero otherwise. 
 Beyond the continuous variable Age, a set of dummy variables has been added as 
regressors of the three equations. Namely, Male identifies a male child; Indigenous takes the 
value if the child answers positively the question about his feeling of belonging to an 
indigenous group and zero otherwise. However, since many children were not able to answer 
this question, those who have both the mother and the father declaring to belong to an 
indigenous group are also defined as indigenous. Urban, Spanish and Poverty identify a child 
that respectively lives in an urbanized area, can speak Spanish as first or second language, 
and that is living in extreme poverty conditions13 and zero otherwise14. 
 Moreover, EdMHead (educated male head) and EdFHead (educated female head) 
have been added to the equations. These take the value of one if the child belongs to a family 
with an educated male or female head, and zero otherwise. A head is defined as educated if 
he or she has completed at least primary school. 
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 The definition of extreme poverty used in the surveys is based on the Unsatisfied Basic Needs (NBI) Index. 
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 Finally, using the available data the impact of the BJP is analyzed by adding a dummy 
variable in the 2007 regression that identifies those who received such scholarship in 2006. 
 
 
6. Empirical Analysis 
This section firstly describes the data employed and illustrates some descriptive 
statistics. Secondly, the results from the estimation of the model are presented and discussed. 
 
6.1. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data used in this paper was obtained from Bolivia’s national household survey 
MECOVI15 for 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2005, 2006 and 2007. This survey is conducted at the 
end of each year, typically in November and December. 
The age of entry in primary school is six and the duration of compulsory education is 
eight years. Therefore, samples of children who are between five and fifteen years
16
 are 
selected in this analysis. The academic year is composed of about forty weeks, five days a 
week and four hours per day.  
The focus of the analysis does not encompass private schools17, as the enrollment and 
attendance behaviors are likely to be driven by different factors. 
Table 1 shows the proportions of children for each of the above mentioned 
characteristics. 
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 MECOVI is a regional program that aims at standardizing household surveys in the Latin American and 
Caribbean region, funded by the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the United Nations. 
16
 A slightly wider age interval has been used to allow for children that go to school one year before or one year 
later the traditional age of entry. 
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[Table 1 about here] 
 
 
It is relevant to note that the population is fairly distributed in many of its features as 
gender, ethnic origin, living area and extreme poverty.  
In fact, the proportion of male children in the population is roughly the same of the 
female one. Moreover, the proportion of indigenous children is slightly higher than the non-
indigenous one. Likewise, extremely poor children are faintly more than non-extremely poor 
ones in all but one year (data in 1999 are out of the average because the definition of poor 
instead of extremely poor has been adopted). In the last two years, the proportion of children 
coming from urban areas exceeded the one of those coming from rural ones, albeit 
maintaining a certain level of symmetry in the population. 
Finally, children speaking Spanish are more than 90 percent in all years and it is quite 
unusual for a child to have an educated head, but it is relatively more common that this is the 
father instead of the mother. 
The data presented in Table 2 shows the proportions of children enrolled in primary 
public school, attending it and carrying out working activities. It is clear that the percentage 
of enrolled children has been increasing over the considered years. However, the attendance 
proportions do not show any clear pattern, and displays the worst value in 2007 after some 







[Table 2 about here] 
 
 
Although the figures on enrollment are suggesting that the country is on path for 
achieving universal primary education, attendance proportions cast doubts on the fulfillment 
of the target relative to the completion of primary school. 
Table 3 presents the proportions of children who enroll/attend primary school and 
those of children that are involved in working activities given the same characteristics. 
 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
 
Unsurprisingly, indigenous children enrolled less than non-indigenous ones. 
However, the gap has been reducing over time, nullifying the difference between the two 
groups. More interestingly, the proportion of children who attend primary school is somwhat 
higher for indigenous people than for non-indigenous ones for all the years. Therefore before 
2002, indigenous children enrolled less, but if they did so, they attended more than non-
indigenous ones. Likewise, even when the enrollment proportions became roughly equal, 
indigenous children attend relatively more. Looking at the working proportions, it is clear 
that indigenous children work more than non-indigenous ones. However, after a peak in 
2005, the indigenous proportion started to decrease by more than 5 percentage points each 
year, whereas the non-indigenous remained the same. 
If a child is extremely poor, he is less likely to enroll in primary school, but, again, if 




extremely poor the enrollment proportion has increased, while the attendance proportion is 
quite volatile and no clear trend emerges. As expected, extremely poor children work more 
than non-extremely poor ones. 




[Figure 1 about here] 
 
 
The gap from being negative became positive and progressively widened, reaching its 
maximum amplitude in 2006 and 2007. Given that indigenous and extremely poor children 
report similar child labor proportions, this suggests that indigenous children reduced labor 
compared with extremely poor children. On the contrary, extremely poor children seem not 
having reduced child labor (see also Table 3). Moreover, given that both groups increased 
attendance as discussed above, it is then relevant to further investigate whether or not 
indigenous (and poor children) were able to substitute (complement) schooling and working. 
Living in an urbanized area seems to be important for enrolling although this feature 
seems to lose importance in the last two years. As for the indigenous people, the proportion 
of not enrolled children from the rural areas has been substantially declining across the 
considered period, whereas it has been only slightly reducing for those not enrolled in the 
urban areas. Interestingly, children from rural areas tend to attend primary school more than 
those living in urban areas, contrary to the general belief. 
Spanish-speaking children usually enroll in school much more than non-Spanish-




addressed the problem through the Intercultural Bilingual Educational Program. As for the 
indigenous, a non-Spanish speaking child, when enrolled, tends to attend more than a Spanish 
speaking one. Non-Spanish speaking children tend to work more than Spanish speaking ones. 
Nonetheless a downward trend in the last three years is observable. 
Gender does not seem to be an issue for the enrollment and attendance in Bolivia; 
however, if for both males and females the proportion of enrolled children improves across 
years (in particular from 2005), this is not true for the attendance behavior. Males tend to 
work more than females for all but one year. Yet, the surveys do not provide a detailed 
household members’ domestic activity section for all years. Therefore, it is important to be 
aware about a potential bias. 
Finally, the education of the head seems to play a relevant role in let children 
enrolling and in taking them away from labor.  
 
6.2. Presentation and Interpretation of the Results 
Table 4 and 5 show the empirical results relative to the trivariate Probit estimation. As 
illustrated in Table 4, overall the cross-equation error terms appear strongly correlated, 




[Table 4 about here] 
 
 






According to the econometric results, extremely poor children tend not to enroll in the 
first years of the analysis. Yet, in the last three years this pattern changes and in 2006 a 
positive and significant coefficient shows up. Interestingly, indigenous children are more 
likely to enroll than the non-indigenous ones. 
Among the regressors of the enrollment equation, it is evident that urban is the most 
important determinant positively affecting the choice to be enrolled in primary school for the 
whole period.  
Being able to speak Spanish positively affects the probability of being enrolled across 
years. In addition, older children tend to enroll less. 
Averaging across years, around 60 percent of working children’s fathers is not 
educated. In other words, parents with little or no education may not consider schooling as an 
investment as also noted in Whaba (2006) for Egypt. The empirical analysis supports the 
previous statement since having an educated parent positively affects the probability of being 
enrolled.  
Undesirably, the gender issue is evident for almost every year under consideration. In 
fact, males are generally more likely to enroll in primary school. 
Overall, it seems that the picture of enrollment of children in primary school is 
positive and improving across time. The proportion of not enrolled children drop from 9.2 
percent in 1999 to 4.4 percent in 2007 and the empirical analysis of the determinants as in 
Tables 4 and 5 shows that the increase of enrollment happens in urban areas and among 
indigenous.  
Regrettably, the attendance analysis does not draw the same encouraging picture. As 




percent. In other words, almost all the children enrolled in primary school but few attended it. 
Thus, it turns out to be crucial to analyze the determinants of attendance. 
The most interesting and important variables in the attendance equation are 
indigenous and extreme poverty. The indigenous variable reports the strongest positive 
marginal effect in the attendance equation and the impact shows an upward trend over the 
years, achieving about 20 percent in 2007. Such result could be linked to the effects of the 
inclusive policies for people belonging to indigenous groups. Moreover, it is clear from 
Tables 4 and 5 that being extremely poor has a positive and significant impact in most of the 
years. In addition, in the last two years the marginal effects increase up to 14 percent. It 
seems plausible that extremely poor children are more motivated than non-extremely poor 
ones to attend school because of school feeding and conditional cash transfers programs 
adopted in several municipalities in Bolivia. In this sense, attending school turns out to be 
very important for an extremely poor child and the family. 
The Spanish variable is positive and significant in most of the years, highlighting that 
not being able to speak Spanish not only discourages children to enroll, but also represents an 
obstacle for the children to attend. Therefore, it seems that policies that introduced the 
bilingual intercultural education were not successful.  
As for the enrollment probability results, older children tend to attend less. However, 
the magnitude of the marginal effects is quite low after 2000. 
Children with educated parents are more likely to attend school, although this is not as 
evident as for the enrollment equation. 
The coefficients of the Urban variable show an interesting trend. From 2000 through 
2002 children in urban areas attended school more than those in rural areas. Nevertheless, the 




significant. This is in line with previous results, in that extremely poor indigenous children 
tend to live in rural areas.  
The results relative to the BJP variable deserve special attention. Note that those 
children who benefited from the scholarship in 2006 tend to enroll, but do not attend school 
in 2007. This is particularly evident when considering that the variable has the highest 
marginal effect in the 2007 enrollment equation while it reports a negative but not significant 
sign in the attendance equation. Thus, children get only the first installment (that is the one 
due at the enrollment act), foregoing the second one (disbursed at the end of the academic 
year). Therefore, it seems that this program encourages free riding behavior since children 
seem to take advantage of it without caring about the learning phase. 
Finally, the working estimation results help to better understand the interaction among 
the three phenomena. Child labor is mainly concentrated in rural areas and parental education 
plays a relevant role in reducing the probability of the child to engage in working activities.  
The variable age shows a positive and significant effect in all the years under analysis. 
This is likely to be due to the increase in child labor productivity as age rises. Unsurprisingly, 
those who do not speak Spanish tend to work more. 
Being indigenous generally leads to child labor across the initial years. However, the 
effect of such determinant diminishes afterwards and in the last two years is not significant. 
In other words, indigenous children are less likely to work after 2005, the year of the election 
of the first indigenous President Morales. On the other hand, it can be observed an increasing 
and significant impact of the extremely poor variable across years. Therefore, as already 
noted from Figure 1, despite indigenous children reduced working, the reverse is true for 
extremely poor children. 
Being male is a relevant determinant of child labor. Nevertheless, it should be 




carried out by females. Therefore, such coefficients could be biased as noted in Contreras et 
al (2006). 
Interestingly, the BJP variable reports a positive though not significant coefficient and 
this is an important finding that comes along with the result of the BJP in the attendance 
equation. More specifically, not only the BJP seems not to increase school attendance but it 
also does not discourage children to leave working activities.  
To sum up, the decision of attending school is mainly driven by indigenous people 
and by a welfare improvement of the extremely poor families. In other words, extremely poor 
families need to benefit from the higher income provided by both child labor and school 
attendance. Although schooling programs oriented to extremely poor children achieved some 
positive results, the proportion of enrolled children who do not attend school is still high and 
those poor who attend are not able to forgo the income coming from labor. Accordingly, it 
seems that the ―luxury assumption‖ by Basu and Van (1998) does not hold in the case of 
Bolivia since the majority of children attending primary school are extremely poor. 
Nevertheless, the Bolivian context is characterized by incentives that are not considered in 
the authors’ framework. 
Finally, the empirical results allow explaining how schooling/labor decisions interact 
across different groups and time. More specifically, given the theoretical framework 
considered in section 4, two clear features seem to emerge from our analysis. In fact, 
empirical evidence shows that in Bolivia there is no substitution between working and 
schooling among extremely poor children. However, the same cannot be argued for the 
indigenous children, who became able to substitute between such goods. It should be also 
observed that attending school seems to be an option for non-extremely poor families and this 
should be taken in consideration in order to implement further educational policies oriented 







This paper contributes to the existing education literature by analyzing the 
determinants of school enrollment, attendance and working in Bolivia from 1999 to 2007. 
Using a trivariate Probit model, evidence is found of a significant increase in 
enrollment among indigenous children and children living in urban areas. In general the 
proportion of not enrolled children in primary school is steadily decreasing achieving 4.4 
percent in 2007. However, about 40 percent of the enrolled children are not attending school. 
When analyzing the determinants of the attendance behavior, poverty and indigenous turn out 
to be the most important characteristics. Nonetheless, the same variables show different 
patterns in the working estimation. In fact, if indigenous children are progressively quitting 
their job, extremely poor cannot. 
The enrollment figures look promising when evaluating the achievement of the 
second MDG on universal primary education, but suggest that further efforts are required to 
allow children to attend school and abandon work activities.  
Education policies aiming at spreading primary education to indigenous and 
extremely poor children seem to have produced positive effects. More specifically, inclusive 
policies toward the indigenous, school feeding and conditional cash transfer programs 
allowed indigenous and poor children to attend school. On the other hand, the BJP initiative 
seems to encourage free riding behavior, leading people to enroll but not to attend. The 
reason of it might be that the second installment of the BJP is not large enough for many 
extremely poor children to forgo working. 
 Thus, it is evident that the attendance decision, corresponding to the learning phase, is 




for the future. In fact, it can be inferred that there is no substitution between working and 
schooling among extremely poor children. In other words, as already found by Ravallion and 
Wodon (2000) in the case of Bangladesh, it seems that child labor does not displace 
schooling among extremely poor individuals in Bolivia. On the contrary, indigenous children 
became able to substitute between such goods. 
 There are three main caveats of the analysis. First, as mentioned, the absence of 
domestic work data could bias the obtained results with relation to the gender issue. Second, 
the analysis is carried out at the national level, disregarding any different dynamic that is 
occurring at the local level. Finally, the absence of a good instrument to control for the 
selection problem could be a potential source of bias. 
 The results have four main policy implications. Policies aiming to foster enrollment in 
rural areas should be promoted. At the same time, incentives and measures to stimulate 
school participation need to be revised in order to encourage child labor abandonment by the 
poorest. Moreover, a different setting of the installments of the BJP should be devised to 
avoid free riding and consequently promote human capital growth. Finally, educational 
policies should not forget those non-extremely poor children that are fully enrolled but hardly 







Table 1: Proportions in the population  
    1999 2000 2001 2002 2005 2006 2007 
 
Male    51.2 50.8 50.6 50.9 53.6 52.4 50.6 
Female   48.8 49.2 49.4 49.1 46.4 47.6 49.4 
 
Indigenous        63.8 53.5 58.5 54.8 54.7 50.9 51.3 
Non-indigenous  36.2 46.5 41.5 45.2 45.3 49.1 48.7 
 
Urban            43.1 46.5 43.3 49.2 45.3 56.7 57.4 
Rural    56.9 53.5 56.7 50.8 54.7 43.3 42.6 
 
Spanish          99.1 97.0 93.7 91.2 98.7 96.8 95.0 
Non-Spanish   0.9 3.0 6.3 8.8 1.3 3.2 5.0 
 
Ed M Head         - - 27.8 20.0 26.9 32.2 29.9 
Non-ed M Head  - - 72.2 80.0 73.1 67.8 70.1 
 
Ed F Head        - - 4.1 10.0 5.5 5.3 6.6 
Non-ed F Head  - - 95.9 90.0 94.5 94.7 93.4 
 
Extr. poor          78.4 54.4 55.6 54.3 52.4 48.5 53.4 
Non-extr. poor  21.6 45.6 44.4 45.7 47.6 51.5 46.6 
 
Observations   2912 4622 5848 5614 1187 3102 3165 
 
 




 Table 2: Enrollment, Attendance and Working 
 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2005 2006  2007
 
 Enrollment (%) 90.8 91.1 90.9 91.1 94.6 94.2 95.6 
 
 Attendance (%) 53.2 71.2 49.5 55.0 62.1 75.4 50.6 
 
 Working (%)       26.5 19.1 22.2 20.3 17.04 19.5 21.9 
 





Table 3: Enrollment, Attendance and Working Proportions 
 
              Enrollment 
    1999 2000 2001 2002 2005 2006 2007 
 
Male    85.9 83.5 84.9 85.1 90.9 89.5 91.3 
Female   82.3 82.5 83.1 83.4 88.2 86.2 89.2 
 
Indigenous        81.1 82.0 84.0 84.4 89.6 88.2 89.6 
Non-indigenous  88.6 83.8 83.2 84.8 89.6 87.7 90.4 
 
Urban            90.2 87.6 88.7 88.2 94.0 89.7 91.5 
Rural    77.8 77.9 78.8 80.1 84.9 86.2 88.8 
 
Spanish          84.0 84.2 85.6 86.0 90.4 88.4 90.9 
Non-Spanish   42.9 29.5 61.6 67.9 54.8 76.8 79.4 
 
Ed M Head         - - 85.8 84.7 95.6 90.7 92.8 
Non-ed M Head  - - 82.5 78.9 87.2 87.0 88.1 
 
Ed F Head        - - 90.8 88.6 96.9 95.5 92.5 
Non-ed F Head  - - 84.6 73.1 83.5 83.3 91.1 
 
Extr. poor          82.7 80.4 81.9 82.2 88.0 87.2 89.3 
Non-extr. poor  89.3 85.9 86.4 86.8 92.1 88.9 91.5 
 
                                   Attendance 
    1999 2000 2001 2002 2005 2006 2007 
 
Male    55.0 67.7 52.1 59.9 62.3 73.0 48.3 
Female   54.9 65.0 52.5 59.7 58.4 74.7 50.6 
 
Indigenous        62.4 73.5 55.4 66.8 74.4 81.9 58.8 
Non-indigenous  40.0 58.1 45.7 49.2 40.9 60.5 33.6 
 
Urban            43.2 60.6 55.8 67.7 54.8 66.5 42.4 
Rural   69.0 73.6 48.1 50.4 67.4 81.3 58.1 
 
Spanish          52.5 65.7 51.5 60.9 60.1 73.8 49.0 
Non-Spanish   50.4 77.8 69.4 58.4 94.8 73.7 60.0 
 
Ed M Head         - - 52.4 60.3 57.6 69.4 50.7 
Non-ed M Head  - - 50.4 48.5 61.5 76.8 47.4 
 
Ed F Head        - - 51.1 63.2 70.3 57.7 44.7 
Non-ed F Head  - - 62.0 56.5 59.3 70.3 54.8 
 
Extr. poor           58.9 72.5 52.7 60.6 67.2 82.0 59.2 
Non-extr. poor  41.9 60.1 51.9 58.9 54.2 64.7 38.7 
 
                 Working 
     1999 2000 2001 2002 2005 2006 2007 
 
Male    26.4 20.6 23.2 23.0 31.0 24.4 21.9 
Female   26.1 15.8 18.3 18.6 22.6 22.0 17.5 
 
Indigenous        31.0 24.1 25.4 25.9 35.3 30.0 24.6 
Non-indigenous  17.2 11.5 14.4 14.2 15.2 15.4 15.6 
 
Urban            8.8 6.7 7.8 7.4 10.2 6.4 5.4 
Rural    45.1 31.7 35.9 36.0 45.2 40.2 36.8 
 
Spanish          37.0 27.2 20.1 18.8 26.3 22.3 19.0 
Non-Spanish   85.8 75.4 36.8 45.3 64.7 60.5 39.7 
 
Ed M Head         - - 17.7 20.2 14.1 12.2 10.0 
Non-ed M Head  - - 22.7 33.8 34.7 32.0 27.7 
 
Ed F Head        - - 12.8 14.2 8.5 3.7 8.8 
Non-ed F Head  - - 23.2 33.0 32.1 19.9 19.3 
 
Extr. poor           29.5 23.8 26.1 27.8 36.2 33.4 28.0 
Non-extr. poor  15.0 12.1 14.9 12.8 16.8  11.9 10.3 
 
 




Table 4: Enrollment, Attendance and Working Coefficients: Trivariate Probit Regressions 
 
 
              Enrollment 
    1999 2000 2001 2002 2005 2006 2007 
 
Age   -.334*** -.435*** -.184*** -.169*** -.412*** -.231*** -.258*** 
   (-5.66) (-7.70) (-10.25) (-9.77) (-6.09) (-6.76) (-5.43) 
 
Male   .413*** .159 .060 .168** .184 .323*** .078 
   (3.48) (1.45) (0.86) (2.54) (1.37) (3.15) (0.57) 
 
Indigenous        .073 .149 .271*** .203*** .104 .419***  .320** 
   (0.53) (1.25) (3.83) (2.91) (0.78) (3.70) (2.40) 
 
Urban           .856*** .627*** .616*** .348*** .361** .400*** .379*** 
   (6.61) (5.20) (7.88) (4.35) (2.02) (3.51) (2.57) 
 
Spanish         .808 1.204***.744*** .548*** .822** .613** .292  
   (1.29) (4.86) (5.35) (5.08) (2.32) (2.48) (1.11) 
 
EdMHead         dropped dropped -.005 .255** .494*** .634*** .383**  
     (-0.06) (2.44) (2.64) (4.35) (2.10) 
 
EdFHead       dropped dropped -.009 .258* 5.451***.582* .111  
     (-0.05) (1.67) (29.94) (1.79) (0.30) 
 
Extr. poor         -.040  -.257** -.113 -.129* -.030 .234* -.190 
   (-0.23) (-2.25) (-1.49) (-1.76) (-0.22) (1.89) (-1.25) 
 
BJP           . . . . . . .845*** 
         (4.29) 
 
Constant           .823 1.102** .584*** .630*** .212 .603** 1.371*** 
   (1.19) (3.39) (3.83) (4.01) (0.55) (2.26) (4.35) 
 
 
              Attendance 
    1999 2000 2001 2002 2005 2006 2007  
 
Age   -.168*** -.208*** -.018* -.022** -.161*** -.052*** -.001 
   (-3.43) (-4.98) (-1.74) (-2.25) (-3.38) (-3.51 (-0.04) 
 
Male   .190* .065 -.008 .028 .116 .066 -.073 
   (1.91) (0.77) (-0.18) (0.59) (1.18) (0.97) (-1.10) 
 
Indigenous        .297*** .450*** .299*** .619*** .788*** .497***  .569*** 
   (2.69) (4.91) (5.88) (12.07) (7.69) (7.17) (8.34) 
 
Urban           -.235** .230*** .439*** .647*** .048 -.157** -.186** 
   (-2.28) (2.65) (8.92) (11.94) (0.43) (-2.05) (-2.35) 
 
Spanish         .865 .961***-.196* .189** .275 .451** .216 
   (1.27) (3.95) (-1.64) (2.08) (0.72) (2.09) (1.30) 
 
EdMHead         dropped dropped .012 .247*** .081 .206*** .385*** 
     (0.22) (2.77) (0.70) (2.62) (5.09) 
 
EdFHead       dropped dropped -.099 .296** .572** .144 .300*  
     (-0.71) (2.44) (2.16) (0.83) (1.91) 
 
Extr. poor         .038 .100 .016 .149*** .152 .371*** .415*** 
   (0.30) (1.14) (0.33) (2.88) (1.45) (5.07) (5.63) 
 
BJP           . . . . . . -.023 
         (-0.29) 
 
Constant           -.652 -.573* -.299** -1.084***-.829* -.400* -.842*** 






Table 4 (Continued) 
 
 
                Working 
   1999 2000 2001 2002 2005 2006 2007  
 
Age   .11**8 .234*** .138*** .158*** .145*** .151*** .141*** 
   (2.36) (4.57) (11.93) (13.84) (3.05) (7.97) (7.00) 
 
Male   -.052 .286*** .238*** .254*** .350*** .123 .214** 
   (-0.47) (2.94) (4.29) (4.59) (3.36) (1.37) (2.52) 
 
Indigenous        .280** .164*** .160*** .174*** .431*** .087  .010 
   (2.23) (1.52) (2.71) (3.07) (4.03) (1.05) (0.12) 
 
Urban           -1.105***-.808***-1.003***-.986***-.964***-1.083***-1.175*** 
   (-9.32) (-8.12) (-17.07) (-16.18) (-8.73) (-11.11) (-12.91) 
 
Spanish         -.773* -.799*** -.367*** -.610*** -.398 -.534** -.154 
   (-1.65) (-3.22) (-2.95) (-6.83) (-1.14) (-2.41) (-0.92) 
 
EdMHead         dropped dropped -.074 -.157* -.277** -.111 -.231** 
     (-1.17) (-1.76) (-2.03) (-0.78) (-2.28) 
 
EdFHead       dropped dropped -.159 -.043 -.522* -.604 -.274 
     (-1.04) (-0.31) (-1.82) (-1.61) (-1.11) 
 
Extr. poor       .148 .117 .147** .159*** .145 .472*** .239*** 
   (1.07) (1.22) (2.54) (2.60) (1.40) (5.26) (2.54) 
 
BJP           . . . .   .104 
         (1.08) 
 
Constant           .289 -.560* -.491*** -.262** -.319 -.324 -1.990*** 
   (0.55) (1.64) (-3.63) (-2.01) (-0.87) (-1.34) (-6.73) 
 
 
Log ps. Likelihood  -8.2e+5 -7.5e+5 -1.7e+6 -1.8 e+6 -8.0 e+5 -1.6 e+6 -1.6 e+6 
 
Wald Test (ρ=0)  280.91 269.60 783.83 950.09 3831.58 501.22 608.30  
(Prob> Chi2)  (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)  
 
Observations  935 1416 4517 4459 1186 2421 2487 
 
ρ 21   .677*** .808*** .467*** .580*** .493*** .517*** .419*** 
   (13.33) (26.59) (14.18) (19.88) (7.17) (10.45) (7.65) 
 
ρ 31   -.382*** -.450*** -.145*** -.241*** -.253*** -.266*** -.051 
   (-6.21) (-8.08) (-3.54) (-6.09) (-3.66) (-4.12) (-0.61) 
 
ρ 32   -.265*** -.405*** -.082** -.132*** -.014 -.049 .042 
   (-4.35) (-6.92) (-2.44) (-4.20) (-0.22) (-0.95) (0.86) 
 
LR test   1.6e+6 1.5e+6 3.5e+6 3.7e+6 1.6e+6 3.4e+6 3.2e+6 
(Prob> Chi2)  (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on MECOVI. In 1999 and 2000 the variables 
EdFhead and EdMhead have been dropped because there are very few educated heads. 
Notes: The number in parenthesis report z-statistics. Estimations performed using the 









             Enrollment 
   1999 2000 2001 2002 2005 2006 2007  
 
Age  -.107*** -.117*** -.065*** -.058*** -.163*** -.082*** -.048*** 
   (-2.36) (-4.24) (-7.98) (-7.85) (-6.15) (-4.95) (-2.60) 
 
Male  .097* .032* .020 .052*** .070** .096*** .012 
   (1.36) (1.29) (0.87) (2.46) (1.39) (2.63) (0.57) 
 
Indigenous  .020 .030 .083*** .062*** .040 .120***  .040* 
   (0.49) (1.13) (3.52) (2.69) (0.76) (2.96) (1.53) 
 
Urban           .159 .093** .164*** .100*** .133* .115*** .045** 
   (1.22) (2.10) (6.13) (4.01) (2.02) (2.90) (1.69) 
 
Spanish         .154 .125** .187*** .145*** .265** .161** .037 
   (0.83) (1.87) (3.98) (3.93) (1.90) (1.97) (0.91) 
 
EdMHead        dropped dropped -.002 .076** .176*** .165*** .045**  
     (-0.63) (2.25) (2.70) (3.30) (1.68) 
 
EdFHead       dropped dropped -.003 .077** .416*** .155** .016 
     (-0.52) (1.69) (2.78) (2.11) (0.31) 
 
Extr. poor      -.011  -.064** -.039* -.044** -.012 .072** -.033 
   (-0.23) (-1.81) (-1.51) (-1.81) (-0.22) (1.73) (-1.36) 
 
BJP           . . . . . . .072** 
         (1.70)  
 
              Attendance 
    1999 2000 2001 2002 2005 2006 2007  
 
Age  -.051* -.066*** -.007** -.005** -.042** -.019*** -.000 
   (-1.56) (-2.96) (-1.74) (-2.13) (-2-25) (-3.39) (-0.42) 
 
Male  .065* .023 -.003 .006 .034 .025 -.020 
   (1.53) (0.76) (-0.17) (0.58)  (1.09) (0.97) (-1.07) 
 
Indigenous       .104** .168*** .117*** .182*** .280*** .194***  .192*** 
   (1.98) (4.59) (5.94) (8.58) (5.16) (7.32) (6.89) 
 
Urban           -.070* .082*** .173*** .192*** .014 -.056** -.048** 
   (-1.43) (2.47) (8.93) (7.70) (0.42) (-2.05) (-2.20) 
 
Spanish         .327* .368*** -.072* .046** .086 .176** .065*  
   (1.48) (4.46) (-1.59) (2.17) (0.79)  (2.21) (1.38) 
 
EdMHead        dropped dropped .005 .062*** .023 .079*** .124*** 
     (0.22) (2.85) (0.66) (2.55) (4.09) 
 
EdFHead       dropped dropped -.037** .076*** .195** .054 .094**  
     (-0.72) (2.32) (1.79) (0.82) (1.74) 
 
Extr. poor      .012 .035 .006 .036*** .046* .144*** .134*** 
   (0.30) (1.13) (0.33) (2.86) (1.38) (5.17) (5.34) 
 
BJP           . . . . . . -.006 







Table 5 (Continued) 
 
 
                Working 
    1999 2000 2001 2002 2005 2006 2007  
 
Age  .044** .085*** .050*** .062*** .056*** .058*** .048*** 
   (1.97) (5.44) (9.51) (13.47) (2.87) (6.97) (5.56) 
 
Male  -.020 .104*** .089*** .100*** .137*** .048* .074*** 
   (-0.47) (2.55) (4.18) (4.59) (3.31) (1.37) (2.47) 
 
Indigenous       .101** .058* .058*** .068*** .170*** .033  .003 
   (1.95) (1.56) (2.72) (3.00) (4.11) (1.06) (.12) 
 
Urban           -.406*** -.202*** -.244*** -.291*** -.275*** -.293*** -.228*** 
   (-6.29) (-3.18) (-7.81) (-9.96) (-3.53) (-5.21) (-4.33) 
 
Spanish         -.299* -.200*** -.116*** -.205*** -.138 -.178** -.048  
   (-1.67) (-2.10) (-2.65) (-5.90) (-1.05) (-1.31) (-.87) 
 
EdMHead        dropped dropped -.026 -.059** -.099** -.041 -.070** 
     (-1.18) (-1.72) (-2.06) (-.79) (-2.26) 
 
EdFHead       dropped dropped -.054 -.016 -.175** -.196** -.081  
     (-1.08) (-0.31) (-1.96) (-1.92) (-1.21) 
 
Extr. poor      .055 .041 .054*** .062*** .056* .186*** .083*** 
   (1.03) (1.24) (2.56) (2.62) (1.41) (5.43) (2.61) 
 
BJP           . . . . . . .035 
         (1.09) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on MECOVI. In 1999 and 2000 the variables 
EdFhead and EdMhead have been dropped because there are very few educated 
heads. 
Notes: The number in parenthesis report z-statistics. Estimations performed using 



















 The objective of this thesis is fourfold. First, it investigates the effectiveness of 
macroeconomic policies in the recoveries periods in the MENAP countries. Second, it 
explores the effects of the MTEF adoption on the main fiscal performance indicators. Third, 
it identifies the nexus between the excess of liquidity and commodity prices; in particular, it 
assesses whether the commodity prices react more powerfully than the consumer goods’ 
prices to changes in real money balances. Finally, it investigates the determinants of primary 
school enrollment, attendance and child labor in Bolivia, with a special attention at 
identifying the substitution and complementary relationships between schooling and working. 
 The analysis carried out in the first chapter suggests that episodes of negative non-oil 
output growth are quite rare in MENAP countries. Also, non-hydrocarbon output growth in 
oil-exporting MENAP countries has on average been higher than output growth in the other 
MENAP countries but also more volatile. The MENAP’s hydrocarbon exporters experienced 
more severe recessions in the 2000s than in the 1990s; this likely reflects the downturn in the 
industrial countries in the aftermath of the bursting of the high-technology stock market 
bubble in the early 2000s and the delayed effect of the low oil prices in 1998-1999. By 
contrast, the other MENAP countries’ slowdowns were milder in the 2000s reflecting 
improvements in their policy frameworks made since the mid-1990s. The other MENAP 
countries’ slowdowns in the 2000s were mostly caused by spillover effects from hydrocarbon 
exporters in the region. The duration of output gap recessions increased for all MENAP 
countries from the 1990s to the 2000s. The duration of recoveries also increased somewhat 
over the two decades. 
Fiscal stimulus is associated with stronger recoveries in both groups of MENAP 
countries; there is also evidence that the impact of fiscal policy is weaker in countries with a 




to have played a significant role in stimulating recoveries; its limited effectiveness is likely to 
be related to the stabilized and pegged exchange rate regimes operated by the countries in the 
sample which limit the scope for independent monetary policy and renders changes in money 
endogenous rather than a variable that policymakers can control. Other main determinants of 
the strength of recoveries are the pre-recovery non-oil trade openness to GDP ratio and the 
public debt to GDP ratio, as well as the growth of real exports. 
The second chapter studies the impact of the MTEF adoption on fiscal performance. 
The data reveal patterns in the timing of MTEF adoption across regions and levels of 
development. The OECD countries were the first to adopt MTEFs, and by the early 1990s 
most countries in this group had an MTPF in place. The bulk of MTEF reforms in Sub-
Saharan African countries took place in the 1990s. Latin American countries adopted MTEFs 
in the 1990s and 2000s, and Eastern Europe and the former soviet republics join the trend in 
the 2000s. Asian countries, however, do not display a clear adoption pattern. MTEF adoption 
is very likely endogenous to internal fiscal conditions, which makes the adequate 
identification of MTEF effects challenging. In this paper, in order to identify MTEFs’ 
impacts the differential patterns of MTEF adoption across regions are exploited. 
Both the event study analysis and the econometric results suggest that MTEF adoption 
strongly improves fiscal discipline and that there is a larger effect with each successive 
MTEF phase. At the same time, although the event study analysis fails to provide a clear 
picture, the econometrics analysis reveals that MTBFs improve allocative efficiency. Finally, 
the MTPF seems to be the only MTEF phase that exerts a significant effect on technical 
efficiency, although the results are not always robust. As for the regulatory and political 
factors, it is found that being a member of the OECD has a favorable effect, however none of 




In the third chapter, it is investigated weather consumer prices and commodity prices 
react to an excess liquidity in the US within a Cointegrated VAR framework, and if the 
different price elasticities of supply for goods and commodities allow for differences in the 
dynamic paths of price adjustment to a liquidity shock. 
The results show a positive relationship between real money and real commodity 
prices and provide empirical evidence for a stronger response of the commodity prices with 
respect to the consumer goods’ prices. This could imply that, if the magnitude of the reaction 
is due the fact that consumer goods’ prices are slower to react, then, their long-run value can 
be predicted with the help of the commodity prices. The results also support the idea that 
monetary policy cannot only focus on the core infaltion and ignore developments in the 
commodity market. In fact, if commodity prices are very high it might be the case that 
monetary policy is loose; therefore they should be taken into account as a useful monetary 
indicator. This conclusion is particularly relevant to those countries that are adopting an 
inflation targeting regime which target is the CPI. 
The last chapter focuses on the determinants of school enrollment, attendance and 
child labor. Results at descriptive level reveal that enrollment became progressively more 
widespread in Bolivia. Nonetheless, the attendance figures are discouraging, as about 40 
percent of the enrolled children did not go to school.  
Triprobit estimations show that the increase in enrollment is led by indigenous and 
children living in urban areas, whereas poverty and indigenous are the main characteristics 
driving the attendance behavior. While school feeding and conditional cash transfers 
programs are likely to have allowed extremely poor children to attend school, at the same 
time these do not seem sufficient to let them forgo child labor. In fact, the proportion of 
working children seems not to be affected by school incentives since extremely poor children 




their leisure time), making those complements. On the contrary, indigenous children made 
them substitutes, increasing schooling and decreasing working. 
Furthermore, the empirical evidence also shows that the implementation of the Bono 
Juancito Pinto (BJP) scholarship in 2006 has a negative effect on attendance in 2007 as 
possibly children tend to enroll to benefit of the first installment but they do not attend school 
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